I have always been enthusiastic in my support for peace negotiations, which have been neglected all too often in internal and international conflicts. But it is clear that the international conference on Syria that held its first meeting in Vienna on October 30 is a sham conference that is not capable of delivering any peace negotiations, and that the Obama administration knew that perfectly well from the start.

Rêvebirî behsa wê yekê dikir ku Îran hatibû vexwendin ji bo beşdariyê di konferansê de, berevajî kombûna berê ya Neteweyên Yekbûyî li ser Sûriyê di Çile û Sibata 2014an de. Wê konferansa bêbext li ser îsrara Amerîka û hevalbendên wê yên Sunnî, Îran ji derve derxistibû. tevî ku çendîn dewlet bê kêmanî şiyana beşdariyê ji bo çareseriyeke aşitiyê - û herwiha Vatîkan - di nav 40 beşdarên ne-sûrî de beşdar bûn.

Iran’s participation in the Vienna conference represents a positive step. Nevertheless, the conference was marked by an even more fundamental absurdity: none of the Syrian parties to the war were invited. The 2014 talks at least had representatives of the Assad regime and some of the armed opposition. The obvious implication of that decision is that the external patrons of the Syrian parties – especially Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia – are expected to move toward the outline of a settlement and then use their clout with the clients to force the acceptance of the deal.

The Vietnam model

The idea of leaping over the Syrian parties to the conflict by having an outside power negotiate a peace agreement on behalf of it clients is perfectly logical in the abstract. The classic case of such an arrangement is the US negotiation of the Paris Agreement with the North Vietnamese in January 1973 to end the US war in Vietnam. The US-backed Thieu regime’s total dependence on US assistance and the weight of the US military in Vietnam ensured Thieu’s forced acceptance of the arrangement.

Lê divê ev jî were zanîn ku bi rêkeftinê şer bi dawî nebû. Rejîma Thieu ne amade bû pabendî agirbestekê yan jî lihevkirineke siyasî be, û şer du salên din berdewam kir berî ku êrîşek mezin a Viyetnamê Bakur ew di sala 1975 de bidawî bike.

Even more important in regard to the applicability of the model to the Syrian War is the stark difference between the US interest in negotiating over the head of its Vietnamese client and the Iranian and Russian interests in regard to the Syrian government. The United States was negotiating to get out of a war of choice that it started, like Iraq, in the mistaken belief that its dominant power guaranteed control of the situation and in which it was forced to end by domestic political pressure. Iran, on the other hand, is fighting a war in Syria that it regards a vital to its security. And Russia’s political and security interests in Syria may be less clear-cut, but it also has no incentive to agree to a settlement that would risk a victory for terrorism in Syria.

Eclipse of the ‘moderate’ opposition

The prospect of delivering the anti-Assad forces in a settlement is even bleaker. If the US-supported opposition forces facing the Syrian regime and its foreign allies had enough power to threaten the regime it might be an objective basis for peace negotiations. The Obama administration has tried to create the impression that the “moderate” forces – meaning those that are willing to work with the United States – are the primary military opposition to the Assad regime. In reality, however, those “moderate” forces have either been absorbed by or have become allied with the jihadists of the al-Nusra Front and its allies.

Ew guhertina dramatîk di cewhera opozîsyona çekdarî ya Esed de cara yekem di Îlona 2013an de xuya bû. neçaverêkirî tevlî bû bi hevalbendên Eniya El-Nusra re li dijî Hevbendiya Niştimanî ya Sûriyê ku di Mijdara 2012an de li Dohayê di bin fişara Amerîka û hevalbendên wê yên kendavê de hatibû avakirin.

Guherîna ber bi serweriya cîhadî ya şerê li dijî rejîma Esed di navbera Mijdara 2014 û Adara 2015an de bileztir bû. Eniya Şoreşgerên Sûriyê û ji Harakat el-Hazm du komên serhildêr ên sereke ku ji CIA an jî ji Siûdî çek distandin, rastî êrîşan hatin û piraniya wan ji aliyê Eniya El Nûsra ve hatin girtin.

That shift has obvious implications for the possibility of a negotiated settlement. At United Nations envoy Lakhdar Brahimi’s Geneva II conference in January 2014, the only opposition groups at the table were those represented by the US-supported Syrian National Coalition, which no one took seriously as representing any military threat to the regime. Missing from the conference were the self-styled Islamic State and the al-Qaeda franchise in Syria, al-Nusra Front and its allies, which did represent such a threat.

Nusra’s hostility to talks

Lê ne Dewleta Islamî û ne jî Îslamîstên ku Eniya Nusrayê serkêşiya wê dike, ji konferanseke aşitiyê re eleqedar nebûn. Serokê leşkerî yê Eniya Îslamî, ku hevalbendeke nêzîk a El Nûsra, Ehrar El-Şam serdest e, daxuyand ku ew ê bifikirin beşdarbûna her leşkerekî serhildêr di danûstandinên aştiyê de wek “xiyanet” e.

Çi ye? Rêveberiya Obama got it wants to see emerge from the Vienna conference is a “road map” for a transition in power. The administration has made it clear, moreover, that it wishes to preserve the institutions of the Syrian state, including the Syrian military structure. But both Islamic State and the al-Qaeda-led coalition are sectarian Sunni extremist organisations who have not hidden their intention to replace the Assad regime with an Islamic state that has no vestiges of the existing state apparatus.

Rejîma Esed diyar e ku tu metneyek tine ye, ji ber vê yekê, amaje bi ti nermbûnekê jî bike li ser daxwaza derketina Esed ji Sûriyê, dema ku ew dizane ku tu îmkana agirbestê û lihevkirinê bi Dewleta Islamî û Eniya el-Nusra re tune ye. Bi heman awayî, ne Rûs û ne jî Îranî ne mimkûn e ku destê Esed di vê mijarê de bi tenê ji bo danûstandinê bi hêmanên herî lawaz di opozisyona çekdar re bikin.

US false narrative on Syria

The Obama administration’s policymakers nevertheless appear determined not to allow unpleasant realities to interfere with its propaganda line on Syria, which is that it is up to Russia and Iran to take care of the problem by somehow wringing concessions from the Assad regime. Secretary of State John Kerry di hevpeyvînekê de bi kanala Kazak TV re pêşniyar kir a few days after the Vienna conference had convened that “the way to end the war is to ask Mr Assad to help with a transition into a new government”. Russia failed to do so, and instead “is there to simply support the Assad regime,” Kerry said, adding that “the opposition will not stop fighting Assad”.

Gûman heye ku Kerry helwesteke wisa bi eşkereyî propaganda bike ji bo rastiyên siyasî-leşkerî yên Sûriyê yên pir dijwartir. Lê ji aliyê siyasî ve ne rehet e ku meriv wan rastiyan qebûl bike. Ev dê pirsên nexwestî der barê biryara rêveberiyê ya sala 2011-an de vebigire ku siyaseta xwe bi hovên Sûriyê re li Riyad, Doha û Stenbolê ku ew qas li ser guhertina rejîmê li Sûriyê bûn, ku ew ne tenê xemsar bûn li hember avakirina cîhadî li Sûriyê, lê ew wek alaveke bikêrhatî ji bo xilasbûna Esed.

Niha bihayê stratejiya siyasî-dîplomatîk a çarenûsî ya Obama konferanseke aştiyê ya sexte ye ku tevahiya cîhanê dixapîne derbarê nebûna çareseriyeke realîst ji şer re.

- Gareth Porter Rojnamevanekî serbixwe yê lêkolîner e û xwediyê Xelata Gellhorn a 2012 ya rojnamevaniyê ye. Ew nivîskarê Krîza Çêkirî ya ku nû hatiye weşandin: Çîroka Untold of The Iran Nuclear Scare e.