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The Damage Done to U.S. Bases in the War on Iran:

Documenting Attacks, Assessing Damage, and Estimating Financial Losses

By Mohammed M. A. Abunahel and David Swanson

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RESEARCH REPORT

The Damage Done to U.S. Bases in the War on Iran:

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By **Mohammed M. A. Abunahel** and **David Swanson**

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Executive Summary

The 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran has exposed the extensive geographical reach and vulnerability of U.S. military installations and associated infrastructure across Western Asia. According to U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio the United States attacked Iran because Israel was planning to attack Iran, which was understood as likely to produce Iranian attacks on U.S. bases. Through the course of the war, the U.S. government has used the bases it has maintained thousands of miles away from the United States to describe its attacks on Iran as "defensive." Prior to the build-up to war, over 50,000 U.S. troops occupied dozens of bases in some of the world's most brutal dictatorships — dictatorships propped up in part by these bases. To the west of Iran, only Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine lacked U.S. bases, while bases could be found in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Cyprus, and Egypt.

This report documents the damage done by Iranian attacks on 10 of those 13 countries, attacks on both U.S. bases and on non-U.S. buildings and people in Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Oman, Cyprus, and Israel. The estimated cost of replacing U.S. military property either completely destroyed or severely damaged by Iranian attacks, according to the calculations below, is $19.94 billion. When we read cost estimates for the U.S. role in the war of $43.6 billion, we can therefore correct that to an estimated $63.5 billion — not counting economic impacts or lost opportunity costs. When the U.S. Congress takes up legislation to authorize more military spending, the question must be carefully addressed: how much funding will go to rebuilding bases that make wars more likely and which have a high probability of being destroyed again, and is it fair to the host nations to impose bases that not only support unpopular rulers but also turn the surrounding areas into targets.

This report should have long since been produced by the U.S. government. Independent researchers should not have to make estimates based on news reports and what scraps of information the U.S. government sees fit to make public. Secrecy, like an archipelago of foreign bases, is one factor contributing to the initiation of wars. This report is offered in hopes of shining what light it can into the darkness of U.S. war policy. Piecing together the costs to U.S. government property is not meant to distract from the massive human and property costs that this war has inflicted on the people of Iran.

The assessment below documents roughly 609 attacks — actually "incident records" — by the Iranian military between February and September 2026. The largest numbers of incident records were documented in Iraq (122), Kuwait (103), and the United Arab Emirates (95), followed by Bahrain (71), Israel (70), Saudi Arabia (54), Jordan (52), Qatar (28), Oman (12), and Cyprus (2). These figures represent documented incident entries rather than an equivalent number of independently verified attacks. Some records concern interceptions, unconfirmed military claims, or multiple reports that may describe the same incident.

Among the most frequently documented locations were Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base in Jordan, Shaikh Isa Air Base in Bahrain, and Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. Satellite imagery, official statements, and independent reporting established physical damage at several installations. At other locations, reported attacks and damage remained unverified or could not be attributed to specific facilities. The assessment identifies aircraft hangars, radar installations, air-defence systems, fuel storage facilities, command and control infrastructure, accommodation buildings, and logistical facilities among the assets reported as affected.

The damage done to U.S. military property in individual countries is estimated at $4.24 billion in Kuwait, $3.22 billion in Bahrain, $2.15 billion in Jordan, $1.80 billion in the United Arab Emirates, $1.32 billion in Iraq, $1.17 billion in Qatar, $472.48 million for Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia and $116.65 million for selected facilities in Oman. To all of this we need to add the cost of 88 U.S. military aircraft across 23 incident records, including aircraft destroyed, lost, damaged, or reportedly affected during the conflict: $5.45 billion.

These cost estimates are based on the "illustrative" value of the facilities and equipment damaged or destroyed, which is to say the full cost of replacement, whether or not each item's complete destruction can be confirmed. It is not possible to quantify the degree of damage in many cases, and full replacement has often been the U.S. military's preference. It is also impossible to be certain all duplications have been eliminated. The financial benchmarks were drawn from publicly available procurement records, military construction projects, and comparable infrastructure costs. They are expressed in U.S. dollars but originate from various reference years and have not been systematically adjusted to a common 2026 price level. The assessment is also subject to limitations arising from incomplete reporting, uncertain asset specifications, and unverified military claims. In what follows, all sources are identified along with degrees of confidence in their reporting.

While this report limits financial cost calculations to U.S. military facilities and equipment, it also includes significant reporting on damage to residential buildings, hotels, airports, ports, oil and gas infrastructure, electricity and water facilities, industrial installations, and telecommunications networks. The assessments document civilian casualties, damage to residential and commercial properties, and disruption to essential services in several countries. Particularly significant incidents involved energy and industrial facilities in the Gulf, residential areas in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, and populated areas in Israel.

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1. Introduction

The extensive presence of U.S. military bases across the Middle East reflects decades of overseas military expansion and investment in foreign military infrastructure. These installations occupy significant areas of land and involve substantial expenditure on buildings, aircraft, weapons systems, and supporting facilities. Their geographical distribution also raises questions about the financial costs, political implications, and wider consequences of maintaining foreign military forces across multiple countries.

The 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran brought these questions into sharper focus. As the conflict expanded, U.S. military installations in several countries were subjected to Iranian missile and drone attacks. The presence of these facilities across the region meant that countries beyond the principal parties to the war were exposed to military confrontation. Reported attacks also affected civilian and commercial infrastructure, demonstrating how the consequences of armed conflict can extend beyond military targets and national borders.

Despite the considerable financial resources invested in overseas military infrastructure, publicly available information about the damage sustained during military conflicts remains incomplete. Official statements frequently provide limited details about affected facilities, while reports from opposing military authorities may contain claims that cannot be independently verified. Satellite imagery and independent investigations can provide additional evidence, but identifying the precise equipment, extent of damage, and associated financial costs remains challenging.

These limitations complicate efforts to establish the scale of military losses. A reported strike does not necessarily confirm the destruction of its intended target, and damage to a facility does not automatically mean that its full replacement value has been lost. Repeated attacks on the same installation can also create overlapping reports and potentially duplicated financial estimates. A systematic examination of available evidence is therefore necessary to distinguish documented damage from unverified claims and hypothetical replacement costs.

Against this background, this report has two primary objectives. The first is to identify and document Iranian attacks on U.S. military bases and associated facilities during the 2026 war, including their dates, locations, targeted infrastructure, and available evidence of physical damage. The second is to identify the military assets associated with these attacks and estimate their financial replacement values using publicly available procurement and construction benchmarks.

To achieve these objectives, the report examines official statements, independent news reporting, satellite imagery, and open-source investigations. It distinguishes between verified physical damage, reported attacks, and claims that remain independently unconfirmed. Financial estimates are calculated using a scenario-based full replacement cost method, providing illustrative values rather than confirmed financial losses or actual repair expenditures.

The report also documents incidents affecting civilian and commercial facilities to reflect the broader geographical consequences of the conflict. Particular attention is given to the relationship between military installations and surrounding infrastructure, including airports, ports, energy facilities, residential areas, and communication networks.

By bringing together incident documentation and financial assessment, this report seeks to provide a clearer understanding of the material costs associated with overseas military infrastructure and its exposure to armed conflict. It also contributes to wider public scrutiny of military expenditure, the consequences of foreign military deployments, and the extent to which their costs extend beyond military facilities themselves.

2. Methodology

This section outlines the methods used to document reported attacks, verify available evidence, and estimate the replacement value of affected military assets. It explains the sources used, the classification of evidence, and the approach to calculating estimated costs. It also addresses potential duplication and the limitations of the financial assessment.

2.1. Research Approach

This report examines reported attacks on U.S. military bases, equipment, and related infrastructure during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. It also documents attacks affecting civilian and commercial facilities.

The financial assessment uses a scenario-based full replacement cost method, estimating the cost of replacing identified assets under a Total Destruction Scenario, regardless of whether the reported damage was complete, partial, or unverified.

The term **"Illustrative Total"** indicates that these estimates represent hypothetical full replacement costs of the assessed assets, rather than confirmed financial losses or actual repair costs.

2.2. Data Collection and Verification

Information was collected from official government and military statements, international and regional news reports, satellite imagery, photographs, and open-source investigations, including sources in English, Arabic, and Persian.

Each incident was examined to identify the attack date, location, targeted facilities, and available evidence. The report distinguishes between confirmed physical damage and attacks reported or claimed without independent verification.

Confidence levels were assigned according to the available evidence:

- **High:** Strong evidence supports the reported incident and its main details.
- **Medium:** Supporting evidence exists, but important details remain uncertain.
- **Low:** The incident relies mainly on claims or reporting without independent confirmation.

Reports describing the same identifiable attack were consolidated where possible. Separate attacks on the same facility were retained when supported by distinct dates or evidence.

Confirmation that an attack occurred does not necessarily establish that physical damage was sustained. The report therefore distinguishes between evidence of an attack and evidence of damage to specific facilities.

2.3. Replacement Cost Estimation

Replacement costs were estimated using publicly available financial benchmarks, primarily from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), government procurement records, and comparable construction projects.

The valuation method depended on the asset type. Aircraft, radar systems, and military equipment were assessed using procurement or reference unit values, while buildings, hangars, warehouses, fuel tanks, and other infrastructure were assessed using comparable construction or replacement costs.

Where exact specifications or quantities were unavailable, estimates were based on stated assumptions and the closest available financial benchmarks.

All financial estimates are expressed in U.S. dollars (USD) and are based on publicly available reference costs from different years. These values have not been systematically adjusted to 2026 prices. Differences in reference years, asset specifications, and procurement conditions should therefore be considered when comparing the estimates.

2.4. Cost Calculations and Double Counting

For each assessed asset, the report establishes minimum and maximum replacement-cost estimates where suitable benchmarks are available. The average estimated cost is calculated as follows:

$$\textbf{Estimated Cost} = \frac{\textbf{Minimum Replacement Cost} + \textbf{Maximum Replacement Cost}}{\mathbf{2}}$$

For multiple identical assets, the unit replacement value is multiplied by the estimated quantity.

To reduce double counting, repeated attacks on the same facility are recorded separately, but the same asset is not assigned multiple replacement values unless distinct additional losses can be established. Equipment included within a complete system is not valued again separately, and aircraft are assessed separately from base infrastructure.

The average estimated cost represents the midpoint between the minimum and maximum replacement values, rather than an estimate of actual financial losses. Where potential duplication cannot be resolved, the resulting uncertainty is identified and considered when interpreting the combined estimates.

Replacement values are also estimated for identifiable assets reported as targets, even when physical damage has not been independently confirmed. These figures represent hypothetical replacement values and must not be interpreted as evidence that the assets were damaged or destroyed.

2.5. Limitations

The assessment is limited by incomplete damage reporting, uncertain asset specifications, differences between financial benchmarks, and potential duplication across incidents.

Some estimates rely on reported targets rather than independently verified physical damage. Procurement and construction benchmarks may also reflect different years, locations, and contract specifications.

Consequently, the lower, upper, and average estimates represent illustrative full replacement values under the selected assumptions, rather than verified monetary losses. Civilian infrastructure costs are distinguished from U.S. military losses, and the estimates do not capture the wider human and economic consequences of the war.

The combined financial estimates may include both verified damaged assets and assets identified only in reported attacks. Accordingly, the totals should be interpreted as illustrative replacement-value scenarios rather than confirmed financial losses.

3. Bahrain

The presence of U.S. military bases in Bahrain illustrates how foreign military installations can expose host countries and their populations to the consequences of wars in which they become involved. During the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, Bahrain became one of the countries affected by Iranian attacks on U.S. military facilities and other infrastructure. What began as a military confrontation extended beyond the countries directly conducting the war, bringing destruction, economic disruption, and threats to civilian lives across the Gulf. Bahrain's experience raises broader questions about the consequences of hosting foreign military forces and the risks that military installations can create for surrounding communities.

Iranian attacks targeted several U.S. military installations in Bahrain, including Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, Shaikh Isa Air Base, Riffa Air Base, Al-Sakhir Air Base, and facilities associated with Salman Port. Reported damage involved military headquarters, satellite communications systems, radar installations, aircraft hangars, fuel storage facilities, warehouses, and other infrastructure. At NSA Bahrain, *The Wall Street Journal* documented extensive damage, including to the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters, which a U.S. official described as no longer usable. While some damage was independently documented through satellite imagery and investigative reporting, other attacks were reported by Iranian military sources without independent confirmation of their consequences.

The destruction and disruption were not limited to military installations. Oil and fuel facilities, industrial plants, data centres, residential towers, hotels, and essential civilian infrastructure were also affected. Facilities operated by Bahrain Petroleum Company, Aluminium Bahrain, Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company, Amazon Web Services, and Batelco appeared among the reported targets or affected locations. Residential buildings sustained damage, and civilians were killed or injured.

These incidents demonstrate that the costs of war cannot be measured solely through destroyed military equipment or damaged buildings. They also include the risks imposed on civilians, disruptions to essential services, and economic consequences borne by communities and businesses far beyond the battlefield.

Bahrain's experience highlights a central contradiction of foreign military basing: installations established for military purposes can also become targets that increase the exposure of nearby civilian populations and infrastructure to armed conflict. The presence of these facilities does not mean that the people living around them have chosen to participate in the wars conducted by foreign powers. Nor can the resulting civilian harm be justified simply by the military significance attributed to nearby installations. The attacks on Bahrain therefore raise questions not only about the financial cost of military infrastructure, but also about the wider human consequences of militarisation and the expansion of war across national borders.

This section documents the reported attacks and damage in Bahrain, distinguishing independently verified incidents from Iranian military claims and reports with uncertain outcomes. It also estimates the potential replacement costs of selected military facilities using available construction and procurement benchmarks, while avoiding double counting and distinguishing hypothetical replacement values from confirmed losses. The purpose is not merely to calculate the cost of damaged U.S. military assets, but to examine how the war and the presence of foreign military infrastructure exposed Bahrain to destruction, civilian harm, and economic losses that could extend well beyond the military installations themselves.

3.1. Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain

Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain was among the U.S. military installations damaged during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The base consists of three main areas: the waterfront, the main base, and a leased warehouse complex. All three sustained damage, including the Fifth Fleet headquarters, training buildings, warehouses, accommodation facilities, and communications infrastructure. *The Wall Street Journal* reported that the headquarters building was no longer usable.

Table 1: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage to U.S. Naval Support Activity Bahrain, February–July 2026.

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1.	February - March 2026	1. AN/GSC-52B SATCOM Terminals one and Two (1&2)	*The New York Times* reported destruction, supported by independently verified video footage and satellite imagery [1].	High	Satellite imagery
2.	April 2026	1. U.S. Personnel Gathering Site Outside the Fifth Fleet Perimeter	IRGC-reported attack; location and damage not independently verified [2].	Low	Iranian Claim
3.	May 2026	1. Satellite Communications Dish	It is not clear if it is the same as AN/GSC-52B SATCOM Terminals [3].	High	Reported by The Washington Post
4.	June 2026	1. U.S. Fifth Fleet Headquarters	*The Wall Street Journal* confirmed structural damage. A U.S. official stated that the building was unusable [4].	High	WSJ by Satellite Imagery
5.	June 11, 2026	1. Patriot Systems 2. Communications Facilities	Iranian military-reported attack; damage not independently verified [5].	Low	Iranian Claim
6.	June 28, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	IRGC-reported regional strikes; specific base damage unverified [6].	Low	Iranian Claim
7.	July 9, 2026	1. U.S. Military Fuel Storage	Iranian Army-reported attack; location and damage unverified [7].	Low	Iranian Claim
8.	July 14, 2026	1. Patriot Radar 2. Air-Control Radar 3. C-RAM Early-Warning Radar 4. Fuel Depots 5. Unmanned Boat Control Center	IRGC-reported destruction; specific losses not independently verified [8].	Low	Iranian Claim
9.	July 15, 2026	1. NSI Management Center		Low	Iranian Claim

		2. Command and Control Center 3. Military Equipment Warehouses	IRGC-reported attack; damage unverified and potential overlap [9].		
10.	July 24, 2026	1. Military Watchtower	IRGC-reported strike; damage not independently verified [10].	Low	Iranian Claim
11.	July 2026	1. Warehouses 2. Radar Site 3. Communications Systems	Damage attributed to *The New York Times* [11]; damage unverified	Medium	Reported by *The New York Times*
12.	February–June 2026	1. Training Building 2. Emergency Management Warehouse 3. Potable Water Tank 4. Adjacent Waterfront Warehouse 5. Main Galley 6. Barracks 7. Banz Group Warehouse Complex (Three Sections) 8. Three Additional Warehouses 9. Communications Management Facility 11. Satellite Communications Tower	WSJ identified the building as destroyed or damaged. Satellite imagery supported the assessment.	High	Satellite Imagery

Table 1 documents reported Iranian attacks and damage at U.S. Naval Support Activity Bahrain between February and July 2026. The reported targets included satellite communications terminals, the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters, command and control facilities, radar systems, fuel storage, warehouses, and other military infrastructure. The evidence varies considerably between incidents. Some damage was documented through satellite imagery and independent reporting, while several attacks in April, June, and July were reported by Iranian military sources without independent confirmation of the specific facilities affected.

The earliest documented damage occurred during February–March 2026, when satellite imagery and independently verified video footage showed destruction affecting buildings and satellite communications infrastructure. *The New York Times* reported damage involving two AN/GSC-52B satellite communications terminals. These facilities formed part of the communications infrastructure associated with the naval installation. A separate report

published by The Washington Post in May described damage to a satellite communications dish. However, it remains unclear whether this was an additional damaged asset or another description of the communications equipment affected during the earlier strikes.

Damage to the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters was also documented. *The Wall Street Journal* reported structural damage to the headquarters building, citing a U.S. official who stated that it was no longer usable. Its investigation also identified damage across other parts of the naval installation, including a training building, an emergency management warehouse, a potable water tank, waterfront storage facilities, barracks, and several additional warehouses. These findings indicate that the damage extended beyond communications equipment to administrative, logistical, and support infrastructure.

The before-and-after satellite imagery provides further evidence of the physical destruction (Image 1). The February 28 image shows several large buildings and surrounding structures before the strikes, while the March 1 image reveals extensive damage to a large rectangular building and two smaller structures nearby. The affected areas are marked with white boxes, making the changes between the two dates easier to identify. The large building shows substantial roof damage and darkened areas consistent with severe structural damage. The image confirms that several structures were affected during the opening phase of the war, although it does not establish the exact function of every damaged building. *The Wall Street Journal* separately identified extensive damage to the Banz Group warehouse complex, but the correspondence between that complex and the buildings marked in this particular image requires further confirmation.



Image 1: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing extensive damage to buildings and warehouse facilities in Manama, Bahrain, following Iranian strikes on 28 February 2026. Two nearby AN/GSC-52B satellite communications terminals are also identified. Source: Planet Labs and Airbus satellite imagery, published by The New York Times.

Further attacks were reported during the following months. In April, the IRGC reported targeting a U.S. personnel gathering site outside the Fifth Fleet perimeter, although the location and resulting damage were not independently verified. On June 11, Iranian military sources reported attacks on Patriot systems and communications facilities. Another report on June 28 referred to regional strikes without establishing specific damage at the naval installation. These incidents remain in the table as reported attacks rather than confirmed physical losses.

The number of reported targets increased during July. On July 9, the Iranian Army reported an attack on U.S. military fuel storage. On July 14, the IRGC reported strikes against Patriot radar, air-control radar, C-RAM early-warning radar, fuel depots, and an unmanned boat control centre. The following day, Iranian sources identified an NSI management centre, a command and control centre, and military equipment warehouses as targets. Another report on July 24 referred to a military watchtower.

An important limitation is the possibility of overlapping records. The AN/GSC-52B terminals and the satellite communications dish may refer to the same damaged equipment. Similarly, the command and control facilities, communications systems, radar installations, and warehouses reported on different dates may overlap with structures already identified in satellite imagery or earlier investigations. The February–June entry based on *The Wall*

Street Journal also covers several buildings that may appear in other rows. As a result, the table should not be interpreted as a count of separate destroyed facilities. The evidence supports substantial physical damage to parts of the naval installation, but the full number of distinct damaged assets and the extent of additional losses reported during later months remain uncertain.

3.1.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain

This section presents an illustrative assessment of the replacement costs of military facilities and infrastructure reported to have been targeted or damaged at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain during the 2026 war with Iran. The assessment combines cost estimates reported by *The Wall Street Journal* with reference values derived from U.S. military procurement contracts, military construction budgets, and indicative market estimates. Where available, lower and upper replacement-cost benchmarks are presented alongside their average values. The estimates represent potential replacement costs rather than independently verified financial losses, as the extent of physical damage and the specifications of several facilities remain uncertain.

Table 2: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Fifth Fleet Headquarters	—	—	$200.00M	The cost estimations are based on an investigation conducted by *The Wall Street Journal* [4].
2.	Naval Security Forces Training Building	—	—	$1.00M	
3.	Emergency Management Warehouse	—	—	$14.00M	
4.	Potable Water Tank and Adjacent Warehouse	—	—	$41.00M	
5.	Main Galley and Barracks	—	—	$24.00M	
6.	Banz Group Warehouse Complex (Three Sections)	—	—	$34.00M	
7.	Three Additional Warehouses	—	—	$75.00M	
8.	Two AN/GSC-52B Satellite	—	—	$40.00M	

	Communications Terminals				
9.	Fuel Storage / Fuel Depots	$6.00M	$24.00M	$15.00M	Based on DLA FY2022 fuel infrastructure projects: $6M at Misawa Air Base and $24M at Kadena Air Base. Values are indicative construction benchmarks, excluding fuel inventory and unverified equipment losses [12].
10.	Gathering Site[1]	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
11.	Satellite Communications Dish[2]	—	—	$40.00M	As estimated by *The Wall Street Journal*
12.	Patriot Systems[3]	—	—	$1,100.00M	Estimated $1.1 billion replacement cost for a complete newly produced Patriot battery. Includes radar, launchers, control and support components. Not applicable to radar-only damage [15].
13.	Patriot Radar	$110.00M	$130.00M	$120.00M	Estimated unit cost of $110M–$115M for legacy AN/MPQ-65 radars and $125M–$130M for next-generation LTAMDS radars. The range excludes launchers, interceptors and other battery components [16].
14.	Air-Control Radar	$12.37M	$15.00M	$13.69M	Based on U.S. Navy AN/SPN-50 radar procurement contracts averaging $12.37M–$15M per unit, including associated support in some contracts [17-19].
15.	C-RAM Early-Warning Radar	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support). [20]
16.	Boat Control Center	—	—	—	The identities, physical configurations, and replacement costs of the Boat Control Center and NSI Management Center at NSA Bahrain could not be independently verified. Therefore, no monetary valuation was assigned.
17.	NSI Management Center[4]	—	—	—	
18.	Command and Control Center[5]	$32.18M	$38.72M	$35.45M	Based on the U.S. Navy FY2026 Bahrain Tactical Operations Center estimate ($32.18M), including an additional $6.54M for secure compartmented facilities [21].
19.	Military Equipment Warehouses[6]	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].

20.	Military Watchtower	$0.03M	$0.25M	$0.14M	Indicative market-based estimate for a prefabricated military observation tower, reflecting standard and reinforced configurations.
21.	Communications Systems[7]	$1.00M	$10.00M	$5.50M	Provisional allowance for a limited military communications installation. U.S. Navy procurement contracts demonstrate relevant satellite communications equipment and integration costs but do not establish a standalone system price
	Illustrative Total	**$558.51 M**	**$602.97M**	**$580.75M**	

Note: The illustrative total includes rows 1–9, 13–15, and 20. All other entries are excluded because of potential overlap with previously valued facilities or insufficient information to establish a reliable replacement cost. Superscript numbers (1–7) identify entries with potential duplication, as explained in the second paragraph below the table.

Table 2 presents the estimated replacement costs of military facilities and infrastructure at Naval Support Activity Bahrain. All values are expressed in millions of U.S. dollars (USD). The illustrative total ranges from $558.51 million to $602.97 million, with an average estimate of $580.75 million. The calculation includes the eight facilities valued using *The Wall Street Journal* estimates, together with fuel storage facilities, the Patriot radar, air-control radar, C-RAM early-warning radar, and military watchtower. Where only a single cost estimate was available, that value was applied consistently to the lower, upper, and average totals.

To minimise potential double counting, seven entries marked with superscript numbers (1–7) were excluded from the aggregate calculation pending further verification. The gathering site (1) may refer to facilities within the barracks, while the satellite communications dish (2) may be one of the two AN/GSC-52B terminals already valued. The complete Patriot battery (3) includes its radar, which is separately listed in the table. The NSI Management Center (4) may form part of existing headquarters or command facilities, while the Command and Control Center (5) may already be included in the Fifth Fleet Headquarters valuation. Similarly, the military equipment warehouses (6) may overlap with previously identified warehouses, and the general category of communications systems (7) may include communications assets already counted. These entries remain in the table to document the reported targets without assuming that each represents an additional damaged facility.

The Boat Control Center was also excluded because no reliable standalone replacement-cost estimate could be established. The estimates exclude unverified equipment inventories, stored supplies, and other losses not explicitly covered by the cited benchmarks. Furthermore, some reported damage may concern repeated attacks on the same infrastructure rather than separate losses. The aggregate figures should therefore be interpreted as illustrative replacement-cost estimates for selected facilities, rather than confirmed financial losses or a comprehensive assessment of all damage at NSA Bahrain.

3.2. Salman Port

Salman Port, also known as Mina Salman, is a major port in Manama, Bahrain. It includes commercial port facilities and areas used for naval activities. The port is located near Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain and has been identified in reports of Iranian attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran.

Table 3: Reported Iranian Attacks on Salman Port and Associated Military Facilities

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
13.	March 1, 2026	1. Port Infrastructure	An Iranian strike targeted Mina Salman port in Bahrain causing a fire.	High	Official confirmation
14.	March 11, 2026	LEADS System	Iranian-reported attack; damage not independently verified [24].	Low	Iranian Claim
15.	July 20, 2026	1. TF59 Vessel Preparation Hangars	IRGC-reported attack; damage not independently verified [25].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 3 presents three reported attacks involving Salman Port and associated military facilities. On March 1, 2026, an Iranian strike caused a fire at the port, as confirmed by Bahrain's Ministry of Interior. On March 11, Iranian sources reported an attack targeting a LEADS system, but no independent evidence of damage was available. On July 20, the IRGC reported targeting facilities used to prepare Task Force 59 (TF59) vessels, although the reported damage was not independently verified. The available evidence confirms the March 1 incident but does not establish the extent of damage from the later attacks. The exact locations of some reported targets also remain unclear, particularly their relationship to nearby U.S. naval facilities.

3.2.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Salman Port

The available reports identify attacks on port infrastructure, the LEADS system, and TF59 vessel preparation hangars at Salman Port. However, the precise facilities affected, their specifications, and the extent of physical damage have not been sufficiently established to support reliable replacement-cost estimates. In addition, some of the reported targets may overlap with facilities already assessed under Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain. Therefore, no separate monetary valuation has been assigned to Salman Port at this stage to avoid potential double counting.

3.3. Sheikh Isa Air Base

Shaikh Isa Air Base is a military airfield in southern Bahrain used by the Bahrain Defence Force and U.S. military forces. The base includes aircraft hangars, maintenance facilities, radar and air defence systems, fuel storage areas, and other support infrastructure. During the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, the base was repeatedly identified as a target of Iranian attacks, with reports of damage to several facilities.

Table 4: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage to Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
16.	March 3, 2026	1. Fuel Storage Tanks	IRGC-reported the strike; damage not independently verified [26]	High	Iranian Claim
17.	March 3, 2026	2. Main Command Headquarters	IRGC-reported destruction; damage not independently verified [27].	Low	Iranian Claim
18.	March 14, 2026	1. Early Warning Radars 2. Aircraft Hangars 3. Central Aircraft Ramp 4. Fuel Storage Tanks	IRGC-reported strikes; specific losses not independently verified [28].	Medium to High	Iranian Claim
19.	March 27, 2026	1. P-8 Aircraft Hangars 2. Radar Maintenance Hangar 3. Drone Hangar 4. Ammunition and Equipment Depot	Structural damage documented in satellite imagery; individual equipment losses unverified [29].	High	Iranian Claim
20.	May 7, 2026	1. Patriot Missile Defense Equipment	Patriot equipment damage verified through satellite imagery reviewed by The Washington Post [3].	High	Iranian Claim
21.	June 10, 2026	1. Strategic U.S. Radar Site	Iranian-reported drone strike; damage not independently verified [30].	High	Iranian Claim
22.	June 11, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iranian-reported destruction; separate attack not established [31].	Low	Iranian Claim
23.	July 8, 2026	1. U.S. Personnel Gathering Centers	Iranian Army-reported attack; damage not independently verified [32].	Low	Iranian Claim
24.	July 13, 2026	1. Helicopter Maintenance Facilities 2. P-8 Aircraft Hangar 3. Drone Command and Control Center	IRGC-reported strikes; damage not independently verified [33].	Medium to High	Iranian Claim
25.	July 14, 2026	1. Weapons and Spare-Parts Storage Sheds for Ships and Aircraft	IRGC-reported destruction; damage not independently verified [34].	Low	Iranian Claim

26.	July 16, 2026	1. C-RAM Early Warning Radar 2. US Troop Assembly Point	IRGC-reported attack; damage not independently verified [35].	Low	Iranian Claim
27.	July 18, 2026	1. U.S. Combat Aircraft Assembly Area	Iranian-reported attack; aircraft losses not independently verified [36].	Low	Iranian Claim
28.	July 21, 2026	1. Personnel Accommodation Facilities	Reported attack; damage not independently verified [37].	Low	Iranian Claim
29.	July 22, 2026	1. Equipment Warehouses 2. Repair Workshops 3. Aircraft Maintenance	Iranian Army-reported attack; damage not independently verified [38].	Low	Iranian Claim
30.	July 24, 2026	1. Fuel Storage Tanks 2. Military Equipment Warehouses 3. Storage Silos 4. U.S. Military Barracks	Reported attack; damage not independently verified [10].	Medium	Iranian Claim
31.	July 30, 2026	1. Power Generators 2. Navigation Systems 3. Administrative and Support Buildings	Iranian Army reported striking these facilities during the 26th phase of Operation Thunder. No independent confirmation of damage was available [39].	Low	Iranian Claim
32.	September 2, 2026	1. Radar Installations 2. Gathering Centers	Iranian Army-reported attack; damage not independently verified [40]	Medium	Iranian Claim

Table 4 presents the reported Iranian attacks on Shaikh Isa Air Base between March and September 2026, during the U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The reported targets included aircraft hangars, radar systems, fuel storage tanks, command facilities, maintenance workshops, warehouses, and personnel accommodation. Some damage was supported by satellite imagery, while many other attacks were reported by Iranian military sources without independent confirmation.

Aircraft hangars were reported as targets on March 14, March 27, and July 13, 2026. The aircraft hangars and P-8 aircraft hangars mentioned in these reports may refer to the same buildings, targeted on different dates. Image 2 shows visible damage to the roof of a hangar, but it is not clear whether this is an aircraft hangar, a P-8 aircraft hangar, or the radar maintenance hangar reported on March 27. The central aircraft ramp reported on March 14 and the combat aircraft assembly area reported on July 18 may also refer to the same location or separate areas. Available evidence does not establish their exact locations.



Image 2: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing visible damage to the roof of an aircraft hangar at Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain, following an Iranian strike. Source: Iranian media.

Radar facilities were reported as targets on March 14, June 10, July 16, and September 2, 2026. It is not publicly clear how many radar installations were present at the base or whether these reports refer to the same equipment. Image 3 shows visible changes at a site identified by Iranian media as a Patriot radar installation. The Washington Post separately reported damage to Patriot missile defence equipment on May 7, supported by satellite imagery. However, the available information does not establish whether Image 4 shows the same equipment or when the visible changes occurred.



Image 3: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing visible changes at a U.S. Patriot radar installation at Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain, following an Iranian strike. Source: Iranian media.

Fuel storage tanks were reported as targets on March 3, March 14, and July 24, 2026. These reports describe attacks on three different dates and should not be treated as duplicate attack reports, even if the same facilities were targeted more than once. Image 4 shows extensive damage to a facility identified by Iranian media as a fuel storage site, but the image does not establish which attack caused the damage.



Image 4: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing extensive damage to fuel storage facilities at Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain, following an Iranian strike. Source: Iranian media.

Several reports also identified command and administrative facilities as targets. These included the main command headquarters on March 3, the drone command and control centre on July 13, and administrative and support buildings on July 30. These may be separate facilities or different descriptions of the same building.

Similarly, the ammunition and equipment depot reported on March 27, weapons and spare-parts storage sheds on July 14, and equipment warehouses reported on July 22 and 24 may refer to the same facilities or different buildings targeted on separate dates.

Image 5 shows extensive fire damage to the roof of a building identified by Iranian media as a military equipment warehouse. However, the available imagery does not establish which reported attack caused the damage or whether the building is among the facilities mentioned in these reports.



Image 5: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing extensive fire and structural damage to a military equipment warehouse at Shaikh Isa Air Base, Bahrain, following an Iranian strike. Source: Iranian media.

Other possible overlaps involve helicopter maintenance facilities reported on July 13 and aircraft maintenance facilities and repair workshops reported on July 22. The U.S. troop assembly point reported on July 16, personnel accommodation facilities on July 21, and gathering centres on September 2 may also refer to related or separate locations. The military barracks reported on July 24 may overlap with the personnel accommodation facilities. In each case, the reported attack dates differ, but the exact facilities have not been independently identified.

Overall, the reports indicate repeated Iranian targeting of similar types of facilities at Shaikh Isa Air Base. However, limited satellite imagery, unclear facility locations, and the lack of independent verification for many attacks make it difficult to determine how many separate buildings and systems were affected. The possible overlaps concern the identity of the targeted facilities, not necessarily the occurrence of separate attacks on different dates.

3.3.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Sheikh Isa Air Base

The estimated replacement costs of military facilities at Shaikh Isa Air Base are presented in Table 5. The estimates are based on U.S. military construction projects, procurement contracts, and comparable facilities. Similar facilities have been grouped where their exact locations or identities remain unclear. The values represent illustrative replacement costs rather than confirmed financial losses, as the available evidence does not establish the full extent of damage to each facility.

Table 5: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Sheikh Isa Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Fuel Storage Tanks	$6.00M	$24.00M	$15.00M	Based on DLA FY2022 fuel infrastructure projects: $6M at Misawa Air Base and $24M at Kadena Air Base. Values are indicative construction benchmarks, excluding fuel inventory and unverified equipment losses [12].
2.	Main Command Headquarters	$200.00M	$200.00M	$200.00M	This estimation is based roughly on the estimation of Fifth Fleet Headquarters as determined by *The Wall Street Journal* [4].
3.	Early Warning Radars; C-RAM Early Warning Radar; Radar Site; Radar Installations	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support). [20]
4.	US Troop Assembly Point; Personnel Accommodation Facilities; Personnel Gathering Centers; Gathering Centers	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
5.	Drone Hangar	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	Based on a U.S. Army drone hangar project at Fort Carson, estimated at $15–20 million, including maintenance and supporting facilities [41]

6.	Aircraft Hangars; P-8 Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	Based on U.S. military aircraft hangar construction benchmarks. Aircraft hangars and P-8 hangars are treated as a single category to avoid potential double counting [42].
7.	Radar Maintenance Hangar	$5.00M	$10.00M	$7.50M	Based on a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers radar operations and maintenance facility project at Yuma Proving Ground, estimated at $5–10 million, excluding radar equipment [43].
8.	Patriot Missile Defense Equipment	$1,100.00M	$1,100.00M	$1,100.00M	Estimated $1.1 billion replacement cost for a complete newly produced Patriot battery. Includes radar, launchers, control and support components. Not applicable to radar-only damage [15].
9.	Combat Aircraft Assembly Area; Central Aircraft Ramp	$30.07M	$30.07M	$30.07M	Based on a $30.07 million U.S. combat aircraft parking apron project at Hurlburt Field, used as an illustrative full-replacement benchmark [44].
10.	Helicopter Maintenance Facilities; Aircraft Maintenance; Repair Workshops	$10.00M	$20.00M	$15.00M	Based on a U.S. military aircraft hangar and maintenance shops construction project at Alpena, Michigan, estimated at $10–20 million, used as a full-replacement benchmark [45].
11.	Ammunition and Equipment Depot; Weapons and Spare-Parts Storage Sheds for Ships and Aircraft; Military Equipment Warehouses	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].
12.	Military Barracks	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks of $6.28–27.29 million. A $24 million galley-and-barracks valuation at NSA Bahrain provides an additional regional comparison [4, 46].
13.	Storage Silos	$8.00M	$12.00M	$10.00M	Based on a U.S. Air Force munitions storage igloos construction project at Ellsworth Air Force Base, estimated at $8–12 million, used as an illustrative full-replacement benchmark [47].
14.	Power Generators	$1.12M	$1.12M	$1.12M	Based on a $1.12 million U.S. Navy generator replacement contract at Isa Air Base, Bahrain, used as a site-specific full-replacement benchmark [48].

15.	Navigation Systems	$0.90M	$1.19M	$1.05M	Based on U.S. Air Force FY2025 procurement benchmarks for military TACAN navigation systems, with unit costs of $0.904–1.194 million, used as an illustrative full-replacement estimate for one system [49].
	Illustrative Total	**$1,411.99 M**	**$1,548.68 M**	**$1,480.36 M**	

Note: *Similar or potentially overlapping facilities were grouped to avoid double counting. The $200.00 million estimate for the Main Command Headquarters is based on the Fifth Fleet Headquarters at NSA Bahrain, while the $1,100.00 million estimate for Patriot Missile Defense Equipment represents a complete Patriot battery. Personnel accommodation facilities and military barracks may overlap, as their identification as separate facilities has not been officially confirmed.*

Table 5 presents the estimated replacement costs of military facilities and infrastructure at Shaikh Isa Air Base, based on comparable U.S. military construction projects and equipment procurement costs. The estimates cover 15 categories, including fuel storage tanks, aircraft hangars, radar systems, command facilities, warehouses, maintenance buildings, and other supporting infrastructure. The total estimated replacement value ranges from $1.41 billion to $1.55 billion, with an average of approximately $1.48 billion. These figures represent illustrative full-replacement costs rather than confirmed losses from Iranian attacks.

Some facilities were reported as targets more than once during the war. Similar facilities were grouped because limited satellite imagery and the lack of independent verification make it difficult to determine whether different reports refer to the same buildings or separate facilities. However, personnel accommodation facilities and military barracks are listed separately and may overlap. The $200 million estimate for the main command headquarters is based on the Fifth Fleet headquarters at NSA Bahrain, while the $1.1 billion estimate for Patriot equipment represents the cost of a complete battery, although its total destruction has not been confirmed. These uncertainties mean that the estimated total should not be interpreted as the actual financial cost of damage at the base.

3.4. Riffa Air Base

Riffa Air Base in Bahrain was among the military installations reportedly targeted during the conflict, with particular attention directed towards U.S. radar facilities and Patriot air defence equipment. The reported incidents involved two separate dates and differed considerably in the strength of the available evidence. While satellite imagery provided evidence of damage to Patriot equipment in May, a subsequent Iranian-reported attack in July has not been independently verified.

Table 6:Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Riffa Air Base,

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
33.	May 7, 2026	1. Patriot Missile Defense Equipment	Patriot equipment damage reported through satellite imagery analyzed by The Washington Post [3].	High	Satellite imagery
34.	July 21, 2026	1. US Radar Facility 2. Patriot Air Defense System	Iranian-reported attack; damage not independently verified [50].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 6 presents two reported incidents at Riffa Air Base. On May 7, 2026, damage to Patriot missile equipment was reported through satellite imagery analysed by The Washington Post, providing stronger evidence of physical damage. On July 21, Iranian sources reported an attack targeting a U.S. radar facility and a Patriot air system, but independent confirmation of damage was not available.

Although both incidents involved air related infrastructure, the available evidence does not establish whether the same equipment was targeted on both dates. This distinction is important when assessing the extent of damage and estimating replacement costs, as the two reports should not automatically be treated as separate equipment losses.

3.4.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Riffa Air Base

The reported damage to Patriot air defence equipment and radar infrastructure at Riffa Air Base raises questions about the financial cost of replacing the affected military assets. Because the available evidence does not establish the exact equipment configuration, number of damaged components, or extent of destruction, the estimates presented below use published procurement benchmarks rather than confirmed repair or replacement costs. Particular attention is given to the possibility that the Patriot equipment reported on different dates belongs to the same system.

Table 7: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Riffa Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Patriot Missile Defense Equipment	$1,100.00M	$1,100.00M	$1,100.00M	Based on the estimated $1.10 billion replacement cost of a complete Patriot battery, including radar, launchers, interceptors, and support equipment [15].
2.	US Radar Facility	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 radar procurement costs and the UAE's $85 million procurement package for 18 radars [20]. Excluded from the total because it may be part of the Patriot battery.
3.	Patriot Air Defense System	$1,100.00M	$1,100.00M	$1,100.00M	Based on the same complete Patriot battery replacement benchmark [15].

	Illustrative Total	**$1,100.00M**	**$1,100.00M**	**$1,100.00 M**	

Notes: *Patriot Missile Defense Equipment and Patriot Air Defense System may refer to the same battery. Therefore, only one complete Patriot battery is included in the illustrative total. The US Radar Facility is also excluded because its independence from the Patriot system has not been established. All three entries remain documented, but the total reflects a single battery replacement benchmark rather than confirmed equipment losses.*

Table 7 presents an illustrative replacement value of $1,100 million ($1.10 billion) for military equipment reported to have been targeted at Riffa Air Base. This estimate is based on the replacement cost of a complete Patriot battery, including its radar, launchers, interceptors, and supporting equipment. A separately reported U.S. radar facility has an estimated replacement value of $1.11–4.72 million, with an average of $2.92 million, based on comparable radar procurement costs. However, this value is excluded from the total because the radar may be part of the Patriot battery.

The Patriot missile defence equipment and Patriot air defence system reported on different dates may also refer to the same battery. To avoid potential double counting, only one complete Patriot battery is included in the aggregate estimate. The resulting $1.10 billion represents an illustrative full-replacement benchmark, not a confirmed financial loss, as the available evidence does not establish that an entire Patriot battery was destroyed or requires replacement.

3.5. Al-Sakhir Air Base

Al-Sakhir Air Base was also identified in Iranian reports as a target during July 2026. Unlike some other military installations in Bahrain, the available reports concerning this base focus primarily on aircraft hangars and drone maintenance facilities. However, the reported attacks remain supported by Iranian accounts rather than independently verified evidence of physical destruction.

Table 8: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Al-Sakhir Air Base

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
35.	July 20, 2026	1. Drone Maintenance 2. Repair Hangars	Iranian-reported attack; damage not independently verified [25].	Low	Iranian Claim
36.	July 17, 2026	1. Aircraft Hangars	Iranian-reported attack; damage not independently verified [51].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 8 presents two Iranian-reported attacks on Al-Sakhir Air Base. On July 17, 2026, Iranian sources reported an attack targeting aircraft hangars. A second attack was reported on July 20, targeting drone maintenance facilities and repair hangars. Neither report was accompanied by independently verified evidence establishing the extent of physical damage.

The two incidents occurred on different dates and should therefore be retained as separate reported attacks. However, the available information does not establish whether the aircraft hangars and drone repair facilities were distinct structures or whether the reports referred to overlapping areas

of the installation. Consequently, any assessment of financial losses should remain provisional until additional evidence identifies the damaged facilities and their condition.

3.5.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Al-Sakhir Air Base

The reported attacks on Al-Sakhir Air Base involved aircraft hangars, drone maintenance facilities, and repair infrastructure. Estimating the potential financial losses associated with these facilities requires the use of comparable military construction projects, as the available evidence does not establish the number, specifications, or extent of damage to the targeted structures. The following estimates therefore represent illustrative replacement costs rather than confirmed losses.

Table 9: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Al-Sakhir Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
4.	Drone Maintenance	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	Based on a U.S. Army drone hangar construction project at Fort Carson, estimated at $15–20 million [41]
5.	Repair Hangars	$10.00M	$20.00M	$15.00M	Based on a U.S. military aircraft hangar and maintenance shops project at Alpena, Michigan, estimated at $10–20 million [45].
6.	Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	Based on U.S. military aircraft hangar construction benchmarks ranging from $18.49 million to $61 million [42].
	Illustrative Total	**$43.49M**	**$101.00M**	**$72.25M**	

Table 9 presents an illustrative replacement cost ranging from $43.49 million to $101.00 million, with an average of $72.25 million. Drone maintenance facilities are valued at $15–20 million, based on a U.S. Army drone hangar construction project at Fort Carson. Repair hangars are estimated at $10–20 million using a military aircraft hangar and maintenance shops project in Alpena, Michigan. Aircraft hangars account for the largest potential cost, ranging from $18.49 million to $61 million, based on comparable U.S. military construction projects.

These estimates assume one facility in each category. However, the available evidence does not establish whether the reported drone maintenance facilities, repair hangars, and aircraft hangars are separate structures or overlapping descriptions of the same buildings. Consequently, the combined total should be interpreted as a hypothetical replacement scenario rather than the actual financial cost of the reported attacks. No independently verified evidence currently establishes the destruction of all three facilities.

3.6. Oil and Fuel Facilities

Oil and fuel facilities in Bahrain were also affected during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The reported attacks involved oil refineries, fuel storage tanks, and commercial vessels. These incidents affected important parts of Bahrain's energy infrastructure, including facilities operated by Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), as well as maritime activities near the country's ports.

Table 10: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage to Oil, Fuel and Maritime Facilities in Bahrain

NO.	Date	Base/ location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
37.	March 2, 2026	Stena Imperative (ASRY Shipyard, Al Hidd)	1. Commercial Oil Tanker 2. Refuelling Support	Reuters reported two projectile impacts and a fire [52].	High	Maritime Security Sources
38.	March 5, 2026	Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO)	1. Oil Refinery Facilities	Bahrain confirmed a missile-related refinery fire; Anadolu reported [53].	High	Official confirmation
39.	March 9, 2026		1. Oil Refinery Facilities	BAPCO declared force majeure after a refinery attack; Reuters reported [54].	High	BAPCO's Confirmation
40.	April 5, 2026		1. Oil Storage Tank	BAPCO confirmed a drone impact and tank fire [55].	High	
41.	March 12, 2026	Fuel Storage Facility, Muharraq Governorate	1. Fuel Storage Tanks	Bahrain's confirmed the attack; Reuters verified the fire location [56].	High	Official confirmation

Table 10 presents five reported incidents involving oil, fuel, and maritime facilities in Bahrain between March 2 and April 5, 2026. On March 2, the commercial oil tanker Stena Imperative was struck by two projectiles while at the ASRY shipyard in Al Hidd, causing a fire, as reported by Reuters. On March 5, Bahrain confirmed a missile-related fire at an oil refinery, while on March 9, BAPCO declared force majeure following a reported attack on its refinery facilities. These two refinery incidents may be related, but the available information does not establish whether they involved the same damage or separate attacks.

On March 12, a fuel storage facility in Muharraq Governorate was attacked, causing a fire that Reuters located and verified. A further attack was reported on April 5, when BAPCO confirmed a drone impact and a fire at an oil storage tank. The reported incidents show damage to both oil processing and storage facilities. However, the available evidence does not fully establish the extent of physical damage or whether some reports refer to the same facilities. The March 12 and April 5 incidents are recorded separately because they occurred on different dates, although the exact locations of the affected storage tanks require further verification.

3.7. Industrial Facilities

Industrial facilities in Bahrain were also affected during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The reported attacks targeted aluminium production and petrochemical facilities, extending the damage beyond military installations to civilian industrial infrastructure. The affected sites included Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA), one of the country's major aluminium producers, and Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company.

Table 11: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage to Industrial Facilities in Bahrain

NO.	Date	Base/ Location	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
42.	March 2, 2026	Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA)	1. Aluminium Smelter Facilities	Iran claimed responsibility; Video circulated on social media which has not independently verified [57].	Medium	Video Attribution
43.	March 28, 2026		1. Aluminium Production Facilities 2. Aluminium Production Facility	Reuters confirmed attack and two minor injuries [58].	High	Reuters's Confirmation
44.	April 5, 2026	Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company	Petrochemical Operational Units	Reuters reported drone impacts and fires [59].	High	Reuters's Confirmation

Table 11 presents three reported incidents involving two major industrial facilities in Bahrain. On March 2, Iran claimed responsibility for an attack on aluminium smelting facilities at Aluminium Bahrain, although the available video evidence was not independently verified. On March 28, ALBA was targeted again in a separate attack. Reuters confirmed the incident, and the company reported that two employees suffered minor injuries. According to later company information, the damage was minor, quickly repaired, and covered by insurance. On April 5, Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company was affected by drone impacts that caused fires at its operational facilities, as reported by Reuters. Unlike the March 2 incident, the March 28 and April 5 attacks were independently reported.

3.8. Telecom and Data Centres, Bahrain

Telecommunications and data centres in Bahrain became targets during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran because of their perceived role in supporting U.S. military and intelligence operations. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps stated that U.S. technology companies provided digital infrastructure, cloud computing and data-processing capabilities used in military and intelligence activities against Iran. The IRGC linked its attacks on these facilities to the broader U.S.–Israeli military campaign, particularly strikes against Iranian infrastructure.

The attacks also reflected the strategic importance of U.S. digital infrastructure in the Gulf. Facilities operated by or associated with Amazon Web Services and Batelco formed part of the region's telecommunications and cloud computing networks, making them significant economic and technological assets. Targeting these facilities could disrupt digital services, impose financial costs on U.S. companies and affect the economies of host

countries. While Iran emphasised their military and intelligence functions, the wider consequences extended to civilian businesses and essential digital services

Table 12: Reported Attacks and Damage to Data Centres in Bahrain

NO.	Date	Base/ Location	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
45.	March 1, 2026	AWS Data Centre	1. Cloud Infrastructure 2. Power and Connectivity	AWS confirmed physical damage from a nearby drone strike [60]	High	Company Confirmation
46.	March 23, 2026		1. Cloud Services 2. Associated Infrastructure	AWS confirmed disruption from nearby drone activity; direct impact unverified [61].	Medium	
47.	April 1, 2026		1. Data Centre Facility 2. Associated Infrastructure	Bahrain reported a facility fire [62]	Medium	Official confirmation
48.	July 20, 2026		1. Central Data Infrastructure	IRGC claimed a cruise-missile strike [63]	Low	Iranian Claim
49.	July 24, 2026		1. Data Centre Infrastructure	ACLED recorded a strike [64, 65]	High	ACLED's confirmation
50.	July 18, 2026	Batelco RJR Data Centre	1. Data Centre 2. Associated Electrical	IRGC claimed the attack; ACLED documented a strike [64, 65].	High	Iranian Claim
51.	July 21, 2026		1. Data Centre 2. Associated Infrastructure	ACLED recorded another strike; Bloomberg identified site damage [64, 65].	Medium	ACLED's confirmation
52.	July 24, 2026		1. Associated Infrastructure	CTP–ISW documented a renewed IRGC attack claim [66].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 12 presents eight reported incidents involving two major digital infrastructure facilities in Bahrain: The Amazon Web Services (AWS) Data Centre and the Batelco RJR Data Centre. Five incidents concern AWS, while three involve Batelco. The reports include physical damage, disruption to cloud services, and attacks reported by Iranian military sources.

At AWS, the company confirmed physical damage associated with a nearby drone strike on March 1 and service disruption following drone activity on March 23. A facility fire was subsequently reported on April 1. Further attacks were reported on July 20 and 24, although the extent of additional physical damage remains uncertain.

The Batelco RJR Data Centre was also the subject of three reported attacks between July 18 and 24. ACLED recorded incidents on July 18 and 21, while Bloomberg-related reporting identified damage at the facility. A further attack was reported by Iranian sources on July 24, but independent

confirmation of additional damage was not established. Although these incidents occurred on different dates, the available evidence does not establish whether each attack caused new damage or affected infrastructure already damaged in earlier strikes.

3.9. Residential and Hotels

Residential towers and hotels were among the civilian properties damaged in Bahrain during the war. Table 13 documents seven reported incidents between February 28 and June 28, 2026, involving residential buildings and hotels in Manama and other areas of the country. The damage ranged from fires and impacts on upper floors to more serious incidents involving civilian casualties.

Table 13: Reported Damage to Residential Buildings and Hotels in Bahrain

NO.	Date	Base/ Location	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
53.	February 28, 2026	ERA View Tower, Hoora, Manama	1. Upper Floors	Human Rights Watch verified drone-impact footage [67].	High	Official confirmation
54.	February 28, 2026	The Breaker Tower	1. Upper-Floor Exterior	Stars and Stripes documented fire damage; impact mechanism uncertain [68].	High	
55.	March 1, 2026	Crowne Plaza	1. Hotel Building	U.S. Embassy confirmed the strike; hotel owner reported damage [69, 70].	High	
56.	March 6, 2026	Fontana Towers	1. Upper Floors	Stars and Stripes identified the damaged residential building [71]	High	
57.	March 6, 2026	Unidentified Hotel	1. Hotel Building	Bahrain's Interior Ministry confirmed both structures were hit [72]	High	
58.	March 9–10, 2026	Millennium Tower	1. Exterior Structure	Human Rights Watch verified aftermath footage; one killed and eight injured [67]	High	
59.	June 28, 2026	Unidentified Residential Building	1. Upper Floor	Bahrain's Interior Ministry confirmed damage; no casualties [73].	High	

Table 13 presents seven reported incidents. On February 28, ERA View Tower and The Breaker Tower sustained damage. Human Rights Watch verified footage of a drone impact at ERA View Tower, while Stars and Stripes documented fire damage at The Breaker Tower. On March 1, the Crowne Plaza hotel was struck, with the U.S. Embassy confirming the incident and the hotel owner reporting damage. Further damage was reported at Fontana Towers and an unidentified hotel on March 6. Between March 9 and 10, Millennium Tower was also affected, with one person killed and eight injured, according to Human Rights Watch. On June 28, Bahrain's Interior Ministry confirmed damage to another residential building, with no casualties reported.

While several incidents were supported by official statements, media reports, and verified footage, the exact cause of damage was not established in every case. Some affected buildings were not fully identified, leaving uncertainty about their locations and possible overlap between reports. The documented incidents highlight the human and material consequences of the conflict for civilians living and staying in Bahrain.

3.10. Other Civilian Infrastructure

Beyond military installations, industrial facilities, and commercial buildings, the war also affected essential civilian infrastructure in Bahrain. Water desalination facilities and civil aviation systems were among the reported targets, raising concerns about the potential consequences for public services and civilian activities. Although the reported incidents did not result in major disruptions to water supplies or air traffic, they demonstrate how infrastructure serving everyday civilian needs was exposed to the war.

Table 14: Reported Attacks and Damage to Other Civilian Infrastructure in Bahrain

NO.	Date	Base/ location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
60.	March 8, 2026	Unidentified Desalination Plant	1. Desalination Plant Infrastructure	Bahrain's Interior Ministry confirmed damage; water supply unaffected [74, 75].	High	Official confirmation
61.	July 20, 2026	Civil Air Navigation Systems	1. Civil Air Navigation Equipment	Bahrain's Civil Aviation Affairs confirmed targeting; flights unaffected [76, 77].		

Table 14 presents two reported incidents involving essential civilian infrastructure in Bahrain. On March 8, 2026, an unidentified desalination plant sustained damage, as confirmed by Bahrain's Interior Ministry. Despite the damage, the country's water supply remained unaffected. On July 20, Bahrain's Civil Aviation Affairs confirmed that civil air navigation equipment had been targeted, although flight operations continued without disruption.

Both incidents were officially acknowledged by Bahraini authorities, providing a high level of confidence in the reported events. However, the available information does not establish the full extent of physical damage or the cost of repairs. The incidents illustrate the vulnerability of essential civilian infrastructure during the conflict, even when public services continued operating.

3.11. Unspecified Other

During the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, Bahrain reported repeated interceptions of Iranian missiles and drones. While Bahrain's Defence Force confirmed these interceptions, the intended targets and exact locations of the incidents were not identified in the available reports. These incidents are therefore presented separately from attacks on named military bases and other facilities.

Table 15: Reported Iranian Missile and Drone Interceptions at Unspecified Locations in Bahrain

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence
62.	March 27,	Unspecified Intended Targets	Bahrain Defence Force reported intercepting twelve drones.	High	Official confirmation
63.	March 28,		Bahrain Defence Force reported intercepting twenty-three drones and		
64.	March 30,		BDF reported intercepting seven Iranian drones and eight missiles.		
65.	March 31,		BDF reported intercepting two Iranian drones.		
66.	April 1, 2026		BDF reported intercepting nineteen drones and four ballistic missiles.		
67.	April 2, 2026		BDF reported intercepting ten drones and two missiles.		
68.	April 4, 2026		BDF reported intercepting eight drones.		
69.	April 8–9,		BDF reported intercepting seven Iranian drones since April 8.		
70.	April 11, 2026		CTP-ISW reported that Iran launched one drone towards Bahrain on April		
71.	April 13, 2026		BDF reported intercepting seven Iranian-type drones.		

Table 15 presents ten reported incidents between March 27 and April 13, 2026. Bahrain's Defence Force reported intercepting multiple drones and ballistic missiles during this period, including 23 drones and 20 missiles on March 28. Most incidents were reported by Bahraini authorities, while the April 11 incident was reported by CTP-ISW. The reports show continued Iranian missile and drone activity involving Bahrain, but they do not identify the intended targets or confirm damage to specific facilities. The April 8–9 report may also overlap with other interception figures because it covers more than one day. These records document reported interceptions rather than confirmed strikes on military installations or civilian infrastructure.

3.12. Identified Patriot Air-Defence Sites in Bahrain during the 2026 War

The United States's military footprint in Bahrain goes well beyond its naval base. Missile systems, joint command facilities, and other installations are woven into the country's territory. When the U.S. and Israel went to war against Iran in 2026, these sites became part of a much larger web of operations, and the fallout didn't stay on the military bases. Ordinary people in Bahrain found themselves living with the risks that come from hosting foreign weapons systems.

Researchers Jeffrey Lewis, Michael Duitsman, and Sam Lair looked into this and located three Patriot missile sites in Bahrain. One of them, near Riffa, is believed to be run by U.S. forces. They also examined what happened on March 9, 2026, when an explosion tore through the residential area of Mahazza, injuring 32 people and damaging more than 60 homes. Bahraini officials first blamed an Iranian drone. But the investigators concluded that the blast was more likely caused by a Patriot interceptor fired from the battery they suspect the Americans were operating.

These findings force an uncomfortable question: what happens to the people who live next to missile installations? They also show that damage during the war shouldn't simply be pinned on Iranian attacks without first checking the physical and visual evidence.

Table 16: Identified Patriot Missile Installations and U.S.–Bahraini Military Infrastructure in Bahrain

NO.	Base	Operator	Identified facilities	Evidence Source
1	Riffa Patriot	Bahrain Defence Force; Likely U.S.	1. Five Patriot missile	Satellite imagery
2	Ras-al Bar Camp	Bahraini-operated Patriot battery; U.S.–Bahrain Joint Command Center	1. One Patriot radar 2. Three missile launchers 3. separate joint command	
3	Safreh Patriot Site	Bahrain Defence Force; Likely U.S.	1. One Patriot radar 2. Four missile launchers	

Table 16 documents three Patriot missile installations identified in Bahrain through satellite imagery and open-source investigation. The Riffa installation, where five missile launchers were observed, was assessed as likely operated by U.S. forces. The researchers based this conclusion on the site's history, its presence since at least 2009, and its similarity to other U.S.-operated missile installations in the region. Image 6 and 7 show the differences between the Riffa and Safreh installations, including their launcher positions, road layouts, and supporting infrastructure.




Image 6: Satellite imagery dated 6 August 2025 showing the layout and missile launcher positions of a Patriot air defence installation near Riffa, Bahrain, assessed as likely U.S.-operated. Source: Arms Control Wonk, Analysis of Patriot Incident in Bahrain.



Image 7: Satellite imagery dated 9 August 2025 showing the Patriot missile installation near Safreh Camp, Bahrain, including launcher positions, an elevated radar position, and supporting infrastructure. Source: Arms Control Wonk, Analysis of Patriot Incident in Bahrain.

The two other installations, at Ras-al Bar Camp and near Safreh Camp, were identified as Bahraini-operated Patriot sites. Ras-al Bar Camp also hosts a U.S.–Bahrain Joint Command Center. In early 2024, the Bahrain Defence Force inaugurated a Patriot missile base at the camp. Approximately one month later, a joint U.S.–Bahraini command centre was opened at the same location. Satellite imagery dated February 28, 2026, identified one Patriot radar and three missile launchers at the site. Although the joint command centre confirms a separate U.S. military presence at Ras-al Bar Camp, it does not establish U.S. operational control over the Patriot battery. The researchers identified the battery as Bahraini-operated.

At Safreh, satellite imagery dated February 22, 2026, showed one Patriot radar and four missile launchers. Unlike the older Riffa installation, the Safreh site has paved launcher positions, permanent buildings, and a dedicated elevated radar position, as shown in Image 8. The investigation did not identify any of these three installations as having been struck or destroyed. They are included here to document the military infrastructure present in Bahrain and to distinguish the likely U.S.-operated battery associated with the March 9 Mahazza explosion from the Bahraini-operated installations.

The Bahrain assessment documents 71 incident records during the 2026 war against Iran, including 61 reports of attacks, damage, or disruption and 10 records of missile and drone interceptions at unspecified locations. The findings indicate that several military installations associated with U.S. forces were targeted, particularly Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Shaikh Isa Air Base, Riffa Air Base, and Al-Sakhir Air Base.

The U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters was reportedly rendered unusable, while Shaikh Isa Air Base recorded the highest number of military incidents. The combined illustrative replacement value of selected military assets is estimated at $3.22 billion, ranging from $3.10 billion to $3.33 billion. These figures represent hypothetical replacement costs rather than confirmed financial losses, and some reported damage remains independently unverified.

Beyond military installations, the attacks and resulting disruptions affected Bahrain's civilian and commercial infrastructure, including oil and petrochemical facilities, aluminium production, data centres, hotels, and residential buildings. Incidents involving Amazon Web Services and the Batelco RJR Data Centre further demonstrate the vulnerability of digital infrastructure during the conflict.

These findings highlight how the presence of foreign military installations can expose host countries to wider consequences during armed conflict, extending beyond military targets to civilian infrastructure and essential services. The Bahrain assessment therefore illustrates both the substantial financial value of military infrastructure and the broader risks and costs associated with the expansion and maintenance of foreign military bases.

4. Qatar

Qatar was among the Gulf countries affected by the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The presence of Al Udeid Air Base, one of the largest U.S. military installations in the Middle East, exposed the country to Iranian missile and drone attacks. The base hosts the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), which is used to coordinate U.S. military operations across the region. During the war, attacks on U.S. military facilities in Qatar were accompanied by threats to civilian infrastructure and damage to major energy facilities. These events show how the consequences of hosting foreign military bases can extend beyond military installations and affect the wider country.

The Qatar assessment documents 28 incident records involving military installations, civilian infrastructure, energy facilities, and unspecified locations. At Al Udeid Air Base, 13 incidents were recorded between February and August 2026. Satellite imagery and independent reporting identified damage to communications facilities, aircraft shelters, logistics buildings, warehouses, and other military infrastructure. A senior U.S. official also reported severe damage to the Combined Air Operations Center. However, several additional attacks were reported by Iranian sources without independent confirmation of physical damage, and some reports may refer to the same facilities.

One of the most significant documented incidents occurred at the Umm Dahal Radar Site, where an Iranian drone strike on February 28 damaged the AN/FPS-132 long-range early-warning radar. Satellite imagery confirmed damage to one of the radar's faces, although the full extent of the damage remains unknown. The illustrative replacement value of the complete radar system is estimated at between $800 million and $1.10 billion, with an average of $950 million. At Al Udeid, the listed average replacement values total approximately $220.12 million. Together, these estimates amount to approximately $1.17 billion, but they represent illustrative replacement benchmarks rather than confirmed financial losses. Possible overlaps between reported facilities and the limited evidence of complete destruction mean that the actual cost of damage remains uncertain.

The effects of the war also reached Qatar's civilian and economic infrastructure. On March 2, Qatari authorities reported drone attacks on energy and water-related facilities in Ras Laffan and Mesaieed. Later that month, Shell confirmed damage to Train 2 at the Pearl GTL facility, while QatarEnergy confirmed damage to LNG Trains 4 and 6 and associated processing infrastructure. Satellite imagery provided further evidence of structural damage at these industrial sites. Hamad International Airport was also threatened by Iranian missiles and drones, although Qatari authorities reported intercepting the incoming weapons, with no confirmed damage to the airport. These incidents demonstrate that the consequences of the war extended into energy production, industrial activity, and civilian aviation.

The findings from Qatar raise wider questions about the risks associated with foreign military bases. While U.S. military installations were among the targets, the consequences were not limited to military equipment or facilities. Damage to energy infrastructure and threats to civilian services exposed the wider population and economy to a war involving external powers. This section examines the reported attacks, documented damage, and potential replacement costs, while distinguishing confirmed findings from unverified claims and avoiding the double counting of facilities reported as damaged on different dates. The assessment highlights both the financial cost of military destruction and the wider risks that war and foreign military installations can impose on host countries.

4.1. Al Udeid Air Base

Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is one of the largest U.S. military bases in the Middle East. It hosts the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), which coordinates U.S. military air operations across the region. During the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, the base was repeatedly targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. Satellite imagery and independent reporting documented damage to communications facilities, military buildings, and aircraft-related infrastructure. The attacks also show how the presence of foreign military bases can expose host countries to the consequences of wars involving external powers.

Table 17: Reported Iranian attacks and damage at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1.	February 28, 2026	1. Base Clinic	Reported clinic damage; independent confirmation not established [78].	Low	Unverified Damage
2.	February 28 – March 1, 2026	1. Communications Tent 2. Satellite Communication Dishes	NYT satellite imagery showed a destroyed tent and likely dish damage; equipment losses remain unspecified [1, 79].	High	Satellite Imagery
3.	Between February 22 and March 14, 2026	Warehouse-Like Building	Bellingcat identified visible roof damage in satellite imagery; the precise strike date remains unknown.	Medium	Iranian Claim
4.	Early weeks of the war	1. Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC)	Air & Space Forces Magazine reported severe damage, citing a senior U.S. official [80].	High	U.S. Official
5.	March 3, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Qatar confirmed a ballistic missile impact at the base; specific infrastructure damage was not disclosed [81].	Low	Official confirmation
6.	March 6, 2026		Qatar reported intercepting a drone targeting the base; no physical damage was confirmed [82].	Low	
7.	May 7, 2026	1. Satellite Communications Site	Washington Post satellite analysis identified communications-site damage; overlap with earlier documented losses remains unresolved [3].	High	Might overlap
8.	Jun 8, 2026	1. Logistics Operations Building 2. Small Aircraft Shelter 3. Camp Andy Housing and Support Building	Satellite-confirmed destruction by Aljazeera [83].	High	Satellite Imagery

9.	July 12, 2026	1. Fighter Aircraft Maintenance and Repair Center 2. Base Command and Control Center	IRGC reported targeting both facilities; no independent confirmation of physical damage was established [84].	Low	Satellite Imagery possibly CAOC
10.	July 17, 2026	Long-Range Radar System	IRGC reported radar destruction and aircraft losses; verifying unavailable [85].	Low	Iranian Claim
11.	July 17, 2026	Military Vehicle and Equipment Warehouse	Iranian media published imagery identifying damage to a vehicle and equipment warehouse at Al Udeid [86].	High	Iranian Claim
12.	July 23–24, 2026	1. U.S. Personnel Gathering Areas	Iranian Army reported drone attacks targeting personnel areas; impacts, casualties, and damage remain unverified [66].	Low	Iranian Claim
13.	August 30–31, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iranian media reported explosions at Al Udeid; direct impacts and physical damage were not independently verified [87].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 17 documents 13 reported incidents involving Iranian attacks and damage at Al Udeid Air Base between February and August 2026. The reported targets included communications facilities, aircraft maintenance buildings, warehouses, command and control infrastructure, radar systems, and personnel areas. The available evidence varies between incidents, with some damage documented through satellite imagery and reporting by U.S. officials, while other attacks were reported by Iranian sources without independent confirmation of physical damage.



Image 8: Satellite imagery dated 1 March 2026 showing the destruction of a tent-covered communications facility and likely damage to several satellite dishes at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, following Iranian strikes. Source: Airbus Defence and Space satellite imagery, published by The New York Times (3 March 2026).

One of the earliest documented incidents involved the base's satellite communications infrastructure between February 28 and March 1. Satellite imagery dated March 1 and published by *The New York Times* on March 3 shows a destroyed communications tent and likely damage to several nearby satellite dishes (Image 8).

The image reveals a heavily damaged area in the centre of the communications compound, surrounded by satellite dishes and other equipment. Although the destruction of the tent is visible, the image does not establish how many dishes were damaged or whether the associated electronic systems were destroyed.

A later *Washington Post* investigation published on May 7 also identified damage to a satellite communications site. However, it remains unclear whether this was a separate

Damage was also identified at several buildings used for logistics and support activities. Satellite imagery dated April 4 shows three affected locations within Al Udeid Air Base, including a destroyed logistics operations building, a damaged small aircraft shelter, and a support building in the Camp Andy area (Image 9). The image marks the locations of these structures across different parts of the base, indicating that the damage was not confined to a single compound. The available evidence supports physical damage at the identified locations, although the extent of destruction and the functions of all affected buildings require careful distinction. These findings are relevant to the June 8 entry in Table 17, but the imagery date alone does not establish that the damage occurred on June 8.



Image 10: Satellite imagery dated 12 July 2026 showing significant roof damage to an aircraft maintenance hangar at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, following Iranian missile strikes. According to Soar Atlas, the facility was used to service fighter aircraft. Source: Soar Atlas (soaratlas.com).



Image 9: Satellite imagery dated 4 April 2026 showing strike damage at three locations within Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, including a destroyed logistics operations building, a damaged aircraft shelter, and minor damage to a Camp Andy support building. Source: Pl

Another reported target was a fighter aircraft maintenance and repair facility. Satellite imagery dated July 12 and published by Soar Atlas shows extensive roof damage to a large aircraft maintenance hangar (Image 10). A substantial section of the roof appears destroyed, with darkened areas and exposed internal structures visible around the damaged section. The image provides evidence of significant structural damage to the building, although it does not establish whether aircraft or maintenance equipment were present at the time of the attack. On July 12, the IRGC also reported targeting a fighter aircraft maintenance and repair centre and a base command and control centre. The satellite image supports the existence of hangar damage, but the precise strike date and the reported damage to the command facility require separate verification.

Iranian-released satellite imagery provides additional evidence of damage to a large warehouse at Al Udeid Air Base (Image 11). The before-and-after comparison shows two large buildings before the attack, followed by extensive roof damage to one of them. A substantial section of the affected roof appears torn open, exposing the structure beneath it, while the neighbouring building remains visibly intact. Iranian sources identified the damaged facility as a central logistics and spare-parts warehouse associated with U.S. military operations. However, the building's precise function has not been

independently established from the imagery alone. The image may relate to the warehouse-like building identified by Bellingcat or to another reported logistics facility, and this possible overlap should be considered before counting it as an additional damaged building.



Image 11: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing extensive roof damage to a building at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, following Iranian strikes. Iran identified the facility as a central logistics and spare-parts warehouse. Source: Fars News Agency, Iranian-released satellite imagery.

A separate set of before-and-after satellite images released by Iranian media shows damage to another large warehouse at Al Udeid Air Base (Image 12). The earlier image shows an intact rectangular building, while the later image reveals a damaged section along one side of its roof, with visible changes to the surrounding area. Iranian sources described the building as a storage facility for U.S. military vehicles and equipment. This evidence is

relevant to the July 17 entry in Table 17, which reports damage to a military vehicle and equipment warehouse. However, the image does not establish the quantity or condition of any vehicles or equipment stored inside. It also remains necessary to determine whether this building is distinct from the other warehouses identified in earlier satellite investigations.




Image 12: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing substantial roof damage to a warehouse at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, following an Iranian strike in July 2026. Iranian media identified the facility as a storage site for U.S. military vehicles and equipment.

4.1.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Al Udeid Air Base

The attacks on Al Udeid Air Base damaged several military buildings and communications facilities, while other reported targets remain unverified. This section estimates the potential cost of replacing the facilities listed in the previous table. The estimates are based on U.S. military construction projects, procurement costs, and available equipment values. They represent illustrative replacement costs, not confirmed financial losses, as the full extent of damage remains unknown.

Table 18: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Al Udeid Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Base Clinic	$4.80M	$4.80M	$4.80M	Based on a reported $4.80 million contract for constructing a medical warehouse at Al Udeid Air Base, including utilities and site improvements. Used as a provisional, site-specific construction benchmark rather than a verified clinic replacement cost [88].
2.	Communications Tent	$0.05M	$0.10M	$0.08M	Provisional estimate for one military communications tent, based on a $45,000–$85,000 indicative range for a U.S. Army deployable shelter and a $104,420 communications-tent contract. Assumes one shelter with basic supporting infrastructure; excludes communications equipment [89].
3.	Satellite Communication Dishes	—	—	$40.00M	As estimated by *The Wall Street Journal*.
4.	Combined Air Operations Center	$39.00M	$57.80M	$48.40M	One communications facility assumed; same benchmark [90].
5.	Warehouse	$4.50M	$32.00M	$18.25M	Assuming one military storage warehouse, the lower estimate is $4.5M, based on the Aviano Air Base equipment warehouse project, and the upper estimate is $32M, based on the Anniston Army Depot general-purpose warehouse budget. Average = $18.25M [91, 92].
6.	Fighter Aircraft Maintenance and Repair Center	$10.00M	$20.00M	$15.00M	Based on a U.S. military aircraft hangar and maintenance shops construction project at Alpena, Michigan, estimated at $10–20 million, used as a full-replacement benchmark [45].
7.	Logistics Operations Building	$4.61M	$21.80M	$13.20M	Based on a $4.606M DLA operations building construction estimate and a $21.80M U.S. Army Corps of Engineers contract for a three-building logistics complex at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. Assumes replacement of one

					logistics operations building, excluding stored equipment and inventory [93, 94].
8.	Small Aircraft Shelter	$5.68M	$6.25M	$5.97M	Assuming one hardened aircraft shelter, the lower estimate is $5.68M, derived from the Kunsan $102.3M project for 18 shelters ($102.3M / 18). The upper estimate is $6.25M, derived from the $125M project for 20 shelters ($125M / 20). Average = $5.965M. These are hardened fighter-aircraft shelters, used as an illustrative comparison for an unidentified helicopter shelter [95, 96].
9.	Camp Andy Housing and Support Building	$6.28M	$18.50M	$12.39M	Based on a $6.28M U.S. Army barracks construction benchmark [13] and the U.S. Air Force's $37.00M project for two dormitory buildings with supporting infrastructure at Al Udeid Air Base, equivalent to $18.50M per building [97].
10.	Military Vehicle and Equipment Warehouse	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].
11.	Base Command and Control Center	$32.18M	$38.72M	$35.45M	Based on the U.S. Navy FY2026 Bahrain Tactical Operations Center estimate ($32.18M), including an additional $6.54M for secure compartmented facilities [21].
12.	Long-Range Radar System	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support) [20].
13.	U.S. Personnel Gathering Areas	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
14.	**Illustrative Total**	**$118.23 M**	**$241.98 M**	**$220.12 M**	

Table 18 presents estimated replacement costs for military facilities reported damaged or targeted at Al Udeid Air Base. The listed average values total approximately $220.12 million, including $40 million for satellite communications dishes reported by *The Wall Street Journal*.

The largest estimated costs are associated with the Combined Air Operations Center ($48.40 million), satellite communications dishes ($40 million), and the Base Command and Control Center ($35.45 million). Other estimates cover warehouses, aircraft maintenance facilities, accommodation buildings, radar equipment, and supporting infrastructure.

These figures require caution. The Combined Air Operations Center and the Base Command and Control Center may refer to the same facility. Some warehouse reports may also describe overlapping damage. In addition, several facilities were reported as targets without independent confirmation of destruction. The estimates generally assume complete replacement, even where the available evidence shows only partial damage or does not establish the extent of the loss.

The $220.12 million figure is therefore an illustrative sum of the listed average values, not a verified total loss. It may overstate the cost if reported facilities overlap or require repairs rather than complete replacement.

4.2. Other Locations: Hamad International Airport and Umm Dahal Radar Site

Hamad International Airport and the Umm Dahal radar site were among the locations affected by Iranian military operations in Qatar during 2026. At Hamad International Airport, Qatari authorities reported intercepting incoming missiles and drones, with no confirmed damage to airport infrastructure. The situation was different at Umm Dahal, where an Iranian drone strike damaged an AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar. Satellite imagery later showed visible damage to the radar installation. The two cases highlight the different outcomes of the attacks, from intercepted threats to confirmed physical damage.

Table 19: Reported Iranian Attacks on Hamad International Airport and Umm Dahal Radar Site, Qatar

NO.	Date	Base/ Location	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
14.	March 2, 2026	Hamad International Airport	1. Airport Infrastructure	Qatar confirmed intercepting Iranian missiles and drones; no airport impact or damage confirmed [98].	High	Official Confirmation
15.	February 28, 2026	Umm Dahal Radar Site	1. AN/FPS-132 long-range early-warning radar	Qatar MOD confirmed a drone strike; Planet Labs imagery analysed by ABC News verified radar-face damage [1–3].		




Image 13: Satellite imagery dated March 3, 2026, showing damage to the northeastern radar face of the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar at Umm Dahal, Qatar, with visible debris and water runoff from firefighting operations following an Iranian strike. Source: Planet Labs PBC / Middlebury Institute's Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, via ABC News.

Table 19 documents reported Iranian attacks on Hamad International Airport and the Umm Dahal Early-Warning Radar Site in Qatar during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Although Qatari officials confirmed multiple Iranian attempts to target Hamad International Airport with missiles and drones, the available reports do not establish the exact dates, number, or circumstances of each attempt.

These incidents are therefore recorded collectively to avoid duplication. Qatari authorities reported intercepting the incoming projectiles before they reached the airport, with no confirmed physical damage to airport infrastructure.

In contrast, the attack on the Umm Dahal Early-Warning Radar Site on February 28, 2026, resulted in documented physical damage. Qatar's Ministry of Defence confirmed that a drone targeted the radar installation. Satellite imagery captured on March 3 and analysed by ABC News and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies revealed damage to the northeastern face of the AN/FPS-132 radar (Image 13).

4.2.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Umm Dahal Radar Site

The Iranian strike on Umm Dahal damaged part of the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar system. Satellite imagery confirmed damage to one of its radar faces, but the full extent of the damage remains unknown. To assess the potential financial cost, this section uses U.S. procurement figures for the radar system as a reference. These figures represent the cost of replacing the complete system, rather than the confirmed cost of the damage.

Table 20: Illustrative Replacement Cost of the AN/FPS-132 Early-Warning Radar at Umm Dahal, Qatar

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Umm Dahal Radar Site	$800.00M	$1,100.00M	$950.00M	Based on the U.S. DSCA's 2013 proposed sale of one AN/FPS-132 radar system: $800.00M for major defence equipment and $1,100.00M for the complete package, including support infrastructure and services. Historical full-system benchmarks, not verified damage costs [99, 100].

Table 20 estimates the full replacement value of the AN/FPS-132 early-warning radar at Umm Dahal at between $800 million and $1.10 billion, with an average of $950 million. The lower estimate is based on the value of major defence equipment in the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency's 2013 proposed sale to Qatar. The upper estimate includes the wider radar package, supporting infrastructure, equipment and services.

4.3. Oil, Gas and Energy Facilities

Qatar's oil, gas and energy facilities were also affected by the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Attacks reached power plants, gas production facilities and major industrial sites, including Ras Laffan and Mesaieed. Unlike military bases, these facilities support electricity generation, industrial production and energy exports. Damage to them can therefore affect workers, businesses and communities, while also disrupting energy supplies beyond Qatar. The incidents show how the war's consequences spread to infrastructure essential to the country's economy.

Table 21: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage to Oil, Gas and Energy Facilities in Qatar

NO.	Date	Base/ location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
16.	March 2, 2026	Ras Laffan Industrial City-QatarEnergy Energy Facility	1. Power Plant, Energy Facility	Qatar MOD confirmed an Iranian drone attack on a power plant; damage extent unspecified [101].	High	Official Confirmation
17.	March 2, 2026	Mesaieed Industrial City, Mesaieed Power Plant	1. Power Plant Water Tank	Qatar MOD confirmed a drone strike targeting the water tank; damage extent unspecified [101].	High	
18.	March 18, 2026	Ras Laffan Industrial City, Pearl GTL	1. Pearl GTL Train 2 2. Associated Processing Infrastructure	Shell confirmed Train 2 damage; HRW verified structural damage in satellite imagery [102, 103].	High	Company Confirmation
19.	March 19, 2026	Ras Laffan Industrial City, QatarEnergy LNG	1. LNG Train 4 2. LNG Train 6 3. Associated Heat-Exchange Towers and Processing Structures	QatarEnergy confirmed two LNG trains damaged; HRW identified structural damage in imagery [102, 104].	High	




Image 14: Satellite imagery showing localised damage and discolouration around LNG Trains 6 and 4 at Ras Laffan, Qatar, with more extensive visible damage at Train 6. Source: Satellite imagery shared by MT Anderson (@MT_Anderson), March 22, 2026.

Table 21 documents four reported attacks on Qatar's oil, gas and energy facilities in March 2026. On March 2, Qatar's Ministry of Defence confirmed drone attacks on a power plant in Ras Laffan Industrial City and a water tank at Mesaieed Power Plant. However, the extent of damage at both locations was not specified.

More extensive damage was reported at Ras Laffan later that month. On March 18, Shell confirmed damage to Train 2 at the Pearl GTL facility, while Human Rights Watch identified structural damage through satellite imagery. On March 19, QatarEnergy confirmed damage to two liquefied natural gas (LNG) production trains, S4 and S6, along with associated processing infrastructure.

Satellite imagery dated March 22 shows visible damage and discolouration around LNG Trains 6 and 4 at Ras Laffan, with more extensive visible damage around Train 6 (Image 14). The imagery provides further visual evidence of the damage reported at the LNG complex, although it does not establish the full extent of equipment losses or the cost of repairs.

4.4. Unspecified Locations and Interceptions

Iranian missile and drone attacks on Qatar were not limited to incidents involving identifiable military bases or civilian facilities. During March and April 2026, Qatari authorities reported several attacks in which incoming missiles and drones were intercepted, but the intended targets were not publicly

identified. These reports provide information about the frequency and scale of the attacks without establishing that particular buildings or installations were struck. A separate Iranian report in July identified an early-warning satellite antenna as a target, although its location and the resulting damage could not be independently verified. Table 22 records these incidents separately from attacks on identified facilities to avoid assigning unconfirmed strikes or damage to specific locations.

Table 22: Reported Iranian Missile and Drone Attacks at Unspecified Locations in Qatar

NO.	Date	Base/ Location	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
20.	March 5, 2026	Unspecified Location	1. Unidentified Intended Targets	Qatar confirmed 14 ballistic missiles and four drones; 13 missiles and all drones intercepted; one missile fell at sea [105].	High	Official Confirmation
21.	March 7, 2026			Qatar confirmed interception of a missile attack; no specific facility identified [106]		
22.	March 10, 2026			Qatar informed the UN that five ballistic missiles were intercepted; intended targets unidentified [107].		
23.	March 28, 2026			Qatar confirmed interception of Iranian drones on March 28 [108].		
24.	March 29, 2026			Qatar's letter to the UN confirmed a separate March 29 drone attack; all drones intercepted [109].		
25.	March 30, 2026			Qatar confirmed another drone attack on March 30; all drones intercepted [108].		
26.	April 2, 2026			Qatar's letter to the UN confirmed the interception of Iranian drones on April 2 [110].		
27.	April 8, 2026			Qatar confirmed interception of seven ballistic missiles and several drones [111].		
28.	July 9, 2026	Unidentified Early-Warning Satellite Antenna Site	1. Satellite Antenna Used for Early Warning	Iranian Army identified the intended target; Anadolu and Reuters reported the claim. No independent damage confirmation [112, 113].	Medium	Iranian claim

Table 22 records nine reported incidents between March 5 and July 9, 2026, where the exact target locations could not be established. Eight incidents were documented through statements by Qatari authorities during March and April, while the ninth involved an Iranian military report in July. The Qatari reports confirm that missiles and drones were directed towards the country, but they do not identify the military or civilian facilities that may have been targeted.

The largest attack documented in the table occurred on March 5, when Qatar reported 14 ballistic missiles and four drones. According to the authorities, 13 missiles and all four drones were intercepted, while the remaining missile fell into the sea. Further missile interceptions were reported on March 7 and March 10, with Qatar informing the United Nations that five ballistic missiles had been intercepted during the latter incident. These reports establish the occurrence of incoming attacks but provide no evidence of damage to identifiable facilities.

A series of additional drone attacks followed towards the end of March. Qatari authorities reported interceptions on March 28, 29 and 30, treating them as separate incidents on different dates. Qatar also informed the United Nations of further drone interceptions on April 2. On April 8, the authorities reported intercepting seven ballistic missiles and several drones. Although these incidents demonstrate that the attacks continued over several weeks, the available information does not establish whether the same facilities were repeatedly targeted or whether the intended targets changed between attacks.

The final entry concerns July 9, when the Iranian Army reported targeting a satellite antenna used for early warning. Anadolu and Reuters reported the Iranian statement, but the antenna's location and any resulting physical damage were not independently confirmed. This incident is therefore different from the earlier entries: the Iranian report identifies a type of military equipment, but the available evidence does not establish where it was located or whether it was damaged.

The distinction between confirmed interceptions and confirmed damage is important when interpreting Table 22. The high confidence assigned to the March and April entries reflects official confirmation that incoming weapons were intercepted, not confirmation that the unidentified targets were struck. Similarly, the July entry records an Iranian military claim rather than independently verified destruction. These incidents are retained to document the wider pattern of attacks on Qatar, but they are not counted as additional confirmed losses at Al Udeid Air Base, Umm Dahal Radar Site, or any other identified facility.

5. United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was among the Gulf countries affected by Iranian missile and drone attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The country hosts several U.S. and other foreign military facilities, including Al Dhafra and Al Minhad air bases, which support military operations in the region. As the war expanded, these installations became targets of Iranian attacks, bringing the consequences of the conflict onto UAE territory.

The attacks were not limited to military installations. Airports, ports, oil and gas facilities, industrial plants, telecommunications networks, data centres, hotels, and residential buildings were also affected. Fujairah's oil infrastructure experienced repeated attacks, while incidents at gas processing facilities and industrial sites caused fires, damage, and interruptions to operations. Civilian areas were also affected, with reports of deaths, injuries, and damage to homes and commercial buildings. Some incidents resulted from direct strikes, while others involved falling debris from intercepted missiles and drones.

The assessment documents 95 incident entries across military and civilian locations, including 15 reports of missile and drone activity at unspecified locations. These records include independently verified damage, official reports, and Iranian military claims that could not always be confirmed. They do not necessarily represent 95 separate attacks. Satellite imagery provides evidence of damage at several military facilities, including aircraft hangars, support buildings, and infrastructure associated with air defence systems. However, the destruction of some reported targets, particularly radar equipment, remains uncertain.

This section also examines the estimated replacement costs of selected military facilities. The combined illustrative average value is approximately $1.80 billion, although this figure does not represent confirmed financial losses. Some estimates concern equipment whose destruction has not been verified, while repeated reports may refer to the same damaged structures. These uncertainties are considered to avoid overstating the scale of the losses.

The UAE assessment shows how the war affected both foreign military installations and the civilian infrastructure surrounding them. Beyond the damage to military facilities, the attacks disrupted economic activities, threatened essential services, and placed civilian lives at risk. The findings highlight the wider consequences of hosting foreign military forces during a regional war, particularly when the effects extend far beyond the military sites themselves.

5.1. Al Dhafra Air Base

Al Dhafra Air Base, located south of Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, hosts U.S. military aircraft, personnel, and supporting facilities. During the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, the base was repeatedly targeted by Iranian missiles and drones. Satellite imagery documented damage to military buildings, tent compounds, and aircraft hangars, while other reports described attacks on radar systems, communications facilities, and personnel areas. These attacks show how the presence of foreign military bases can expose host countries to the consequences of war.

Table 23: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Al Dhafra Air Base, United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1.	By March 1, 2026	1. Clustered Buildings 2. Tent Compound 3. Possible Communications Infrastructure	NYT identified extensive compound damage in March 1 satellite imagery [1].	High	Satellite Imagery
2.	By March 2, 2026	1. Previously Damaged Compound	NYT identified a further impact in the same general area in March 2 imagery [1].	High	Satellite Imagery
3.	March 4, 2026	1. Unspecified	Destruction reported by the Washington Post with Satellite imagery [114].	High	Satellite Imagery
4.	March 7, 2026	1. U.S. Air Combat Centre 2. Satellite Communications Centre 3. Early-Warning Radars 4. Fire-Control Radars	IRGC claimed drone strikes; damage to the named facilities not independently confirmed [115]	Medium	Iranian Claim
5.	March 10, 2026	1. U.S. Troop Gathering Points	Iranian reporting described attacks on troop positions; exact March 10 incident requires primary-source confirmation.	Low	Iranian Claim
6.	By March 11, 2026	1. Three Significantly Damaged Aircraft Hangars 2. Additional Hangar Roof Damage	AP reported three damaged hangars in March 11 Airbus imagery; March 15 imagery documented further visible damage [115].	High	Satellite Imagery
7.	March 12, 2026	1. Unspecified Airbase Facilities	IRGC strike claim; no independently verified distinct March 12 impact.	Low	Iranian Claim
8.	March 13, 2026	1. Early Warning Radars 2. Command and Control Centers 3. U.S. Troop Assembly Areas	IRGC-reported two-phase attack; damage not independently verified [116].	Low	Iranian Claim
9.	March 15, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iranian-reported missile and drone attack; damage unverified [117].	Low	Iranian Claim
10.	March 14, 2026	1. Patriot Radar Systems 2. Control Tower	IRGC claimed missile and drone strikes; damage to the named facilities not independently confirmed [28].	Medium	Iranian Claim

		3. Air-Defence Aircraft Hangars			
11.	March 15–16, 2026	1. Command and Control Centers 2. Flight Control Towers 3. Air Defense Depots 4. Logistics Warehouses 5. Equipment Depots	IRGC-reported coordinated strikes; damage not independently verified [118].	Low	Iranian Claim
12.	March 16, 2026	1. Central Ammunition Storage Depot	IRGC-reported ammunition depot destruction; not independently verified [119].	Low	Iranian Claim
13.	March 23, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	IRGC-reported missile and drone attack; damage unverified [120].	Low	Iranian Claim
14.	March 29, 2026	1. U.S. and Israeli Military Personnel Positions	IRGC included Al Dhafra in its 86th attack wave; impact unverified [121].	Medium	Iranian Claim
15.	April 2, 2026	1. Early Warning Radar System	IRGC-reported radar destruction; not independently verified [122].	Low	Iranian Claim
16.	By April 7, 2026	1. Main Aircraft Hangars	Al Jazeera identified hangar damage in April 7 imagery; overlap with March damage unresolved [83].	High	Satellite Imagery
17.	September 2, 2026	1. Radar Installations 2. U.S. Personnel Positions	Iranian Army claimed drone strikes; independent impact confirmation unavailable [123].	Low	Iranian Claim
18.	Reported October	1. Early-Warning Radar System	AP reported damage, citing a regional military official	High	AP



Image 15: Planet Labs satellite imagery dated 1 March 2026 showing extensive damage to buildings and tents within a military compound at Al Dhafra Air Base, UAE, following Iranian strikes. Earlier imagery identified satellite dishes and antennas at the site. Source: Planet Labs, published by The New York Times (3 March 2026).

Table 23 documents 18 reported incidents at Al Dhafra Air Base between March and October 2026. The available evidence includes satellite imagery, reporting by international news organisations, and statements issued by Iranian military sources. Satellite imagery confirms damage to several buildings, tent compounds, and aircraft hangars, while Iranian reports describe additional attacks on radar systems, command centres, warehouses, and personnel areas. However, not all reported attacks have been independently verified, and some may concern the same facilities on different dates.

The earliest documented damage was visible in satellite imagery dated March 1, 2026. *The New York Times* identified extensive damage to a military compound containing buildings and tents. Earlier imagery had shown satellite dishes and antennas in the same area, suggesting that communications infrastructure may also have been affected.

Image 15 shows the damaged compound, including a heavily affected central area surrounded by rows of smaller structures. The image provides evidence of physical damage but does not establish the exact number of destroyed buildings or whether the communications equipment was damaged. Satellite imagery dated March 2 identified another impact in the same general area. It remains unclear whether this represented a separate attack on additional facilities or further damage to the previously affected compound.



Image 16: Airbus satellite imagery dated 15 March 2026 showing damage to an aircraft hangar at Al Dhafra Air Base, Abu Dhabi, UAE, following Iranian strikes. Source: Airbus Defence and Space, published by the Associated Press (31 March 2026).

On March 4, The Washington Post reported further destruction at Al Dhafra using satellite imagery, although the specific facilities affected were not identified. Iranian military sources subsequently reported attacks on the U.S. Air Combat Centre, satellite communications facilities, early-warning radars, and fire-control radars on March 7. A further report on March 10 described attacks on U.S. troop gathering points. These reports identify possible military targets, but the available evidence does not independently establish damage to the named facilities.

Aircraft hangars were among the most clearly documented damaged structures at the base. The Associated Press reported significant damage to three aircraft hangars visible in Airbus satellite imagery by March 11, with further damage visible in imagery dated March 15.

Image 16 shows a large aircraft hangar with extensive roof damage. Several sections of the roof appear missing or severely affected, exposing parts of the structure beneath. Nearby hangars and aircraft parking areas are also visible, providing a clearer view of the affected facility within the airbase. Although the image confirms substantial structural damage, it does not establish whether aircraft or equipment inside the hangar were destroyed.




Image 17: Satellite imagery dated 8 April 2026 showing extensive damage to several aircraft hangars at Al Dhafra Air Base, UAE, following Iranian strikes. Source: European Sentinel and Airbus satellite imagery; damage analysis by Al Jazeera's Open-Source Unit.

The image supports the finding that aircraft-related facilities sustained physical damage. However, it does not establish whether this damage resulted from a new attack in April or whether it was already present following the March strikes. The March and April imagery therefore require comparison before the affected hangars can be counted as separate losses.

Iranian military sources reported several additional attacks during March. On March 12, the IRGC reported striking unspecified facilities at the base. On March 13, Iranian reports described a two-phase attack targeting early-warning radars, command and control centres, and troop assembly areas. The following day, the IRGC reported attacks on Patriot radar systems, a control tower, and aircraft hangars.

Further missile and drone attacks were reported on March 15, followed by claims concerning command centres, flight control towers, air defence depots, logistics warehouses, and equipment storage facilities during March 15–16. On March 16, Iranian sources also reported destroying a central ammunition storage depot. Additional attacks were reported on March 23 and March 29. However, independent evidence confirming damage to these specific targets was not established.

Further evidence of damage to aircraft-related infrastructure appeared in satellite imagery dated April 7–8, analysed by Al Jazeera. Image 17 shows a section of the airbase containing aircraft parking areas, support buildings, and hangar-like structures. One large roofed structure appears extensively damaged, with a substantial section of its roof missing or exposed.

Radar installations were repeatedly identified as targets in Iranian military reports. On April 2, the IRGC reported destroying an early-warning radar system, but this claim was not independently verified. On September 2, Iranian forces reported further drone strikes against radar installations and U.S. personnel positions. A later Associated Press report, published on October 31, described damage to an early-warning radar system, citing a regional military official. However, the date of the damage was not established, and its relationship to earlier radar-related attacks remains unclear. The October report should therefore not automatically be treated as evidence of a separate strike.

Satellite imagery published by MizarVision provides a broader view of damage within the military compound at Al Dhafra Air Base. Image 18 compares the compound before and after the reported attacks. The earlier image shows groups of buildings, support facilities, and rows of smaller structures. The later image highlights several areas where damage or visible changes were identified.

These include building clusters and sections of the support compound. The comparison helps show that damage was distributed across different parts of the installation rather than confined to a single structure. However, the highlighted areas do not establish the exact number of destroyed buildings, their individual functions, or the dates on which they were damaged. Some of these areas may overlap with the compound damage already documented in the March 1 and March 2 imagery.



Image 18: Satellite imagery showing military buildings and support facilities at Al Dhafra Air Base, UAE, before the Iranian strike. Source: Satellite imagery published by MizarVision on X (7 March 2026).

Overall, the evidence confirms substantial physical damage to buildings, aircraft hangars, and support infrastructure at Al Dhafra Air Base. However, the 18 incident entries should not be interpreted as 18 independently verified attacks or as evidence that every reported target was destroyed. The repeated references to radar systems, aircraft hangars, command facilities, and warehouses create a risk of counting the same damaged assets more than once. These uncertainties are particularly important when estimating replacement costs, as the available evidence does not always establish the number of distinct damaged facilities or whether complete replacement would be necessary.

5.1.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Al Dhafra Air Base

The reported Iranian attacks on Al Dhafra Air Base affected a range of military facilities, including aircraft hangars, radar systems, command and control centres, communications infrastructure, and storage facilities. To assess the potential financial scale of these losses, Table 24 provides estimated replacement costs based on available U.S. military construction projects and equipment procurement benchmarks. Each facility is assigned a lower, upper, and average value, reflecting differences in construction costs, equipment types, and the availability of information.

Table 24: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Al Dhafra Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Clustered Buildings	$25.90M	$45.00M	$35.45M	Assumes one cluster using military headquarters/support-complex benchmarks [124, 125]. Actual count, size and functions unknown; exclude buildings valued separately.
2.	Tent Compound	$0.54M	$1.09M	$0.82M	Assumes 5–10 shelters at $108,981 each [126]. Actual number and specifications unknown; excludes contents and site infrastructure.
3.	Possible Communications Infrastructure	$6.20M	$50.00M	$28.10M	Assumes one facility using Chinhae ($6.2M) and Camp Arifjan ($50M) benchmarks [124, 127]. Actual scope unknown; exclude assets valued separately.
4.	Air Combat Centre	$30.07M	$30.07M	$30.07M	Based on a $30.07 million U.S. combat aircraft parking apron project at Hurlburt Field, used as an illustrative full-replacement benchmark [44].
5.	Satellite Communications Centre	$1.00M	$10.00M	$5.50M	Assumed one terminal installation with associated equipment [49].
6.	Early-Warning Radars	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support). [20]

7.	Fire-Control Radars	$110.00M	$115.00M	$112.50M	Assumes one radar, using the reported $110–115M production cost of a legacy Patriot radar as an illustrative replacement benchmark. Average: ($110M + $115M) ÷ 2 = $112.5M.
8.	U.S. Troop Gathering Points	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
9.	Three Aircraft Hangars	$55.47M	$183.00M	$119.24M	Based on three aircraft hangars, using U.S. military construction benchmarks of $18.49M–$61.00M per hangar. Total illustrative replacement costs are calculated by multiplying the per-hangar benchmarks by three, assuming comparable facilities [42].
10.	Hangar Roof Damage	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	Assumes the hanger fully destroyed. Based on U.S. military aircraft hangar construction benchmarks. [42].
11.	Early Warning Radars	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See number 6
12.	Command and Control Centers	$32.18M	$38.72M	$35.45M	Based on the U.S. Navy FY2026 Bahrain Tactical Operations Center estimate ($32.18M), including an additional $6.54M for secure compartmented facilities [21].
13.	U.S. Troop Assembly Areas	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	See number 8
14.	Patriot Radar Systems	$110.00M	$130.00M	$120.00M	Estimated unit cost of $110M–$115M for legacy AN/MPQ-65 radars and $125M–$130M for next-generation LTAMDS radars. The range excludes launchers, interceptors and other battery components [16].
15.	Control Tower	$0.03M	$0.25M	$0.14M	Indicative market-based estimate for a prefabricated military observation tower, reflecting standard and reinforced configurations.
16.	Air-Defence Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 10
17.	Command and Control Centers	$32.18M	$38.72M	$35.45M	See number 12
18.	Flight Control Towers	$12.50M	$20.00M	$16.25M	Far East District. 2013 Year in Review [128, 129]. Illustrative replacement using historical, unadjusted benchmarks; actual specifications unknown.
19.	Air Defense Depots	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].

20.	Logistics Warehouses	$23.00M	$32.90M	$27.95M	Assumes one warehouse using USACE benchmarks of $23–32.9M; average $27.95M. Historical, unadjusted replacement costs; size and quantity unknown. Contents excluded [130, 131].
21.	Equipment Depots	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].
22.	Central Ammunition Storage Depot	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	See number 19.
23.	Early Warning Radar System	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See number 6.
24.	Main Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 16.
25.	Radar Installations	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See number 6.
26.	U.S. Personnel Positions	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	See number 8.
27.	Early-Warning Radar System	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See number 6.
	Illustrative Total	**$530.15 M**	**$1.01B**	**$771.75 M**	

Table 24 presents 27 estimated replacement-cost entries, with a reported combined lower estimate of $530.15 million, an upper estimate of approximately $1.01 billion, and an average of $771.75 million. The largest individual estimates relate to aircraft hangars, radar systems, and command and control facilities. These values are based on comparable military construction and procurement costs rather than confirmed assessments of the damage at Al Dhafra Air Base.

However, some entries may overlap because different reports describe similar facilities or repeated attacks on the same infrastructure. For example, early-warning radars appear in several entries, while fire-control radars may overlap with Patriot radar systems. Similar uncertainty applies to aircraft hangars, command and control centres, personnel facilities, and storage depots. It is therefore possible that some assets have been valued more than once. The combined estimates should be understood as illustrative replacement values that may include duplication, rather than the actual financial losses resulting from the attacks. The precise extent of damage and the number of distinct affected facilities remain uncertain.

5.2. Al Minhad Air Base

Al Minhad Air Base, located near Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, is used by Emirati and foreign military forces, including Australian and U.S. personnel. The presence of foreign forces has made the base part of the wider military confrontation during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran.

At Al Minhad Air Base in the UAE, the clearest evidence of damage came from Australian authorities, who confirmed that a projectile struck a road near the base on March 17–18, 2026, causing minor damage to accommodation and medical facilities. Iranian forces also reported attacks on command buildings, aircraft hangars, fuel storage facilities, and radar systems throughout the year. However, most of these claims were not independently verified. The contrast between the confirmed damage and the wider Iranian reports makes it difficult to determine the full extent of the attacks on the base.

Table 25: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Al Minhad Air Base, United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
19.	February 28 – March 1, 2026	1. Unspecified Facilities	Australia confirmed an attack; damage extent unspecified [132].	High	Official confirmation
20.	March 2, 2026	1. U.S. Military Command and Control Center	IRGC reported an attack; damage not independently verified [133].	Low	Iranian Claim
21.	March 17–18, 2026	1. Australian Accommodation Block Medical Facility	Australian Defence confirmed minor damage to accommodation and medical facilities after a projectile struck a road near the base [134].	High	Official confirmation
22.	March 19, 2026	1. Commanders' Building 2. Fuel Tanks 3. Military Equipment	IRGC Navy reported an attack; damage not independently verified [135].	Low	Iranian Claim
23.	March 21, 2026	1. Fighter Aircraft Hangars 2. Fuel Storage Facilities	IRGC reported an attack; damage not independently verified [136].	Low	Iranian Claim
24.	August 31, 2026	1. U.S. Helicopter Positions 2. Personnel Locations	Iranian media claimed drone hits at Al Minhad; UAE confirmed a drone interception but did not confirm damage to the base [137].	Low	Iranian Claim
25.	September 2, 2026	1. Radar Systems 2. Troop Positions	Iranian forces reported an attack; damage not independently verified [138].	Low	Iranian Claim
26.	September 3, 2026	1. Radar System	Iranian Army claimed missile and drone strikes; a U.S. defence official reported no impacts on U.S. bases [139].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 25 records eight reported incidents at Al Minhad Air Base between February and September 2026. Australian authorities confirmed an attack during February 28–March 1, although the extent of damage was not specified.

The clearest documented damage occurred on March 17–18, when a projectile struck a road near the base. Australia's Department of Defence confirmed minor damage to an Australian accommodation block and medical facilities. This is the most clearly documented physical damage in the available records.

Iranian military sources reported further attacks on a U.S. command and control centre, commanders' buildings, fuel tanks, military equipment, aircraft hangars, and fuel storage facilities during March. However, independent evidence confirming damage to these specific facilities was not established.

Further attacks were reported in late August and early September, targeting helicopter positions, personnel areas, and radar systems. The August 31 report followed a UAE-confirmed drone interception, but no damage to Al Minhad was independently established. On September 3, Iranian forces reported another radar attack, while a U.S. defence official stated that no U.S. bases had been hit.

Some reported targets may overlap, particularly the fuel storage facilities mentioned on March 19 and 21, and the radar systems reported on September 2 and 3. Without evidence identifying separate damaged structures, these reports should not be treated as confirmed independent losses.

Overall, the available evidence confirms limited physical damage to Australian facilities, while most other reported attacks remain unverified. The records illustrate how foreign military installations can expose personnel and surrounding infrastructure in host countries to the consequences of a wider war.

5.2.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Al Minhad Air Base

The reported Iranian attacks on Al Minhad Air Base involved several types of military infrastructure, including command facilities, personnel accommodation, medical facilities, aircraft hangars, fuel storage installations, and radar systems. Australian authorities confirmed minor damage to accommodation and medical facilities, while other military infrastructure was identified in Iranian reports without independent confirmation of physical damage. This difference is important when estimating costs, as the reported targets cannot all be treated as destroyed or requiring replacement.

Table 26 estimates the potential replacement costs of these facilities using comparable U.S. military construction and equipment procurement projects. Lower, upper, and average values are provided to reflect differences in facility size, specifications, and available cost information. Where the number or type of facilities is unknown, the calculations rely on stated assumptions. These estimates are illustrative and do not represent the confirmed financial cost of damage, particularly where the extent of destruction or the exact equipment involved has not been established.

Table 26: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Al Minhad Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Command and Control Center	$32.18M	$38.72M	$35.45M	Based on the U.S. Navy FY2026 Bahrain Tactical Operations Center estimate ($32.18M), including an additional $6.54M for secure compartmented facilities [21].

2.	Australian Accommodation Block	$41.80M	$41.80M	$41.80M	Assumes one permanent accommodation block using a $41.8M, 360-person barracks benchmark [140].
3.	Medical Facility	$1.67M	$10.10M	$5.89M	Assumes one clinic using Camp Zafar ($1.67M) and Fort Stewart ($10.1M) benchmarks [141, 142]. Average: $5.885M, rounded to $5.89M.
4.	Commanders' Building	$5.00M	$12.30M	$8.65M	Assumes one command building using Fort Jackson headquarters ($5M) and a battalion headquarters/company facility ($12.3M) [143, 144].
5.	Fuel Tanks	$6.00M	$24.00M	$15.00M	Based on DLA FY2022 fuel infrastructure projects: $6M at Misawa Air Base and $24M at Kadena Air Base. Values are indicative construction benchmarks, excluding fuel inventory and unverified equipment losses [12].
6.	Military Equipment	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].
7.	Fighter Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	Based on U.S. military aircraft hangar construction benchmarks ranging from $18.49 million to $61 million [42].
8.	Fuel Storage Facilities	$6.00M	$24.00M	$15.00M	See number 5
9.	Helicopter Positions	$2.45M	$2.45M	$2.45M	Assumes one helicopter parking apron using NAVFAC's $2.45M estimate for Mari Naval Base, Cyprus [145].
10.	Personnel Locations	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
11.	Radar Systems	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support). [20]
12.	Troop Positions	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	See number 10
13.	Radar System	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See number 11
	Illustrative Total	**$132.11 M**	**$288.39 M**	**$210.25 M**	

Table 26 presents 13 estimated replacement-cost entries, with a lower total of $132.11 million, an upper total of $288.39 million, and an average of $210.25 million. The largest individual estimates relate to the Australian accommodation block ($41.80 million), fighter aircraft hangars ($18.49–$61 million), and the command-and-control centre ($32.18–$38.72 million). Other estimates cover medical facilities, commanders' buildings, fuel storage, helicopter positions, personnel facilities, and radar systems.

The estimated values vary according to the type and assumed size of each facility. For example, the accommodation block is valued using a $41.80 million military barracks construction benchmark, while the medical facility is estimated at $1.67–$10.10 million using comparable military clinic projects. Aircraft hangars have a wider estimated range because construction costs depend on their dimensions and functions. Radar systems are valued at $1.11–$4.72 million per assumed system, although the actual radar types and quantities at the base have not been established. Similarly, the military equipment entry uses a storage-building benchmark rather than the value of the equipment itself.

Some entries may overlap because different reports could refer to the same facilities or repeated attacks on the same infrastructure. The two fuel-related entries (Nos. 5 and 8) may concern the same storage installations, while personnel and troop positions (Nos. 10 and 12) may describe overlapping accommodation or support facilities. The two radar entries (Nos. 11 and 13) could also refer to the same equipment. In addition, the Australian accommodation block may overlap with the more general personnel facilities listed elsewhere in the table.

These uncertainties are important when interpreting the combined estimates. The available evidence confirms only minor damage to Australian accommodation and medical facilities, while the extent of damage to most other reported targets remains unverified. The calculations also assume full replacement values rather than the cost of repairing partially damaged structures. Therefore, the estimated average of $210.25 million should be understood as a preliminary illustrative benchmark, not as confirmed financial losses. A more accurate assessment would require identification of the individual damaged assets, their condition, and any overlap between the reported incidents.

5.3. Unnamed Base Near Al Ruwais

A military installation near Al Ruwais in western Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, contains a THAAD missile defence site associated with an AN/TPY-2 radar system. The installation was among the military sites targeted during the opening days of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Before-and-after satellite imagery shows damage to structures within the installation, including a building associated with the radar system. Although the site's official name and operational arrangements have not been publicly established, the available imagery provides evidence of physical damage to military infrastructure on UAE territory.

Table 27: Reported Iranian Strikes and Damage at a THAAD Missile Defence Site Near Al Ruwais, United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
27.	February 28 – March 1, 2026	1. AN/TPY-2 THAAD Radar Installation	Al Jazeera cited IRGC imagery identifying a radar installation among the impact points; NYT reportedly described its destruction [146].	High	Satellite Imagery
		1. Radar-Related Support Infrastructure.			

		2. At Least Three Impact Points in the Southern Section of the THAAD Site	Al Jazeera presented Airbus satellite imagery showing at least three impacts near radar and support equipment [146, 147].		

Table 27 documents a reported Iranian strike on a THAAD missile defence installation near Al Ruwais, United Arab Emirates, between February 28 and March 1, 2026. The reported targets included an AN/TPY-2 radar installation, radar-related support infrastructure, and at least three impact locations in the southern and northern sections of the site. The available evidence includes satellite imagery released by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and independent imagery published by *The New York Times*. These sources provide evidence of damage to structures within the installation, although the condition of the radar equipment itself remains uncertain.

The before-and-after comparison in Image 19 shows the layout of the installation before the strikes and the locations identified as damaged afterwards. The red box highlights a structure associated with the AN/TPY-2 radar system in the northern section of the compound. The two yellow boxes identify additional locations in the southern section, where visible changes appear in the post-strike imagery.

These areas are located within the same military installation but represent different parts of the compound. The comparison suggests that the reported damage was not limited to a single location. The post-strike image also shows darkened areas and changes in the appearance of the highlighted structures compared with the earlier image.

These visible differences provide further evidence of damage at several locations, although the imagery does not establish whether the affected buildings were completely destroyed or remained partly usable. However, the precise functions of the two southern structures, the severity of their damage, and whether military equipment inside them was affected have not been independently established.



Image 19: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing three reported impact points at a THAAD missile defence site near Al Ruwais, UAE, following Iranian strikes, including a structure associated with an AN/TPY-2 radar system. Source: Satellite imagery released by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Damage locations identified by the IRGC.

Further evidence of damage to radar-related infrastructure is provided by satellite imagery published by *The New York Times* (Image 20). The earlier image, dated August 18, 2025, shows the radar-associated structure before the attack. The second image, dated March 1, 2026, shows visible damage at the corresponding location, including dark marks and changes to the building's appearance. This closer comparison supports the identification of physical damage to the structure highlighted in red in Image 19.

However, damage to a building associated with the radar does not necessarily mean that the AN/TPY-2 radar itself was destroyed. The satellite images do not clearly show the condition of the radar equipment after the strike, and no independent assessment of its operational status is established in the available evidence. The Iranian reporting identifies the radar installation as a target, but the independently visible damage relates primarily to the surrounding structure. The distinction is particularly important because the radar represents a major component of the site's estimated replacement value.



Image 20: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing damage to a structure housing an AN/TPY-2 radar system at a THAAD missile defence site near Al Ruwais, UAE, following Iranian strikes. Damage to the radar itself remains unconfirmed. Source: Airbus Defence and Space and Planet Labs satellite imagery (18 August 2025 and 1 March 2026), originally published by The New York Times

Overall, the available satellite imagery confirms physical damage to infrastructure at the THAAD installation near Al Ruwais, particularly a structure associated with the AN/TPY-2 radar system. The Iranian imagery also identifies two additional affected locations, although their functions and the extent

of damage remain uncertain. The evidence therefore supports recording damage to the installation without treating the destruction of the radar as independently confirmed. These uncertainties must also be considered when estimating replacement costs, since the three reported impact locations may include structures already counted under radar-related infrastructure. The incident illustrates how military installations in host countries became exposed to attack during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran.

5.3.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Al Ruwais, United Arab Emirates

Estimating the financial cost of the strike on the THAAD installation near Al Ruwais is difficult because the available satellite images show damage to military structures without revealing the full condition of the equipment inside them. This is particularly important for the AN/TPY-2 radar, which accounts for most of the potential replacement value. Table 28 uses military procurement and construction benchmarks to estimate what replacing the identified facilities could cost, rather than assuming that everything targeted was destroyed.

Table 28: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Al Ruwais, United Arab Emirates

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	AN/TPY-2 THAAD Radar Installation	$328.57M	$328.57M	$328.57M	Assumes one radar using Raytheon's 2020 production contract: $2,300M ÷ 7 ≈ $328.57M [148]. Contract-average replacement proxy; configuration and support scope may differ.
2.	Radar-Related Support Infrastructure.	$32.18M	$38.72M	$35.45M	Based on the U.S. Navy FY2026 Bahrain Tactical Operations Center estimate ($32.18M), including an additional $6.54M for secure compartmented facilities [21].
3.	At Least Three Impact Points in the Southern Section of the THAAD Site	$15.00M	$36.90M	$25.95M	Assumes full replacement of three buildings at $5–12.3M each, using military headquarters benchmarks [144, 149]. Actual sizes and functions unknown.
	Illustrative Total	**$380.75 M**	**$416.49 M**	**$398.62 M**	

The estimated replacement value ranges from $380.75 million to $416.49 million, with an average of $398.62 million. Most of this amount comes from the AN/TPY-2 radar, valued at $328.57 million using the average cost derived from Raytheon's 2020 production contract. The remaining estimates cover radar-related support infrastructure ($32.18–$38.72 million) and three assumed buildings at the reported impact locations ($15–$36.90 million).

The AN/TPY-2 radar accounts for approximately 82% of the estimated average replacement value, making it the largest component of the assessment. Its estimated value of $328.57 million is based on the average unit cost derived from Raytheon's 2020 production contract, rather than a confirmed replacement requirement at Al Ruwais. The remaining $70.05 million covers radar-related support infrastructure and three assumed buildings at the

reported impact locations. However, the available imagery provides stronger evidence of structural damage than of equipment destruction. This distinction is important because repairing damaged buildings could cost substantially less than replacing an entire radar system and its associated facilities.

However, the satellite evidence does not confirm that the radar itself was destroyed. The three reported impact points may also include structures already covered by the radar and support infrastructure estimates. As a result, some values could overlap, and the total may count the same infrastructure more than once. The figures therefore represent a possible full-replacement scenario, not the confirmed cost of the damage. A more precise estimate would require evidence of the radar's condition and identification of the individual buildings affected.

5.4. Al Sader THAAD Site

The Al Sader military installation in the United Arab Emirates contains a Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence site, including radar equipment and supporting buildings. The installation was struck during the opening days of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Satellite imagery subsequently revealed damage to several buildings, including structures associated with the radar system. CNN identified four damaged buildings at the installation, while imagery published by *The New York Times* provided a closer view of two radar-related shelters or hangars. Although the damage to these buildings is visible, the available evidence does not establish whether the AN/TPY-2 radar equipment itself was damaged or destroyed.

Table 29: Satellite-Verified Damage at the Al Sader THAAD Site, United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
28.	February 28 – March 1, 2026	1. Four Damaged Buildings, Including Two THAAD Radar Equipment Hangars/Shelters	CNN confirmed four damaged buildings; NYT imagery shows damage to two radar-related structures [1, 150].	High	Satellite Imagery
		2. AN/TPY-2 Radar System	Anadolu reported a radar hit; CNN and ABC could not establish equipment damage [151-153].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 29 documents damage to the Al Sader THAAD installation between February 28 and March 1, 2026. CNN identified four damaged buildings at the site, while satellite imagery published by *The New York Times* shows two structures associated with the radar system. These findings provide independent evidence of physical damage to military infrastructure, although the full extent of the losses remains uncertain.

The before-and-after comparison in Image 22 shows two different sections of the installation on October 22, 2025, before the strikes, and March 1, 2026, afterwards. Both structures show visible changes to their roofs, including dark impact marks and areas of apparent structural damage. The images also show radar equipment positioned near the affected buildings. In the first comparison, the damaged structure is located beside an area identified as

a radar system, while the second comparison shows another damaged hangar close to a separate radar position. These images help identify the affected buildings and their relationship to the surrounding radar infrastructure.

The four damaged buildings reported by CNN represent the broader extent of structural damage identified at Al Sader, while Image 22 focuses on two radar-associated structures. These two buildings should therefore be understood as part of the four reported damaged buildings, rather than additional losses. The available imagery does not provide the same level of detail for the other two buildings, making it difficult to assess their functions, size, or condition. This limits the ability to determine how much of the installation's supporting infrastructure was affected.

However, the visible damage to the two buildings does not establish that the radar equipment itself was destroyed. Iranian reports identified AN/TPY-2 radar systems as targets, but CNN and ABC could not independently confirm damage to the equipment. The satellite imagery provides stronger evidence of structural damage than of radar destruction. It is also important that the two buildings shown in Image 21 are part of the four damaged buildings reported by CNN and should not be counted as additional structures.

Overall, the evidence supports recording four damaged buildings at Al Sader with high confidence, while the condition of the AN/TPY-2 radar remains unconfirmed. This distinction is important for the replacement-cost assessment because the value of the radar equipment is substantially higher than that of the surrounding buildings. Including the radar as a confirmed loss would therefore overstate the damage established by the available evidence.

The available evidence also limits the assessment of the site's operational condition after the strikes. Although the images show damage near radar equipment, they do not establish whether the installation continued operating, required repairs, or experienced a longer interruption. These differences matter when estimating financial losses, since repairing a damaged shelter, replacing an entire building, and replacing radar equipment involve very different costs.



Image 21: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing damage to two aircraft hangars at a THAAD missile defence installation in Al Sader, UAE, following Iranian strikes. AN/TPY-2 radar systems were positioned near the damaged structures, but damage to the radars remains unconfirmed. Source: Satellite imagery dated 22 October 2025 and 1 March 2026, published by The New York Times (11 March 2026).

The following section therefore uses separate replacement benchmarks for the buildings and radar system, while maintaining the distinction between documented structural damage and unconfirmed equipment losses.

5.4.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at the Al Sader THAAD Site, United Arab Emirates

The satellite imagery of Al Sader provides clear evidence of damage to several military buildings, but the condition of the AN/TPY-2 radar remains uncertain. This creates an important difference between the value of the infrastructure visibly damaged and the potential cost of replacing the radar itself. Table 30 examines both components using military construction benchmarks and radar procurement costs to estimate the possible financial scale of the losses. The assessment covers four damaged buildings, including two radar-associated shelters, and one AN/TPY-2 radar system. Because the exact specifications and condition of these facilities are unknown, the estimates assume full replacement rather than confirmed repair costs. The radar is included as a possible loss, not as independently verified destroyed equipment.

Table 30: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at the Al Sader THAAD Site, United Arab Emirates

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	1. Four Damaged Buildings, Including Two Radar-Associated Hangars/Shelters	$74.36M	$102.04M	$88.20M	Assumes full replacement of two radar equipment shelters at $32.18–38.72M each, plus two other buildings at $5–12.3M each. Actual specifications unknown; excludes the radar and buildings counted elsewhere.
2.	2. AN/TPY-2 Radar System	$328.57M	$328.57M	$328.57M	Assumes one radar using Raytheon's 2020 production contract: $2,300M ÷ 7 ≈ $328.57M [148]. Contract-average replacement proxy; configuration and support scope may differ.
	Illustrative Total	**$402.93 M**	**$430.61 M**	**$416.77 M**	

Table 30 estimates a total replacement value of $402.93–$430.61 million, with an average of $416.77 million. Of this amount, $74.36–$102.04 million is allocated to four damaged buildings, including two radar-associated hangars or shelters. The calculation assumes $32.18–$38.72 million for each of the two radar-related shelters and $5–$12.30 million for each of the remaining two buildings. These values are based on comparable U.S. military construction projects rather than the actual dimensions or specifications of the damaged structures.

The remaining $328.57 million represents the estimated replacement value of one AN/TPY-2 radar, calculated using the average unit value derived from Raytheon's 2020 production contract. This single component accounts for approximately 79% of the illustrative average total. Its inclusion has a major effect on the assessment because the radar is considerably more expensive than the surrounding buildings. However, the contract-based value may include equipment and support arrangements that differ from those at Al Sader.

The available satellite imagery confirms damage to buildings, not the destruction of the radar itself. The radar's inclusion therefore represents a hypothetical full-replacement scenario rather than a verified equipment loss. There is also uncertainty about the size and function of the four buildings.

The two radar-associated shelters are included within the four-building estimate and must not be counted separately. Although the assessment uses construction benchmarks for complete buildings, the visible damage does not establish that every structure requires full replacement.

Consequently, the estimated average of $416.77 million should not be interpreted as confirmed financial losses. The actual cost could be substantially lower if the radar remained operational and the damaged buildings could be repaired. A more precise assessment would require evidence of the radar's condition, the extent of structural damage, and the repair or replacement requirements for each facility.

5.5. Dubai International Airport

Dubai International Airport is one of the world's busiest international airports and a major centre for civilian air travel. During the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, the airport and its surrounding areas experienced damage, drone impacts, and flight disruptions. Unlike military installations, the airport serves millions of civilian passengers, making these incidents particularly significant for public safety and international transport. The attacks and resulting disruptions illustrate how the consequences of war extended beyond military facilities into civilian infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates.

Table 31: Reported Iranian Attacks, Damage and Disruptions at Dubai International Airport and Its Vicinity

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
29.	February 28 – March 1, 2026	1. Airport Concourse 2. Passenger Terminal Infrastructure	Dubai Airports confirmed minor damage to a concourse and four injured staff; Reuters reported terminal damage [154].	High	Official confirmation
30.	March 7, 2026	1. Airport Vicinity — Interception Debris 2. Airport Operations	AFP reported an explosion near DXB and temporary flight disruption. Dubai authorities confirmed falling interception debris but denied reports of an incident at the airport [155, 156].	Medium	
31.	March 11, 2026	1. Airport Vicinity — Two Drone Impacts 2. Nearby Ground Area	Dubai Media Office confirmed two drones fell near DXB, injuring four people. Reuters observed no visible airport damage [157].	High	
32.	March 16, 2026	1. Fuel Tank in the Airport Vicinity; 2. Associated Fuel Storage Infrastructure	Dubai authorities confirmed a drone-related fire affecting a fuel tank near DXB. Civil Defence contained the fire; no injuries reported [158, 159].	High	

Table 31 documents four incidents affecting Dubai International Airport and its surrounding area between February 28 and March 16, 2026. The first incident, reported between February 28 and March 1, caused minor damage to an airport concourse and passenger terminal infrastructure. Dubai Airports confirmed the damage and reported four injured staff members, while Reuters also documented the impact on the terminal.

On March 7, an explosion was reported near the airport, accompanied by temporary flight disruptions. AFP reported the incident, while Dubai authorities confirmed falling interception debris but denied that an incident had occurred inside the airport itself. The available evidence therefore does not establish direct damage to airport infrastructure on that date. On March 11, the Dubai Media Office confirmed that two drones fell near the airport, injuring four people. Reuters reported that no visible damage to airport facilities was observed. This incident is recorded separately because it involved confirmed drone impacts and civilian injuries, rather than documented damage to airport buildings.

The final incident occurred on March 16, when a drone-related fire affected a fuel tank near the airport. Dubai Civil Defence contained the fire, and no injuries were reported. Although fuel storage infrastructure was affected, the available information does not establish whether the tank was part of the airport's own fuel supply system. These incidents demonstrate the consequences of the war for civilian aviation, including injuries, infrastructure damage, and interruptions to airport operations. However, the four records should not be treated as four confirmed direct strikes on the airport. Some occurred in its vicinity, and the evidence does not establish direct airport damage in every case.

5.6. Jebel Ali Port

Jebel Ali Port in Dubai is one of the UAE's largest commercial ports, handling international shipping, cargo, and industrial activities. The port area also contains fuel storage facilities, warehouses, and infrastructure associated with military activities. During the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, several fires and explosions were reported at the port and nearby industrial facilities. Some incidents were documented through satellite imagery or confirmed by UAE authorities, while others were reported by Iranian sources without independent verification.

The incidents affected different parts of the port area, including a large structure, a port berth, and facilities connected to fuel storage and handling. However, the available evidence does not establish whether all these incidents resulted from direct Iranian strikes. The presence of military-related infrastructure within a major commercial port raises concerns about the exposure of civilian facilities, port workers, and economic activities to the consequences of war. Table 32 records the reported incidents while distinguishing confirmed fires and visible damage from unverified attacks.

Table 32: Reported Iranian Attacks, Fires and Damage at Jebel Ali Port, Dubai, UAE

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
33.	February 28, 2026	1. Large Structure	Fire at military-area structure verified by satellite imagery; damage extent undetermined [139].	Low	Satellite Imagery
34.	March 1, 2026	1. Port Berth — Unspecified Civilian or Military Use	Fire confirmed by UAE authorities; attributed to interception debris [160].	High	Official confirmation
35.	March 1, 2026	1. Fuel-Handling Facility Connected to Storage Tanks	Separate fire independently identified by satellite imagery [161].	Medium	Satellite Imagery
36.	March 31, 2026	1. Jebel Ali Port Anchorage and Nearby Waters	Reported incident; military involvement and damage not independently verified [162].	Low	Iranian Claim

37.	August 5, 2026	1. Fuel Storage 2. Transfer Warehouse 3. Port and Adjacent Industrial Facilities	Explosions reported; military cause and damage not independently verified [163].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 32 records five incidents at Jebel Ali Port and its surrounding area between February 28 and August 5, 2026. The earliest incident occurred on February 28, when satellite imagery identified a fire affecting a large structure in a military-related area of the port. However, the available evidence does not establish the precise function of the building or the extent of the resulting damage. Although the structure was located in an area associated with military activities, its exact use remains uncertain.

On March 1, UAE authorities confirmed a fire at a port berth, which they attributed to debris from an intercepted missile or drone. This official confirmation establishes that a fire occurred but does not support classifying the incident as a direct strike on the berth. The available information also does not establish whether the affected berth was used for civilian shipping, military activities, or both. A separate fire was identified on March 1 at a fuel-handling facility connected to storage tanks. Satellite imagery documented visible damage within the affected area, suggesting that infrastructure associated with fuel storage or transfer operations was affected. However, the images do not establish the exact cause of the fire, the quantity of fuel involved, or whether the storage tanks themselves sustained damage. The relationship between this incident and the other fires reported around the port on February 28 and March 1 also remains uncertain.

Further incidents were reported on March 31 in the port anchorage and nearby waters. The available reporting does not independently confirm damage to identifiable facilities or establish whether military infrastructure was involved. On August 5, additional explosions were reported at fuel storage facilities, a transfer warehouse, and adjacent industrial infrastructure. However, the available evidence does not establish the extent of physical damage or independently confirm the reported military involvement. These incidents are retained in the assessment because they identify possible additional attacks, but they cannot be treated as confirmed infrastructure losses.

Satellite imagery shared by MizarVision provides a closer view of an affected industrial and fuel-handling facility at Jebel Ali Port (Image 22). The image shows a large complex containing numerous circular storage tanks, connecting infrastructure, and buildings associated with fuel-handling operations. Within the highlighted area, a rectangular structure appears heavily darkened and damaged compared with the surrounding facilities. The visible changes suggest substantial damage to part of the complex, while several nearby storage tanks remain identifiable in the image.

The imagery helps locate the affected facility within the wider port infrastructure and provides visual evidence of damage to a specific industrial area. However, it does not establish whether the damage resulted from a direct Iranian strike, falling interception debris, or another cause. The image also does not confirm the exact date of the damage or whether it corresponds to one of the March 1 incidents recorded in Table 32. These uncertainties should be considered before treating the affected structures as additional or independently confirmed losses.

The surrounding storage tanks also show how closely the affected structure is connected to the port's fuel-handling infrastructure. However, the image does not establish whether the tanks or connecting pipelines were damaged, so these assets should not be counted as separate losses without further evidence.



Image 22: High-resolution satellite imagery showing visible damage to an industrial and fuel-handling facility at Jebel Ali Port, Dubai, UAE. The highlighted area identifies a damaged structure surrounded by fuel storage tanks and associated infrastructure. The precise cause and date of the damage remain unconfirmed. Source: Soar Atlas satellite imagery, circulated by Iranian state media and shared by MizarVision on X (10 August 2026).

Overall, the incidents at Jebel Ali Port show how the effects of the war extended into major commercial and industrial infrastructure. The available evidence confirms fires and visible damage at several locations, but it does not establish that all five incidents were direct Iranian strikes or that each affected a separate facility. In particular, the fires reported between February 28 and March 1 may involve overlapping locations or damage documented through different sources. Without clearer evidence, these incidents should not be counted as five independently verified attacks or used to calculate separate replacement costs for the same infrastructure. The findings also highlight the risks faced by civilian workers and commercial facilities when military-related activities take place within or near major ports.

5.7. Diplomatic Facilities

Diplomatic premises were also affected by the fighting in the United Arab Emirates during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Two incidents were documented in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, involving a building housing the Israeli Embassy and an area adjacent to the U.S. Consulate. Both incidents caused physical damage, while the Abu Dhabi incident also resulted in civilian injuries. These events show how the war reached diplomatic locations within the UAE, exposing surrounding buildings and people to the dangers of missile and drone warfare.

Table 33: Iranian Drone Incidents Affecting Diplomatic Facilities in the United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
38.	March 1, 2026	Etihad Towers — Israeli Embassy Complex	1. Building Façade 2. Diplomatic Complex Housing the Israeli Embassy	Abu Dhabi Media Office confirmed interception debris damage and two injuries [164]; Reuters identified the diplomatic complex [165].	High	Official confirmation
39.	March 3, 2026	U.S. Consulate	1. Adjacent Parking Area; 2. Fire-Affected Area	Dubai Media Office confirmed drone-related fire; WSJ reported a parking-area impact [166, 167].	High	

Table 33 documents two incidents affecting diplomatic premises in the UAE during the first days of March 2026. On March 1, falling interception debris damaged the façade of Etihad Towers in Abu Dhabi, a complex housing the Israeli Embassy. The Abu Dhabi Media Office confirmed the damage and reported two injuries, while Reuters identified the building's diplomatic connection. The available evidence does not establish that the embassy itself was directly struck.

On March 3, a drone-related incident caused a fire in an area adjacent to the U.S. Consulate in Dubai. The Dubai Media Office confirmed the fire, while *The Wall Street Journal* reported an impact in a nearby parking area. The available information does not establish damage to the consulate building itself. Both incidents affected locations associated with foreign diplomatic missions, but neither establishes a confirmed direct strike on an embassy or consulate building.

5.8. Oil, Gas, Fuel and Energy Infrastructure

Oil, gas, fuel, and energy infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates was repeatedly affected during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The incidents involved oil storage terminals, refineries, gas processing facilities, fuel depots, petrochemical plants, oil tankers, and electricity infrastructure. Some resulted from reported direct strikes, while others involved falling interception debris. Fujairah was particularly affected, with satellite imagery documenting damage to crude oil storage tanks and oil transfer infrastructure. Elsewhere, fires and damage disrupted industrial operations, interrupted energy production and transport, injured workers, and caused loss of life.

The incidents were reported across several locations, including Fujairah, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ruwais, and offshore waters. Their consequences extended beyond physical damage to individual facilities, affecting oil-loading operations, gas processing, and industrial production. However, the available evidence varies between incidents, and not every reported attack resulted in independently verified damage. The following table documents these incidents while distinguishing officially confirmed damage, satellite-verified destruction, and reports that remain unverified.

Table 34: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage to Oil, Gas, Fuel and Energy Infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
40.	March 2, 2026	Mussafah Fuel Tank Terminal, Abu Dhabi	1. Fuel Tank Terminal	Abu Dhabi authorities confirmed drone-related fire; no injuries [168].	High	Official confirmation
41.	March 3, 2026	Fujairah Oil Industry Zone	1. Oil Storage Tanks 2. Fire-Affected Facilities	WAM confirmed fire; Bellingcat imagery showed at least three destroyed tanks [169, 170].	High	
42.	March 3, 2026	Libra Trader Oil Tanker, off Fujairah	1. Oil Tanker Hull	UKMTO reported projectile impact and minor damage [171].	High	UKMTO Confirmation
43.	March 9, 2026	Fujairah Oil Terminal	1. 1. Matrix Manifold (62-Pipeline Oil Transfer System)	Reuters satellite investigation identified destruction of a matrix manifold on March 9 [172].	High	Satellite Imagery
44.	March 10, 2026	Ruwais Industrial Complex, Abu Dhabi	1. Refinery-Adjacent Industrial Facilities	Bloomberg reported drone-related fire and precautionary refinery shutdown [173].	High	Iranian Claim
45.	March 14, 2026	Fujairah Oil Terminal	1. Oil Terminal and Loading Facilities	Reuters documented fire and suspended oil-loading operations [174].	High	Reuters

46.	March 16, 2026	Fujairah Oil Industry Zone	1. Oil Storage and Industrial Facilities	Fujairah authorities confirmed drone strike and major fire [175].	High	Official confirmation
47.	March 16, 2026	Shah Field, Abu Dhabi	1. Oil and Gas Field Facilities	Abu Dhabi Media Office confirmed drone strike and fire [176].	High	
48.	March 16, 2026	Dubai International Airport Fuel Storage Area	1. Fuel Storage Tank	Dubai authorities confirmed drone-related tank damage and fire [159].	High	
49.	March 18–19, 2026	Habshan Gas Facilities, Abu Dhabi	1. Gas Processing Facilities	Abu Dhabi Media Office confirmed interception debris and shutdown [177].	High	
50.	March 18–19, 2026	Bab Oil Field, Abu Dhabi	1. Oil Field Facilities	Abu Dhabi Media Office confirmed interception-debris incident [177].	High	
51.	March 30, 2026	Al Salmi Oil Tanker, Dubai Anchorage	1. Oil Tanker Hull; 2. Fire-Affected Area	KPC confirmed Iranian attack, hull damage and fire; Reuters reported [178].	High	
52.	April 3, 2026	Habshan Gas Facilities, Abu Dhabi	1. Gas Processing Facilities 2. Two Fire-Affected Areas	Abu Dhabi authorities confirmed two fires, significant damage, one death and four injuries [179].	High	
53.	April 5, 2026	Borouge Petrochemical Plant, Ruwais	1. Petrochemical Plant Facilities 2. Three Fire-Affected Areas	Abu Dhabi Media Office confirmed interception debris, fires and damage [180].	High	
54.	April 8, 2026	Habshan Gas Facilities, Abu Dhabi	1. Gas Processing Facilities; 2. Fire-Affected Areas	Abu Dhabi authorities confirmed interception debris, fires and three injuries [181].	High	
55.	May 4, 2026	Fujairah Oil Industry Zone	1. Unidentified Oil-Industry Facility	Fujairah authorities confirmed Iranian drone attack and fire [182].	High	
56.	May 17, 2026	Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, Abu Dhabi	1. Electrical Generator Outside the Inner Perimeter	FANR confirmed generator fire following drone strike; nuclear safety unaffected [183].	High	
57.			1. Power Generation Facilities		Low	Iranian Claim

	March 1, 2026	Jebel Ali Power Station Complex, Dubai	2. Desalination Infrastructure	CTP–ISW reported a strike; facility damage not independently verified [184].		

The incidents were concentrated in several important energy and industrial areas, particularly Fujairah and Abu Dhabi, as seen in Table 34. Fujairah experienced repeated fires and damage affecting crude oil storage, transfer infrastructure, and loading operations. In Abu Dhabi, the reported incidents involved fuel terminals, oil fields, gas processing facilities, and petrochemical plants. Dubai also experienced incidents affecting fuel storage and energy infrastructure. The geographical spread of these events shows that the disruption was not limited to a single facility or type of energy production.

The table also shows differences in the causes and consequences of the incidents. Some facilities were directly struck by drones or other projectiles, while others were affected by debris from intercepted weapons. Several incidents resulted in fires or temporary shutdowns, even where extensive structural damage was not established. The repeated incidents at Fujairah and Habshan are particularly important because they affected facilities on different dates. However, the available evidence does not always establish whether later attacks damaged new structures or affected infrastructure already damaged in earlier incidents. This distinction is necessary when assessing the overall extent of damage and avoiding duplicate estimates of financial losses.

The incidents also differed in their consequences for energy operations. Damage to storage tanks could affect fuel reserves, while damage to pipelines and transfer facilities could interrupt the movement of oil to shipping terminals. At gas-processing and petrochemical facilities, fires and precautionary shutdowns created further operational disruption. The incidents involving commercial oil tankers also extended the impact beyond land-based infrastructure. These differences are important because the economic consequences of an incident may extend beyond the cost of repairing the damaged structure, although the available evidence does not allow these wider losses to be quantified.



Image 23: Satellite imagery showing locations of reported Iranian strike damage at Fujairah Oil Terminal, UAE, between 3 March and 4 May 2026, including oil storage tanks, pipelines, manifolds, and buildings. Source: Screenshot from a satellite imagery analysis

The attacks on Fujairah affected different parts of the oil terminal between March and May 2026. Table 34 records several incidents during this period, beginning with the March 3 fire at Fujairah Oil Industry Zone. The UAE's Emirates News Agency confirmed the fire, while Bellingcat's satellite analysis identified at least three destroyed crude oil storage tanks.

Image 23 brings these incidents together on a single satellite map. The orange markers identify affected storage tanks, while the blue markers indicate the oil transfer manifold, the yellow markers show buildings, and the green markers identify pipelines. The locations are spread across the terminal rather than concentrated in one area. This shows that the reported damage extended beyond oil storage to infrastructure used to transfer petroleum products towards shipping facilities.

An important distinction is that the marked locations represent damage reported on different dates. The affected storage tanks are associated with the March 3 incident, while damage to the manifold and pipelines relates to subsequent attacks. The image should therefore be understood as a combined record of affected locations, not as evidence of one attack damaging the entire terminal.

The geographical distribution also helps explain why damage to a relatively small part of the terminal can have wider consequences. The storage tanks, pipelines, and transfer manifold form an interconnected system. Damage to a key transfer point could interrupt the movement of oil even where nearby tanks remain intact. However, the satellite map does not establish how long operations were disrupted, whether every marked structure required replacement, or the total financial cost of the damage. These questions require additional operational and engineering evidence.




Image 24: Airbus satellite imagery dated 3 March 2026 showing burning crude oil storage tanks and extensive smoke following Iranian strikes on Fujairah Oil Terminal, UAE. Source: Pléiades Neo / Airbus Defence and Space; published by MizarVision (16 October 2026)

On March 3, 2026, a major fire broke out at Fujairah Oil Terminal, affecting crude oil storage facilities. The incident is recorded as No. 41 in Table 34. UAE authorities confirmed the fire, while Bellingcat's subsequent satellite investigation identified at least three destroyed storage tanks. The Airbus satellite image (Image 24) captures the incident while the fire was still burning, providing a view of the immediate conditions at the terminal.

Large flames are visible around the affected tanks, accompanied by thick black smoke rising above the storage area. The smoke spreads across neighbouring facilities and partially obscures other tanks. Unlike the wider damage map in Image 23, which combines locations affected on different dates, Image 24 captures a specific event. It shows the intensity of the fire and its proximity to other oil storage facilities, illustrating the potential for a localised incident to threaten a larger industrial complex.

The timing of the satellite image is particularly important. It records an active fire rather than the final condition of the affected facilities. Although the flames identify the main burning area, the smoke makes it difficult to distinguish individual tanks or determine how far the damage extended. The image therefore documents the immediate physical consequences of the incident but cannot establish the final number of destroyed tanks or the condition of nearby pipelines and equipment. Image 24 is therefore most useful as a visual record of the fire itself. The closer satellite view in Image 25 provides a different perspective by showing the condition of individual tanks after the incident.



Image 25: High-resolution satellite imagery showing fire damage to multiple crude oil storage tanks and a large smoke plume at Fujairah Oil Terminal, UAE, following Iranian strikes in March 2026. Source: Pléiades Neo / Airbus Defence and Space; published by by MizarVision (16 October 2026).

Image 25 presents a detailed satellite view of the crude oil storage tanks affected by the March 3, 2026 incident at Fujairah Oil Terminal, recorded as No. 41 in Table 34. Unlike Image 24, which captures the wider fire and smoke plume, this image focuses on the physical condition of individual tanks. Three storage tanks show particularly severe visible damage, with darkened roofs and upper surfaces indicating extensive fire exposure.

The comparison with neighbouring tanks is especially important. Several surrounding structures retain their lighter roof appearance, while the three affected tanks show substantial changes in colour and surface condition. These differences help distinguish the most heavily damaged facilities from nearby tanks without comparable visible damage. Bellingcat's satellite investigation identified at least three destroyed crude oil storage tanks, consistent with the damage highlighted in the image.

The destruction of these tanks represents a direct loss of oil storage infrastructure rather than damage to the terminal's transfer network. Each affected tank formed part of the facility's capacity to hold crude oil before its movement through pipelines and loading systems. Their destruction could therefore reduce available storage capacity until the facilities were repaired or replaced. However, the image does not establish the tanks' individual capacities, the quantity of oil lost, or whether neighbouring tanks continued operating.

For the assessment in Table 34, the three tanks should be treated as a documented minimum rather than an estimate of the total number of facilities affected across Fujairah. Images 24 and 25 relate to the same March 3 incident and provide different levels of visual detail. This distinction is important when evaluating the damage, as the wider fire shown in Image 24 and the three affected tanks identified in Image 25 do not represent separate sets of losses.



Image 26: Satellite imagery showing reported strike damage to an oil transfer manifold at Fujairah Oil Terminal, UAE, during Iranian attacks between March and May 2026. Source: Pléiades Neo / Airbus Defence and Space; analysis by MizarVision (16 October 2026).

The March 9, 2026 attack on Fujairah Oil Terminal marked a different type of damage from the storage tank fires recorded earlier that month. According to a Reuters investigation using satellite imagery, the attack damaged a matrix manifold connected to a network of 62 pipelines used to transport crude oil and petroleum products between storage facilities and shipping berths. This incident is recorded as No. 43 in Table 34.

Image 26 identifies the damaged manifold within a complex arrangement of pipelines, valves, and connecting structures. The affected area forms part of the terminal's oil transfer system, where petroleum flows are directed between different storage and loading connections. Its location is significant because the manifold is not an isolated facility but a component of the infrastructure linking storage operations with maritime transport.

The damage highlights the vulnerability of interconnected industrial infrastructure during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Unlike the destruction of storage tanks, which directly affects the capacity to hold petroleum, damage to a manifold can interfere with the movement of oil through several connected routes. This means that the operational consequences may extend beyond the visibly damaged section, particularly where multiple transfer lines depend on shared equipment. The image, however, does not establish how many individual pipelines were rendered unusable.

The same damaged manifold is also identified in Image 27, alongside another section of the terminal's pipeline infrastructure associated with a later incident. This provides an opportunity to compare the locations of damage over time and examine how repeated attacks affected different parts of Fujairah's oil transfer network, without recording the March 9 manifold damage as an additional loss.




Image 27: Satellite imagery from May 2026 showing damage to an oil transfer manifold from the 9 March strike and nearby piping from the 4 May strike at Fujairah Oil Terminal, UAE. Source: Pléiades Neo / Airbus Defence and Space; published by MizarVision on X, citing Reuters' investigation.

Together, Images 26 and 27 provide complementary evidence of damage to the terminal's oil transfer system. The manifold shown in both images represents the same damaged infrastructure, while the nearby piping is identified as a separate affected area. This distinction helps avoid counting the March 9 manifold damage twice when assessing the overall losses at Fujairah.

Image 27 provides further evidence of damage to Fujairah's oil transfer infrastructure and helps distinguish two reported incidents recorded in Table 34. The satellite image, acquired in May 2026, identifies damage to the matrix manifold associated with the March 9 attack (No. 43) and a separate damaged section of nearby piping associated with the May 4 incident (No. 55).

The two affected areas are located within the same industrial complex but involve different sections of the oil transfer network. The manifold occupies a large area containing numerous pipes and valves, while the second damaged location is situated along nearby connecting pipelines. This distinction is important because damage to different components of the same network may have occurred during separate attacks.

The May 4 incident was confirmed by Fujairah authorities, who reported an Iranian drone attack and fire at an oil-industry facility. The satellite analysis associates the damaged piping with that incident, although the available image alone cannot establish the precise timing of the damage or the full extent of the resulting disruption.

Overall, Table 34 documents how the consequences of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran extended across the UAE's energy infrastructure. The incidents affected crude oil storage, fuel terminals, gas processing facilities, petrochemical plants, oil transfer networks, commercial tankers, and

electricity infrastructure. Fujairah provides particularly clear evidence of repeated damage, with satellite imagery documenting affected storage tanks, a matrix manifold, and nearby pipelines on different dates.

The findings also show that the consequences of these incidents were not limited to physical damage. Fires, precautionary shutdowns, interrupted oil-loading operations, injuries, and loss of life affected workers and essential industrial activities. However, the available evidence does not establish the full financial cost of these incidents, and repeated damage at the same facilities must be assessed carefully to avoid double counting. The UAE assessment therefore distinguishes documented physical damage from reported attacks and operational disruption, while recognising the wider human and economic consequences of the war.

5.9. Civilian, Commercial and Industrial Facilities

Residential buildings, hotels, and industrial facilities across the United Arab Emirates suffered damage during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. In Dubai and Abu Dhabi, drone impacts and falling interception debris damaged homes, hotel buildings, and other civilian properties, causing injuries and fires. Industrial operations were also affected, including aluminium production facilities at Al Taweelah. These incidents demonstrate the human and economic consequences of the war, particularly for civilians and businesses far from identifiable military targets.

Table 35: Reported Iranian Attacks and Civilian Impacts at Residential, Commercial and Industrial Facilities in the United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
58.	February 28, 2026	Fairmont The Palm, Dubai	1. Hotel Forecourt; 2. Parking Area and Vehicles	HRW verified direct drone strike; four injured [67].	High	Independent Verification
59.	March 1, 2026	Burj Al Arab, Dubai	1. Hotel Exterior Façade	Dubai authorities confirmed debris-related fire; Bellingcat reviewed footage [185, 186].	High	Official Confirmation
60.	March 1, 2026	Two Residential Homes, Dubai	1. Two Residential Courtyards	Dubai authorities confirmed interception debris; two injured [187].	High	
61.	March 1, 2026	Warda Residential Complex, Dubai	1. 19th-Floor Residential Apartment	Bellingcat verified direct drone impact in two videos [185].	High	Independent Video Verification
62.	March 12, 2026	Address Creek Harbour 2, Dubai	1. Residential-Hotel Building	Dubai authorities confirmed drone incident and fire; no injuries [188].	High	Official confirmation
63.	March 16, 2026	Unidentified Building, Umm Al Quwain	1. Unidentified Building	Umm Al Quwain Media Office confirmed drone strike and fire; no injuries [189].	High	

64.	March 28, 2026	Khalifa Economic Zone, Abu Dhabi (KEZAD)	1. Three Fire-Affected Areas	Abu Dhabi authorities confirmed interception debris, three fires and six injuries [190].	High	
65.	March 28–29, 2026	Emirates Global Aluminium, Al Taweelah	1. Aluminium Production Infrastructure	EGA confirmed significant damage following missile and drone attacks [191].	High	
66.	March 31, 2026	Residential Areas, Southern Dubai	1. Residential Properties Affected by Debris	Dubai authorities confirmed shrapnel incident; four injured [192].	High	

Table 35 documents ten incidents affecting residential, commercial, and industrial facilities in the UAE between February 28 and March 31, 2026.

The first incident occurred at Fairmont The Palm in Dubai on February 28, when a drone strike damaged hotel property, including the hotel forecourt, parking area, and vehicles, injuring four people. Human Rights Watch independently verified the strike. On March 1, a debris-related fire also affected the exterior of Burj Al Arab.

Residential areas were particularly affected on March 1. Interception debris fell into the courtyards of two homes in Dubai, injuring two people. On the same day, video evidence reviewed by Bellingcat showed a direct drone impact on a 19th-floor apartment at Warda Residential Complex. Further incidents occurred on March 12 at Address Creek Harbour 2 in Dubai and on March 16 at an unidentified building in Umm Al Quwain. Both involved drone-related fires, with no injuries reported. On March 31, shrapnel affected residential properties in southern Dubai, injuring four people.

Industrial facilities also suffered damage. On March 28, falling interception debris caused three fires in Khalifa Economic Zone Abu Dhabi (KEZAD), injuring six people. During March 28–29, Emirates Global Aluminium confirmed significant damage to its aluminium production infrastructure at Al Taweelah following missile and drone attacks. Satellite imagery provides further evidence of the destruction, showing extensive structural damage to a production cell line (Image 28).

A large section of the roof appears torn apart, exposing damaged structures and equipment beneath it. The damage is concentrated around the central part of the production building, while sections of the surrounding roof remain intact. The image demonstrates the severity of the physical damage, although the full extent of equipment losses and disruption to aluminium production cannot be determined from the imagery alone.




Image 28: Satellite imagery showing extensive structural damage to a production cell line at Emirates Global Aluminium's Al Taweelah plant, UAE, following Iranian strikes. Source: Pléiades Neo / Airbus Defence and Space; published by MizarVision on X.

These incidents show that the consequences of the war extended into homes, hotels, and workplaces. However, the records distinguish direct strikes from interception debris and shrapnel, which are not equivalent forms of impact. The available evidence establishes damage and injuries at several civilian locations, but it does not establish that every affected building was an intended target.

5.10. Telecommunications, Data Centres and Offices

Telecommunications networks, data centres, and company offices were among the civilian facilities affected in the United Arab Emirates during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. These facilities support digital services, communications, and everyday business activities. The incidents included direct drone strikes, missile impacts, and falling interception debris, affecting both major technology companies and local telecommunications providers. Damage to such infrastructure demonstrates how the war extended into civilian services and commercial activities beyond military installations.

Table 36: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage to Telecommunications, Data Centres and Office Buildings in the United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
67.	March 1, 2026	AWS Data Centre 1	1. Data Centre Facility	AWS confirmed direct drone impact and physical damage [193].	High	Company Confirmation
68.	March 1, 2026	AWS Data Centre 2	1. Data Centre Facility	AWS confirmed a second facility was directly struck [193].	High	
69.	March 22–23, 2026	Two Unidentified Data Centres, near Abu Dhabi	1. Data Centre Facility 1 2. Data Centre Facility 2	CTP–ISW reported two missile impacts; sites unverified [194].	Low	Irain claim
70.	March 30–31, 2026	Thuraya Telecommunications, Central Region, Sharjah	1. Administrative Building	Sharjah Media Office confirmed drone strike; no injuries [195].	High	Official confirmation
71.	April 4, 2026	Oracle Building, Dubai Internet City	1. Office Building Façade	Dubai Media Office confirmed interception debris; no injuries [196].	High	
72.	April 6, 2026	du Telecommunications Building, Fujairah	1. Telecommunications Building	Fujairah authorities confirmed drone attack; no injuries [197].	High	
73.	April 6, 2026	Raneen Systems, Musaffah ICAD, Abu Dhabi	1. Company Facility	Abu Dhabi authorities confirmed interception debris; one injured [198].	High	
74.	April 7, 2026	Thuraya Telecommunications, Central Region, Sharjah	1. Administrative Building	Sharjah authorities confirmed ballistic missile strike; two injured [199].	High	

Table 36 records eight incidents affecting telecommunications facilities, data centres, and company buildings in the UAE between March 1 and April 7, 2026. The most significant documented damage involved two Amazon Web Services (AWS) data centre facilities on March 1. AWS confirmed direct drone impacts and physical damage at both locations. These incidents demonstrate that digital infrastructure was directly affected by the fighting, rather than only disrupted by nearby military activity.

On March 22–23, two additional data centres near Abu Dhabi were reported as targets of missile strikes. However, their locations were not identified, and the reported impacts were not independently verified. These facilities therefore cannot be counted as confirmed additional losses.

Telecommunications companies were also affected. On March 30–31, Sharjah authorities confirmed a drone strike on an administrative building belonging to Thuraya Telecommunications, with no injuries reported. A second incident at Thuraya on April 7 involved a ballistic missile strike on an administrative building, injuring two people. The available information does not establish whether both incidents affected the same building or separate structures.

Other incidents involved company premises in Dubai, Fujairah, and Abu Dhabi. On April 4, interception debris damaged the façade of the Oracle Building in Dubai Internet City. On April 6, a drone attack affected the du Telecommunications Building in Fujairah, while interception debris struck a Raneen Systems facility in Musaffah, injuring one person.

The records distinguish direct strikes from damage caused by interception debris. They also identify potential overlaps, particularly the two incidents involving Thuraya Telecommunications. These distinctions are necessary when assessing the number of affected facilities and estimating their replacement costs.

5.11. Other Military and Civilian Sites

The effects of the war in the United Arab Emirates were not confined to major military bases and airports. Incidents were also reported at smaller military facilities, along public roads, and in residential areas. Some involved direct drone strikes, while others resulted from falling missile or interception debris. These incidents caused property damage and civilian deaths, showing how the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran affected people and places beyond the main military targets.

Table 37: Reported Iranian Attacks, Strike Claims and Civilian Impacts at Other Military and Civilian Sites in the United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
75.	February 28, 2026	Unspecified U.S. Military Bases	1. Unspecified U.S. Military Facilities	IRGC claimed attacks on U.S. bases in the UAE [200].	Low	Iranian Claim
76.	March 1, 2026	Al-Salam Naval Base, Abu Dhabi	1. Naval Warehouse 2. Two Storage Containers	UAE MoD confirmed a two-drone strike and storage fire [201].	High	Official confirmation
77.	March 1, 2026	Unspecified Location, Sharjah	1. Unspecified Facilities	CTP–ISW reported a drone attack; impact unverified [184].	Low	
78.	March 12, 2026	Sheikh Zayed Road, Dubai	1. Civilian Building Façade	Dubai Media Office confirmed debris damage; no injuries [202].	High	
79.	March 16, 2026	Al Bahyah, Abu Dhabi	1. Civilian Vehicle	Abu Dhabi authorities confirmed missile impact and one death [203].	High	
80.	March 17, 2026	Bani Yas, Abu Dhabi	1. Ground Area	Abu Dhabi Media Office confirmed one death from missile debris [204].	High	

Table 37 covers six reported incidents involving military and civilian locations in the United Arab Emirates between February 28 and March 17, 2026. The military-related reports include an IRGC claim of attacks on unspecified U.S. bases on February 28 and a reported drone attack at an unidentified location in Sharjah on March 1. Neither report establishes independently verified damage to a specific facility.

A more clearly documented incident occurred at Al-Salam Naval Base in Abu Dhabi on March 1. The UAE Ministry of Defence confirmed a two-drone strike that caused a fire involving naval storage facilities, including a warehouse and two storage containers.

Civilian areas were also affected. On March 12, interception debris damaged the façade of a building on Sheikh Zayed Road in Dubai, with no injuries reported. Four days later, a missile impact in Al Bahyah, Abu Dhabi, struck a civilian vehicle and killed one person. On March 17, another person was killed by missile debris in Bani Yas. The distinction between these incidents is important. The Al-Salam incident involved a confirmed strike on a military installation, while the incidents on Sheikh Zayed Road and in Bani Yas involved debris. The Al Bahyah incident involved a reported missile impact. Together, these records document both military damage and the human consequences of missile and drone warfare in civilian areas.

5.12. Unspecified Locations and Attacks

Between March 5 and April 8, 2026, the UAE Ministry of Defence released a series of reports documenting Iranian missile and drone activity across the country. Some projectiles reached the ground, while others were intercepted before reaching their intended targets. In many cases, the authorities did not identify where the weapons landed or which facilities were targeted. These reports provide a broader picture of the attacks on the UAE, but the absence of precise locations makes it difficult to assess the resulting damage or determine whether military or civilian infrastructure was affected.

Table 38: Iranian Missile and Drone Impacts and Interceptions at Unspecified Locations in the United Arab Emirates

NO.	Date	Base/ Location	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
81.	March 5, 2026	Unspecified Locations	1. One Ballistic Missile Ground Impact 2. Six Drone Ground Impacts	UAE MoD confirmed one missile and six drones landed; sites unidentified [205].	High	Official Confirmation
82.	March 6, 2026		1. Three Drone Ground Impacts 2. Unspecified Intended Targets	UAE MoD confirmed three drones landed; nine ballistic missiles intercepted [206].	High	
83.	March 7, 2026		1. Two Drone Ground Impacts 2. Unspecified Intended Targets	UAE MoD confirmed two drones landed; 15 ballistic missiles and 119 drones intercepted [207].	High	
84.	March 8, 2026		1. Four Drone Ground Impacts 2. Unspecified Intended Targets	UAE MoD confirmed four drones landed; 16 ballistic missiles and 113 drones intercepted [208].	High	

85.	March 9, 2026		1. One Drone Ground Impact 2. Unspecified Intended Targets	UAE MoD confirmed one drone landed; 12 ballistic missiles and 17 drones intercepted [209].	High	
86.	March 10, 2026		1. Nine Drone Ground Impacts	UAE MoD confirmed nine drones landed; individual sites unidentified [210].	High	
87.	March 11, 2026		1. Unspecified Intended Missile and Drone Targets	UAE MoD confirmed interception of six ballistic missiles, seven cruise missiles and 39 drones [211].	High	
88.	March 27, 2026		Unspecified Intended Targets	UAE MoD reported engagement of six ballistic missiles and nine drones; no specific impact sites identified [212].	High	
89.	March 29, 2026			UAE MoD reported engagement of 16 ballistic missiles and 42 drones; targets unidentified [213].	High	
90.	March 30, 2026			UAE MoD confirmed interception of 11 ballistic missiles and 27 drones [214].	High	
91.	March 31, 2026			UAE MoD confirmed interception of eight ballistic missiles, four cruise missiles and 36 drones [215].	High	
92.	April 1, 2026			UAE MoD confirmed interception of five ballistic missiles and 35 drones [216].	High	
93.	April 2, 2026			UAE MoD reported engagement of 19 ballistic missiles and 26 drones [217].	High	
94.	April 4, 2026			UAE MoD reported engagement of 23 ballistic missiles and 56 drones [218].	High	
95.	April 8, 2026			UAE MoD reported engagement of 17 ballistic missiles and 35 drones [219] 0020.	High	

Table 38 records 15 daily reports issued by the UAE Ministry of Defence between March 5 and April 8, 2026, covering missile and drone impacts, interceptions, and engagements at unspecified locations.

Between March 5 and 10, UAE authorities reported at least 26 drone ground impacts and one ballistic missile ground impact. The largest number of reported drone impacts occurred on March 10, when nine drones reached the ground. However, the authorities did not identify the affected locations or establish whether the impacts caused damage to buildings, military facilities, or civilian infrastructure.

The remaining reports, covering March 11 and selected dates between March 27 and April 8, mainly documented the interception or engagement of incoming missiles and drones. These included ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aircraft. Although the Ministry of Defence confirmed these military responses, the available information does not establish the intended targets or any resulting physical damage.

These records should therefore be distinguished from documented attacks on identifiable facilities. A confirmed interception does not establish that a particular military base or civilian site was targeted, while a ground impact does not necessarily indicate damage to infrastructure.

The reports illustrate the wider risks created by the war, including falling debris, unexploded munitions, and potential harm to civilians. However, without identified impact sites or independent damage assessments, these incidents cannot be assigned to specific facilities or included as confirmed infrastructure losses in the cost assessment.

6. Kuwait

Kuwait was among the countries affected by the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, experiencing reported missile and drone attacks against military installations, civilian infrastructure, and economic facilities. The country's longstanding role in hosting U.S. military forces and supporting U.S. operations in the Middle East placed it within the wider geographical scope of the conflict. However, the consequences of the attacks extended beyond facilities associated with the United States, affecting Kuwaiti military installations, public infrastructure, commercial activities, and essential civilian services.

Kuwait has hosted a substantial U.S. military presence for decades, with installations such as Ali Al Salem Air Base, Camp Arifjan, and Camp Buehring supporting military aviation, logistics, equipment storage, and regional operations. During the conflict, Iranian sources repeatedly identified these installations as targets. Independent reporting, video evidence, and satellite imagery documented physical damage at several locations, including aircraft shelters, military buildings, radar-related infrastructure, and support facilities. Nevertheless, other reported attacks, particularly those involving communications systems, ammunition depots, and military equipment, remain independently unverified.

The Kuwait assessment documents 103 incident records, including 93 records concerning reported attacks, damage, or disruption and 10 records involving missile and drone interceptions at unspecified locations. These records cover incidents reported between February and September 2026. They do not necessarily represent 103 distinct attacks or independently verified cases of damage. Some facilities were reportedly targeted on different dates, while others appeared in multiple reports or satellite investigations. This creates uncertainty over whether the records concern separate incidents, repeated attacks on the same facilities, or different descriptions of previously documented damage.

The financial assessment provides illustrative replacement and repair cost estimates for selected military and civilian infrastructure across seven locations in Kuwait. The combined estimated value ranges from approximately $3.77 billion to $4.93 billion, with a reported average of $4.39 billion. These figures cover facilities associated with U.S. military operations, Kuwaiti military installations, and civilian airport infrastructure. They are based on publicly available military construction, procurement, and infrastructure benchmarks rather than verified reconstruction expenditure. The estimates therefore represent hypothetical replacement and repair values, not confirmed U.S. military losses. Uncertainty regarding the actual extent of damage, asset specifications, and possible duplication further limits their precision.

An important feature of the Kuwait assessment is the distinction between U.S. military assets and facilities belonging to Kuwait or serving civilian purposes. Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base is a Kuwaiti military installation, while Kuwait International Airport primarily serves civilian aviation. Although the airport has historically supported U.S. military logistics, the available evidence does not establish that its damaged passenger terminal, fuel storage facilities, or radar systems were owned or operated by U.S. forces at the time of the attacks. Similarly, the inclusion of Kuwaiti military and civilian facilities in the report does not imply U.S. ownership, operational control, or financial responsibility for their replacement.

The consequences of the war extended considerably beyond military installations. Reported attacks affected Kuwait's oil and petroleum sector, including refineries, fuel storage facilities, petrochemical infrastructure, and administrative buildings. Power generation and water desalination facilities also experienced damage, fires, and temporary shutdowns, threatening the continuity of essential public services. Additional incidents involved

commercial ports, border infrastructure, government institutions, private warehouses, and foreign commercial projects. These cases demonstrate how the effects of the conflict reached civilian economic activities and infrastructure on which the population depends.

The assessment also records missile and drone interceptions announced by Kuwaiti authorities. These incidents are presented separately because the available statements do not consistently identify the intended targets, interception locations, or resulting physical damage. Their inclusion documents the wider scale of aerial attacks and defensive activity without assuming that every intercepted projectile was directed at an U.S. military installation or caused infrastructure losses.

The following sections examine reported incidents at individual military bases, naval facilities, airports, ports, energy installations, government buildings, and other civilian locations. The analysis distinguishes independently documented damage from Iranian-reported claims, identifies possible overlaps between reported incidents, and estimates illustrative replacement or repair costs where suitable benchmarks are available. Facilities whose U.S. ownership or military use has not been established are identified separately to avoid presenting Kuwaiti civilian or military infrastructure damage as confirmed U.S. military losses.

Overall, Kuwait's experience demonstrates how the presence of foreign military forces can expose a host country to the consequences of wars involving external powers. Although U.S. military installations were among the reported targets, the effects extended to Kuwaiti infrastructure, civilian lives, public services, and economic activities.

6.1. Ali Al Salem Airbase

Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait was among the military installations repeatedly targeted during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Reports documented attacks affecting different parts of the base, including aircraft shelters, military buildings, fuel storage facilities, air-defence equipment, radar installations, and infrastructure associated with unmanned aerial vehicles.

The available evidence includes satellite investigations published by *The New York Times*, The Washington Post, and BBC Verify, alongside imagery released by open-source researchers and Iranian sources. These materials provide different levels of information about the reported attacks. While satellite imagery documents physical damage to several structures, other reports identify military targets without independently establishing whether they were destroyed.

Table 39 brings together the reported incidents at Ali Al Salem Air Base between February and September 2026. It distinguishes independently documented damage from reported attacks and identifies the facilities associated with each incident. This distinction is important for understanding the extent of the damage without treating every reported target as a confirmed loss.

Table 39: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1.	February 28, 2026	1. Roofs of Structures in Several Different Locations	Damaged status has been reported by *The New York Times* with Satellite imagery [220].	High	Satellite Imagery
2.	February 28, 2026	1. Runway	ANSA reported significant runway damage during [221].	Medium	Iranian Claim
3.	March 1, 2026	1. Unspecified Military Facilities	Kuwaiti-reported attack; site-specific damage unverified [222].	High	Official Confirmation
4.	March 3, 2026	1. Six Buildings or Structures 2. Two Buildings	Damaged or destroyed status has been reported by *The New York Times* with Satellite imagery [1].	High	Satellite Imagery
5.	March 4, 2026	1. Four Aircraft Shelters 2. Military Equipment Storage	Damage reported by the Washington Post with Satellite imagery [114].	High	Satellite Imagery
6.	March 21, 2026	1. Fighter Aircraft Hangars 2. Fuel Storage Facilities	IRGC-reported target. Specific damage was not independently confirmed [136].	Low	Iranian Claim
7.	April 5, 2026	1. Unspecified Military Facilities	Saraya Awliya al-Dam claim; no independent verification [223].	Low	Iranian Claim
8.	April 6, 2026	1. Unspecified Military Facilities	Specific facility damage was not identified [224].	High	Iranian Claim
9.	May 7, 2026	1. Nine Fuel Bladders	Washington Post satellite-verified damage [3].		Satellite Imagery
10.	May 7, 2026	1. Patriot Missile Defense Equipment 2. Radomes. Unspecified Quantity	Damage identified through satellite imagery analyzed by The Washington Post [3].		
11.	June 2–3, 2026	1. Probable Aircraft/UAV Hangar	BBC verify-reported destroyed structure [225].		BBC
12.	June 6, 2026	1. Unspecified Military Facilities	IRGC-reported attack; damage is not verified [5, 226, 227].	Low	Iranian Claim
13.	June 10, 2026	1. Unspecified Military Facilities			
14.	June 11, 2026	1. Unspecified Military Facilities			
15.	June 28, 2026	1. Military Shelters 2. Radar Systems 3. Communications Systems	Iranian sources reported targeting these facilities. The reported destruction was not independently verified [228].	Low	

		4. Watchtowers			
16.	July 9, 2026	1. Military Infrastructure	IRGC-reported attack; damage is not verified [35, 229-231].	Low	
		2. Unspecified Military Facilities			
17.	July 13, 2026	1. Fuel Tanks			
		2. Patriot Air Defense Systems			
18.	July 16, 2026	1. C-RAM Early Warning Radar			
19.	July 16, 2026	1. Radar Systems			
		2. Patriot Air Defense Batteries			
		3. Fuel Storage Tanks			
		4. US Troop Assembly Point			
20.	July 18, 2026	1. Radar Facility	IRGC-reported destruction; independently unverified [36].		
21.	July 19, 2026	1. Patriot Missile Systems	Iranian Army-reported strikes; damage unverified [232].		
		2. Air-Defense Radar Installations			
22.	July 21, 2026	1. Mq-9 Drone Hangar	IRGC-reported destruction; damage unverified [50].	Low	
		2. Several Drones			
		3. Long-Range Radar Site			
		4. Communications Center			
		5. Satellite-Receiving Systems			
		6. US Missile Defense Radar			
23.	July 21, 2026	1. Large Ammunition Depot	Reported destruction; independent verification pending [233].	Low	
		2. Personnel Accommodation Structures (Six Destroyed and Three Damaged)			
24.	July 21, 2026	1. Early Warning Radar	Iranian-reported targets; independent verification pending [234].	Low	
		2. Tactical Radar Complex			
25.	July 22–23, 2026	1. Multiple Unspecified Military Sites	OSINT-reported damage [235].	Medium	
26.	July 30, 2026	1. Two Drone Hangars	IRGC-reported destruction; damage unverified [236].	Low	
		2. Fuel Tank			
27.		1. U.S. Command Headquarters	IRGC-reported destruction; damage unverified [237].	Low	

	September 2, 2026	2. Personnel Accommodation 3. Drone Hangar 4. Deployment Ramp			

Table 39 records 27 incident entries at Ali Al Salem Air Base, numbered 8 – 34, covering the period from February 28 to September 2, 2026. The reports describe attacks on a wide range of military facilities, with varying levels of independent verification. The most clearly documented damage includes affected buildings, aircraft shelters, fuel storage equipment, and other structures identified through satellite imagery.

The early incidents provide some of the strongest visual evidence. *The New York Times* reported damage to structures at different locations within the base following the initial attacks, while The Washington Post subsequently identified damage to aircraft shelters and military equipment storage facilities. Its later satellite analysis also documented damage involving fuel bladders, Patriot-related equipment, and radomes. These findings indicate that the reported damage was distributed across several functional areas rather than confined to a single part of the installation.

The June incidents introduced further evidence of damage to aircraft-related infrastructure. BBC Verify reported a destroyed structure assessed as a probable aircraft or UAV hangar, while additional satellite imagery circulated by open-source researchers identified damage to a shelter within the base. These findings are particularly relevant because they document physical changes to identifiable structures, although the available evidence does not always establish the exact function of each building or the date of the strike.

During July and September, Iranian sources reported additional attacks involving radar facilities, Patriot systems, fuel storage, UAV hangars, communications infrastructure, ammunition storage, and personnel accommodation. These reports suggest a broad range of intended targets, but the claimed destruction of individual systems has not been independently established in every case. Some descriptions may also refer to facilities affected during earlier attacks, making it necessary to examine possible overlaps before treating them as additional losses.

Overall, the table demonstrates the difference between the number of reported attacks and the number of independently documented damaged facilities. The accompanying satellite images provide more detailed evidence of selected structures, while the wider incident register preserves reports for which physical damage remains uncertain. This approach is important when assessing the consequences of repeated attacks without overstating the available evidence or counting the same damage more than once.

Image 29 presents two satellite views of an aircraft or UAV shelter at Ali Al Salem Air Base, highlighting the location of reported damage. The upper image, dated March 6, 2026, identifies a darkened area within the marked structure, while the lower image provides a clearer view of the shelter and its position within the surrounding military compound. The shelter is located close to several other structures and paved access routes connected to the base's aircraft operations. The comparison helps identify the affected location and provides context for the damage reported at the installation. The imagery was published by Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT), which identified the structure as a drone or aircraft shelter.



Image 29: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing reported damage to a drone/aircraft shelter at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, following Iranian missile and drone strikes in June 2026. Source: Satellite imagery analysis published by Egypt's Intel Observer **(@EGYOSINT) on X (3 June 2026).**

The image is relevant to the aircraft shelter damage recorded in Table 39, particularly the incidents reported during early March. However, the available material does not establish whether the marked shelter corresponds to one of the four aircraft shelters identified by The Washington Post or represents a different structure. It should therefore be treated as additional visual evidence requiring location-based comparison rather than automatically counted as a separate destroyed shelter.

The surrounding layout provides useful geographical details for identifying the structure in other satellite investigations. The curved access road, nearby shelters, and adjoining paved areas offer reference points that could help researchers match this location with damage documented in subsequent imagery.

Such comparisons are particularly important at Ali Al Salem Air Base, where several attacks reportedly affected aircraft-related infrastructure during different periods of the war. Establishing whether the same shelter appears in multiple investigations would help distinguish newly documented damage from repeated observations of an earlier incident.



Image 30: Satellite imagery (3 September 2026) showing damage to two U.S. military barracks at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, following Iranian strikes. One appears destroyed, with debris clearance at the other. Source: Soar Atlas / Airbus Defence and Space; @tabzlive, via @MarioNawfal (7 September 2026).

Image 30 provides a wider view of a military compound at Ali Al Salem Air Base, with an enlarged section highlighting two visibly affected buildings. The satellite imagery, dated September 3, 2026, shows the structures within a larger area containing rows of similar buildings and internal access roads.

The enlarged view makes the damage easier to identify. One building appears to have sustained substantial structural damage, while the second shows visible changes and debris around the affected area. The surrounding buildings provide a useful comparison, as several retain their regular rectangular appearance.

The image adds to the satellite evidence of physical damage recorded at Ali Al Salem Air Base during the war. However, September 3 is the imagery date and should not be presented as the confirmed date of the attack. The exact functions of the two buildings also remain uncertain, and the available information does not establish whether they correspond to structures already documented in Table 39.

The arrangement of the buildings provides additional context for assessing the affected area. The structures are positioned in organised rows, separated by narrow access routes and open spaces. This layout allows the damaged locations to be compared with nearby buildings of similar dimensions and appearance. The concentration of damage around two identifiable structures, rather than across the entire compound, also helps define the visible extent of destruction.



Image 31: Satellite imagery showing extensive structural damage to at least one building at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, following reported Iranian strikes in July 2026. The facility's exact function remains unverified. Source: Soar Atlas satellite imagery, published by MizarVision (@MizarVision) on X (24 July 2026).

Image 31 shows extensive structural damage within a section of Ali Al Salem Air Base containing multiple long, rectangular buildings. The satellite imagery, published by MizarVision on July 24, 2026, identifies an area where at least one structure appears severely damaged, with irregular debris scattered across the surrounding ground.

The most striking feature is the contrast between the affected location and the neighbouring buildings. Several nearby structures retain their regular roof shapes, while the central damaged area shows a disrupted outline and a concentration of scattered material. This provides visual evidence of substantial physical destruction rather than merely a reported attack.

The location is surrounded by closely positioned buildings, making the image useful for understanding the concentration of military infrastructure within this part of the base. However, the precise function of the damaged structure has not been established. It would therefore be inappropriate to identify it definitively as an ammunition depot, accommodation building, or UAV facility solely from the satellite image.

The visible debris also raises questions about the condition of the affected building. If the damage extends beyond the roof to the supporting structure, restoration could involve more than replacing damaged roofing materials. However, the satellite image cannot establish the condition of the building's foundations, internal equipment, or structural supports. A reliable replacement-cost estimate would therefore require information about the building's dimensions, construction type, and original function, none of which can be determined with confidence from the available imagery.




Image 32: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing damage to a facility at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, following an Iranian strike on 8 July 2026. Iranian sources identified the targets as U.S. UAV ground control units and communications antennas. Source: Iranian state media satellite imagery.

Image 32 presents before-and-after satellite imagery released by Iranian state media concerning an attack reported on July 8, 2026, at Ali Al Salem Air Base. The images identify two locations within a military compound that Iranian sources described as UAV ground control units and communications antennas.

In the earlier image, the marked areas contain several identifiable objects and structures. In the subsequent image, visible changes appear at the highlighted locations, including darkened areas and differences in the arrangement of objects. These changes are consistent with reported physical damage, although the imagery does not independently establish the exact equipment present before the attack.

The reported targets are significant because UAV ground control equipment and communications systems perform different functions from aircraft shelters or fuel storage facilities.

Damage to such equipment could affect the operation and coordination of unmanned aircraft, but the images do not establish whether the reported systems were operational, destroyed, or subsequently replaced.

The July 8 attack described in the image should also be distinguished from the July 9 incident recorded in Table 39. Without further evidence, it is not possible to determine whether these dates refer to separate attacks or different reporting dates for the same event. The image is therefore retained as Iranian-source evidence of reported damage, rather than independent confirmation of the claimed destruction of UAV control and communications systems.



Image 33: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing severe damage to a UAV shelter at Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait, following Iranian strikes. The imagery shows substantial structural destruction at the marked location. Source: Soar Atlas / Airbus Defence and Space satellite imagery.

Image 33 provides a before-and-after satellite comparison of a UAV shelter at Ali Al Salem Air Base. The imagery, supplied by Soar Atlas and Airbus Defence and Space, shows a substantial change in the condition of the marked structure between the two observations.

In the earlier image, the shelter has a recognisable roof and a regular structural outline. In the later image, the marked location appears heavily disrupted, with much of the original roof structure no longer clearly visible. The contrast between the two images provides strong visual evidence of severe structural damage at the identified location.

This image is particularly relevant to the aircraft and UAV shelter incidents recorded in Table 39. Unlike reports that identify intended targets without showing the consequences, the satellite comparison documents a visible change to a specific structure. However, the image does not establish the exact date of the attack, whether UAVs were inside the shelter, or whether the damage corresponds to a previously recorded incident.

The image therefore strengthens the physical evidence of damage to aircraft-related infrastructure at Ali Al Salem Air Base. It also illustrates the importance of distinguishing the destruction of a shelter from the loss of any aircraft or equipment that may have been housed inside it. No additional UAV losses should be inferred from the shelter damage alone.

Taken together, Images 29–33 provide visual evidence of damage to different structures at Ali Al Salem Air Base, including aircraft or UAV shelters, military buildings, and facilities identified by Iranian sources as communications and UAV control infrastructure. The satellite images complement the incidents recorded in Table 39 by showing physical changes at selected locations, although the precise functions and strike dates of some structures remain uncertain. The findings demonstrate the extent to which the 2026 war affected military infrastructure in Kuwait, while also highlighting the need to distinguish verified physical destruction from reported targets and potentially overlapping incidents.

6.1.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Ali Al Salem Air Base

The reported attacks on Ali Al Salem Air Base affected various military facilities, including aircraft shelters, buildings, fuel storage infrastructure, radar systems, and air-defence equipment. As documented in Table 39, some damage was independently identified through satellite imagery, while other reported losses remain unverified. Table 40 estimates the illustrative replacement costs of these facilities using publicly available military construction and procurement benchmarks. Lower, upper, and average values are provided to account for differences in facility specifications and equipment costs.

To minimise double counting, the assessment adopts a minimum unique-asset approach, excluding potentially overlapping facilities from the aggregate. The resulting estimates represent illustrative full replacement costs rather than confirmed financial losses.

Table 40: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Ali Al Salem Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Roofs of Structure*	$0.498M	$2.376M	$1.437M	Assuming six damaged roofs, the lower estimate is $0.498M (6 × $0.083M), and the upper estimate is $2.376M (6 × $0.396M), based on Holloman AFB roof-repair contracts, averaging $1.437M [238].
2.	Runway*	$4.5M	$64.4M	$34.45M	Lower: $4.5M, based on partial runway repairs at Hill AFB [239]. Upper: $64.4M, based on a broader runway rehabilitation estimate attributed to Osan AFB [240], pending source verification. Average: $34.45M.
3.	Six Buildings or Structures*	$12.5M	$37.68M	$25.09M	Six buildings or structures × $2.083M–$6.28M per building, using comparative construction-cost benchmarks from Ali Al Salem and Fort Bliss [241, 242].
4.	Two Buildings	$4.17M	$12.56M	$8.363M	Two buildings × $2.083M–$6.28M per building, based on Ali Al Salem and Fort Bliss comparative benchmarks; potential overlap with the six buildings previously recorded [241, 242].**Error! Bookmark not defined.Error! Bookmark not defined.**
5.	Four Aircraft Shelters*	$22.73M	$25M	$23.865M	Four × $5.68M–$6.25M, based on Kunsan aircraft shelter projects [242].

6.	Military Equipment Storage*	$4.5M	$32M	$18.25M	Lower: $4.5M, based on a military storage facility construction benchmark [240]. Upper: $32M, based on a DLA storage construction benchmark [243]. Assuming one warehouse, the average is $18.25M. Actual storage size and damage extent remain unknown.
7.	Fighter Aircraft Hangars	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	Based on a U.S. Army drone hangar project at Fort Carson, estimated at $15–20 million, including maintenance and supporting facilities [41].
8.	Nine Fuel Bladders*	$0.065M	$0.672M	$0.3685M	Nine × $7,251–$74,620 per collapsible tank; capacities unknown [244, 245].,
9.	Patriot Missile Defense Equipment	$180M	$280M	$230M	One Patriot configuration assumed; upper comparison uses DSCA package, lower provisional [246].
10.	Radomes*	$15M	$20M	$17.5M	One antenna facility assumed; Schriever project estimate includes radome infrastructure and utilities [247].
11.	Aircraft/UAV Hangar	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	See number 7.
12.	Military Shelters*	$0.10M	$0.12M	$0.11M	Assumes full replacement of one prefabricated military shelter, using a U.S. National Guard procurement benchmark of approximately $107,626, rounded to an illustrative range of $100,000–$120,000.
13.	Radar Systems*	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support). [20]
14.	Communications Systems*	$39M	$57.8M	$48.4M	One communications facility assumed; Camp Roberts and NAVFAC benchmarks [90].
15.	Watchtowers*	$0.27M	$0.27M	$0.27M	One observation/control tower assumed; historical USACE pricing [248].
16.	Patriot Air Defense Systems*	$1,090.00M	$1,100.00M	$1,095.00M	Assumes full replacement of one Patriot battery, including radar, launchers, command-and-control equipment, support equipment and missiles. Based on CSIS and Congressional Research Service estimates of approximately $1.1 billion per complete battery.
17.	C-RAM Early Warning Radar	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 13.

18.	Radar Systems	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 13.
19.	Patriot Air Defense Batteries	$180M	$280M	$230M	One Patriot configuration assumed; possible overlap with other entries [246].
20.	Fuel Storage Tanks*	$17M	$35M	$26M	Assumes replacement of one complete fuel-storage facility. The lower benchmark is a $17M fuel complex at Fresno Air National Guard Base, including storage tanks and associated infrastructure [249]. The upper benchmark is a $35M fuel facility at General Mitchell Airfield, including two bulk storage tanks, pumping systems, and supporting infrastructure [250].
21.	Radar Facility	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 13.
22.	Patriot Missile Systems	$180M	$280M	$230M	One Patriot configuration assumed; possible overlap with other Patriot entries [246].
23.	Air-Defense Radar Installations	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 13.
24.	Mq-9 Drone Hangar	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	See number 7.
25.	Long-Range Radar Site	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 13.
26.	Communications Center	$1.00M	$10.00M	$5.50M	Assumed one terminal installation with associated equipment [49].
27.	Satellite-Receiving Systems	$1M	$10M	$5.5M	One satellite terminal installation assumed; provisional equipment estimates. [10]
28.	US Missile Defense Radar	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 13.
29.	Large Ammunition Depot*	$15M	$30M	$22.5M	One ammunition depot assumed; provisional construction comparisons [251].
30.	Personnel Accommodation Structures*	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
31.	Early Warning Radar	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 13.
32.	Tactical Radar Complex	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 13.
33.	Two Drone Hangars*	$30.00M	$40.00M	$35.00M	Assumes full replacement of two drone hangars at $15–20 million each, based on a U.S. Army drone hangar project at Fort Carson, including maintenance and supporting facilities [41].

34.	Fuel Tank	$6.00M	$24.00M	$15.00M	Based on DLA FY2022 fuel infrastructure projects: $6M at Misawa Air Base and $24M at Kadena Air Base. Values are indicative construction benchmarks, excluding fuel inventory and unverified equipment losses [12].
35.	Command Headquarters*	$200.00M	$200.00M	$200.00M	This estimation is based roughly on the estimation of Fifth Fleet Headquarters as determined by *The Wall Street Journal* [4].
36.	Personnel Accommodation	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	See number 30.
37.	Drone Hangar	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	See number 7.
38.	Deployment Ramp*	$11.71M	$11.71M	$11.71M	One aircraft-apron construction comparison [252].
	Illustrative Total*	**$1.470B**	**$1.689B**	**$1.580B**	

Valuation Note: *(*) Indicates the facilities included in the illustrative total under the full replacement scenario. Only the 18 marked entries were counted, while the remaining 20 entries were excluded to minimise potential double counting of similar or overlapping assets. All reported facilities remain listed in the table for transparency. Exclusion from the total does not establish that the facilities or attacks were duplicates. The estimated costs represent illustrative full replacement values, not confirmed financial losses.*

Table 40 presents 38 estimated replacement-cost entries for military facilities and infrastructure at Ali Al Salem Air Base. The illustrative total ranges from $1.470 billion to $1.689 billion, averaging approximately $1.580 billion. These estimates cover a selected minimum set of assets rather than every facility reported as targeted.

The largest component is one complete Patriot air-defence battery, valued at approximately $1.095 billion, accounting for around 69% of the average total. Other significant estimates include the command headquarters ($200 million), runway ($34.45 million), aircraft shelters, and drone hangars. These figures represent full replacement benchmarks, not confirmed destruction or actual repair costs.

The assessment also considers fuel storage, radar systems, communications facilities, ammunition storage, and personnel accommodation. However, several reports in Table 39 describe similar facilities on different dates, creating a risk of counting the same assets more than once. The unique-asset approach therefore excludes potentially overlapping entries from the aggregate without assuming that the reported attacks were identical.

Overall, the estimated $1.580 billion illustrates the potential replacement value of selected military infrastructure under the stated assumptions. It should not be interpreted as verified financial losses, particularly because some high-value equipment damage remains independently unconfirmed.

6.2. Ahmad al Jaber Air Base

Ahmad Al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait was reportedly targeted by several missile and drone attacks during the 2026 war with Iran. Between March and September 2026, seven reported incidents involved military facilities, radar systems, air defense equipment, satellite communications systems, aircraft

hangars, and equipment storage facilities. While some reports indicated physical damage, others were based on Iranian military statements without independent confirmation. The following table presents the dates, targeted facilities, available evidence, and confidence levels for each reported incident.

Table 41: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base, Kuwait

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
28.	March 14, 2026	1. Unspecified Military Facilities	Kuwait's Ministry of Defense reported material damage [253].	High	Official Confirmation
29.	June 11, 2026	1. Multiple Unspecified Facilities	IRGC-reported attack; damage unconfirmed by the US or Kuwait [254].	Low	Iranian Claim
30.	July 13, 2026	1. FPS Radar System	IRGC-reported radar destruction; independently unverified [230].		
31.	July 20, 2026	1. Radar System	Destroyed; verified by *The New York Times* [11].	High	*The New York Times*
32.	July 21, 2026	1. Early Warning Radar 2. Missile Defense Radar System 3. Satellite Communications System 4. Patriot Air Defense System 5. FPS-117 radar (Image 1)	Iranian-reported strikes; independent damage verification incomplete. However, satellite imagery published by the IRGC confirmed the damage to the FPS-117 radar [234].		Satellite Imagery
33.	July 31, 2026	1. Fighter Aircraft Hangars 2. Satellite Communication Systems 3. Equipment Warehouses	Iran confirmed this without any confirmation from the US or Kuwait [139, 234].	Low	Iranian Claim
34.	September 3, 2026	1. Satellite Communication Systems 2. Equipment Depots 3. Fighter Aircraft Hangars			

Table 41 documents seven reported incidents at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base between March 14 and September 3, 2026. The reported targets include radar installations, air-defence systems, satellite communications facilities, aircraft hangars, and equipment storage areas. Kuwait's Ministry of Defence confirmed material damage following the March 14 attack, while several subsequent incidents were reported by Iranian sources without independent damage verification.



Image 34: Before-and-after satellite imagery released by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on July 22, 2026, showing the reported destruction of an AN/FPS-117 early-warning radar at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base in Kuwait during an Iranian strike. (Source: IRGC)

Radar installations were repeatedly identified as targets during July. Reports dated July 13, 20, and 21 referred to radar systems, including an AN/FPS-117 early-warning radar. Image 34 presents satellite imagery released by the IRGC on July 22, showing reported damage at the radar installation. However, these reports may refer to the same facility rather than separate radar losses.

The July 31 and September 3 incidents also involved similar targets, particularly aircraft hangars and satellite communications systems. As the extent of damage remains uncertain, the seven records should not be interpreted as seven independently confirmed cases of physical destruction.

Image 34 presents before-and-after satellite imagery released by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on July 22, 2026. Iranian sources identified the location as

The earlier image shows a large circular radar structure surrounded by smaller buildings. In the subsequent image, the marked area appears substantially altered, with the original circular structure no longer clearly visible. These changes suggest significant physical damage, although the imagery alone cannot confirm the complete destruction of the radar's electronic components.

The AN/FPS-117 is a long-range air-surveillance radar used to detect and track aircraft. Its reported destruction would represent damage to air-surveillance infrastructure rather than aircraft or storage facilities. However, the radar incidents recorded on July 13, 20, and 21 in Table 41 may concern the same installation. The image therefore provides evidence relevant to the reported damage without establishing multiple independent radar losses.

6.2.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base

This subsection assesses the illustrative replacement costs of military facilities and equipment reportedly targeted at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Table 42 presents lower, upper, and average estimates based on available military procurement and construction benchmarks. To minimise potential double counting, the assessment includes selected assets in the aggregate while excluding potentially overlapping radar, communications, and storage facilities.

Table 42: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Ahmad al-Jaber Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	FPS Radar System *	$800.00M	$1,100.00M	$950.00M	Based on the U.S. DSCA's 2013 proposed sale of one AN/FPS-132 radar system: $800.00M for major defence equipment and $1,100.00M for the complete package, including support infrastructure and services. Historical full-system benchmarks, not verified damage costs [99, 100].
2.	Radar System	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support). [20]
3.	Early Warning Radar	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 2.
4.	Missile Defense Radar System	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See Number 2.
5.	Satellite Communications System *	$1.00M	$10.00M	$5.50M	Assumed one terminal installation with associated equipment [49].
6.	Patriot Air Defense System *	$1,090.00M	$1,100.00M	$1,095.00M	Assumes full replacement of one Patriot battery, including radar, launchers, command-and-control equipment, support equipment and missiles. Based on CSIS and Congressional Research Service estimates of approximately $1.1 billion per complete battery.
7.	FPS-117 radar *	$16.00M	$20.00M	$18.00M	Assumes full replacement of one AN/FPS-117 long-range 3D air surveillance radar at an indicative unit cost of $16–20 million. The estimate excludes additional site construction, radomes, maintenance contracts and other support infrastructure.

8.	Fighter Aircraft Hangars *	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	Based on U.S. military aircraft hangar construction benchmarks ranging from $18.49 million to $61 million [42].
9.	Satellite Communication Systems	$1.00M	$10.00M	$5.50M	See Number 5.
10.	Equipment Warehouses *	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].
12.	Equipment Depots	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	See Number 10.
	Illustrative Total *	**$1,929.23M**	**$2,301.00M**	**$2,115.12M**	

***Valuation Note**: (*) Indicates the six entries included in the illustrative total. The remaining five entries were excluded to avoid potential double counting of radar, communications, and storage facilities. The estimates reflect hypothetical full replacement costs, not verified losses.*

Table 42 presents an illustrative replacement-cost estimate ranging from $1.929 billion to $2.301 billion, with an average of approximately $2.115 billion. The assessment includes six selected entries, while five potentially overlapping entries are excluded from the aggregate.

The largest estimated component is one complete Patriot air-defence battery, valued at an average of $1.095 billion, followed by the FPS radar system at $950 million. Together, these two systems account for approximately 97% of the stated average total. However, the FPS radar valuation uses an AN/FPS-132 procurement benchmark, which should not be interpreted as the verified replacement cost of the AN/FPS-117 radar identified in the attack reports.

The remaining estimates cover the AN/FPS-117 radar, aircraft hangars, satellite communications equipment, and storage facilities. These figures represent illustrative full replacement values rather than independently verified losses. The actual financial impact remains uncertain because the extent of damage, equipment specifications, and possible overlap between reported incidents have not been fully established.

6.3. Camp Arifjan

Camp Arifjan in Kuwait was repeatedly identified in reports of Iranian attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The reported targets included radar domes, satellite communications equipment, military support facilities, ammunition storage, and other military infrastructure. Satellite investigations documented damage to communications-related structures, while several later attacks were reported by Iranian sources without independent confirmation of physical damage.

The following table presents eight reported incidents between March and July 2026, distinguishing satellite-documented damage from unverified claims and identifying possible overlaps between reports.

Table 43: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
35.	March 4, 2026	1. Three Radar Domes	Damage confirmed by Kuwait; satellite imagery reviewed [255].	High	Official Confirmation
		2. 1. Satellite Communications Dishes (Quantity Unspecified)	Regional damage reported; Camp Arifjan attribution unverified [255].	Medium	Iranian Claim
36.	March 4, 2026	1. Communications Equipment	Destruction reported by the Washington Post with Satellite imagery [114].	Medium	Satellite Imagery
37.	May 7, 2026	1. Radomes (Quantity Unspecified)	Satellite imagery documented damage; attack date unverified [3].	High	Satellite Imagery
38.	July 9, 2026	1. Military Infrastructure and Vital Facilities (Unspecified)	IRGC-reported strike; damage not independently verified [25, 36, 229, 256, 257].	Low	Iranian Claim
39.	July 18, 2026	1. U.S. Military Support Center			
40.	July 20, 2026	1. U.S. Special Naval Commando Stationing			
		2. Equipment Facilities			
41.	July 23, 2026	1. Ammunition Stores			
42.	July 24, 2026	1. U.S. Troop Positions			

Table 43 records eight reported incidents at Camp Arifjan, numbered 52–59. The strongest evidence concerns damage to radar domes and communications infrastructure, documented through satellite imagery and reporting by The Washington Post. The March 4 and May 7 entries may describe the same damaged radomes, particularly because the later report does not establish a separate attack date.

The July incidents identify additional targets, including military support facilities, ammunition stores, and troop positions. However, these reports rely primarily on Iranian statements, and the available evidence does not independently establish the extent of physical damage.

Overall, the table demonstrates the difference between documented infrastructure damage and reported attacks. Potential overlaps involving radar domes and communications equipment.

6.3.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Camp Arifjan

This subsection assesses the illustrative replacement costs of military facilities and infrastructure reportedly targeted at Camp Arifjan during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The assessment covers radar domes, satellite communications equipment, military support facilities, warehouses, ammunition storage, and personnel facilities. Potentially overlapping facilities are excluded from the aggregate to minimise double counting. The estimates represent hypothetical replacement values rather than independently verified financial losses.

Table 44: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Camp Arifjan

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Three Radar Domes	$45.00M	$60.00M	$52.50M	Assumes full replacement of three radar domes at $15–20 million each, based on the Schriever radar dome infrastructure benchmark
2.	Satellite Communications Dishes	—	—	$40.00M	As estimated by *The Wall Street Journal*.
3.	Communications Equipment*	$1.00M	$10.00M	$5.50M	Provisional allowance for a limited military communications installation. U.S. Navy procurement contracts demonstrate relevant satellite communications equipment and integration costs but do not establish a standalone system price
4.	Radomes*	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	See number 1.
5.	U.S. Military Support Center	$6.28M	$18.50M	$12.39M	Based on a $6.28M U.S. Army barracks construction benchmark [13] and the U.S. Air Force's $37.00M project for two dormitory buildings with supporting infrastructure at Al Udeid Air Base, equivalent to $18.50M per building [97].
6.	U.S. Special Naval Commando Stationing, Support	$12.00M	$51.00M	$31.50M	Assumes full replacement of one naval special operations support facility, using U.S. Special Operations Command construction benchmarks of $12M at Naval Base Coronado (FY2022) and $51M for a larger facility at the same base (FY2025). Actual facility specifications remain unknown.
7.	2. Equipment Facilities	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].
8.	1. Ammunition Stores	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	See number8

9.	1. U.S. Troop Positions	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
	Illustrative Total *	**$77.04M**	**$176.79M**	**$166.92M**	

Valuation Note: (*) *Indicates entries excluded to avoid potential double counting. Only unmarked entries were counted. The $40M satellite communications estimate is included in the average only. Figures represent illustrative replacement costs, not verified losses.*

Table 44 presents an illustrative replacement-cost estimate ranging from $1.929 billion to $2.301 billion, with an average of approximately $2.115 billion. The assessment includes six selected entries, while five potentially overlapping entries are excluded from the aggregate.

The largest estimated component is one complete Patriot air-defence battery, valued at an average of $1.095 billion, followed by the FPS radar system at $950 million. Together, these two systems account for approximately 97% of the stated average total. However, the FPS radar valuation uses an AN/FPS-132 procurement benchmark, which should not be interpreted as the verified replacement cost of the AN/FPS-117 radar identified in the attack reports.

The remaining estimates cover the AN/FPS-117 radar, aircraft hangars, satellite communications equipment, and storage facilities. These figures represent illustrative full replacement values rather than independently verified losses. The actual financial impact remains uncertain because the extent of damage, equipment specifications, and possible overlap between reported incidents have not been fully established.

6.4. Camp Buehring

Camp Buehring in Kuwait was repeatedly identified as a target of Iranian missile and drone attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Reported incidents affected different parts of the installation, including recreational facilities, garages, dining areas, power infrastructure, aircraft shelters, warehouses, and ammunition storage facilities.

The available evidence includes independently verified video footage, satellite imagery, and Iranian military statements. While some investigations documented physical damage to identifiable structures, other reports described attacks without independently confirming their consequences. The following table presents nine reported incidents between March and July 2026, distinguishing documented damage from unverified reports.

Table 45: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Camp Buehring, Kuwait

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
43.	March 1, 2026	1. Gym and Athletic Field	Drone impact independently verified by video [114].	Medium	Video Attribution
44.	March 2026	1. Garage	Damage reported from satellite imagery analysis [258].	Medium	

		2. Dining Area		Medium	Satellite Imagery
45.	March 5, 2026	1. Unspecified Military Facilities	Iranian Army-reported attack; damage not independently verified [259].	Medium	Iranian Claim
46.	May 7, 2026	1. Power Plant	Damage independently verified by satellite imagery [3].	High	Satellite Imagery
47.	July 19, 2026	1. Ammunition Depot	Iranian-reported attack; damage not independently verified [232].	Low	Iranian Claim
48.	July 22–23, 2026	1. Electronic Warfare Unit 2. Flight Control Tower 3. Medical Center 4. Helicopter Shelter 5. Warehouse	IRGC-reported strikes; shelter and warehouse damage supported by satellite imagery [235].	High	
49.	July 23, 2026	1. U.S. Troop Quarters 2. Two Helicopter Hangars	IRGC-reported attack; damage not independently verified [256].	Low	
50.	July 24, 2026	1. Military Equipment Warehouses	Iranian Army-reported attack; damage not independently verified [257].	Low	
51.	July 24, 2026	1. Three Ammunition 2. Equipment Storage Hangars	IRGC-reported destruction; not independently verified [10].	Low	

Table 45 records nine reported incidents at Camp Buehring between March 1 and July 24, 2026. The earliest documented incident involved a drone impact near a gym and athletic field on March 1, independently verified through video footage. Subsequent satellite investigations identified damage to a garage, dining facilities, and power infrastructure, demonstrating that the reported effects extended across different parts of the installation.

The July reports identified additional targets, including ammunition storage, electronic warfare equipment, a flight control tower, medical facilities, helicopter shelters, warehouses, and personnel accommodation. However, several of these reports relied on Iranian military statements without independent confirmation of the claimed destruction. Images 35–38 provide further visual evidence of reported damage at Camp Buehring. The imagery identifies multiple affected locations and shows substantial structural changes to selected shelters and buildings. Nevertheless, the dates of image publication do not necessarily establish when the damage occurred, and some structures may appear in more than one investigation.

Overall, the table documents both independently observed damage and reported attacks whose consequences remain uncertain. Potential overlaps between shelter, hangar, and warehouse records require particular attention before calculating the number of distinct damaged facilities.

Image 35 provides a broad satellite view of Camp Buehring, with red markers identifying locations reported as affected by Iranian strikes. The imagery, analysed by Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) and published on April 1, 2026, shows the distribution of marked locations across different sections of the installation.



Image 35: Satellite imagery showing multiple reported Iranian strike locations at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, with red markers identifying affected facilities. The reported impact locations were assessed using Sentinel-2L imagery. Source: Iranian-released satellite imagery, analysed by Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) on X (1 April 2026).

The image reveals that the reported damage was not concentrated in a single area. Markers appear near clusters of buildings, internal roads, and facilities adjacent to the large paved aviation area. This distribution is important because Camp Buehring contains different types of infrastructure within a relatively extensive military compound.

Unlike close-up images showing individual damaged structures, Image 35 provides geographical context for the reported incidents. It helps identify the relationship between affected locations and the surrounding infrastructure, including accommodation areas, operational buildings, and aviation-related facilities.

However, the red markers represent locations identified in the source analysis rather than independent confirmation that every marked structure was destroyed. The map also does not establish whether all the locations were affected during the same attack. It should therefore be used as an overview of reported damage locations rather than a count of independently verified losses.




Image 36: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing extensive roof damage to a helicopter maintenance hangar at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, following Iranian strikes. Damage at the site was visible by 14 April 2026. Source: Soar Atlas satellite imagery, released by Iranian state media.

Image 36 presents before-and-after satellite imagery showing substantial roof damage to a large helicopter maintenance hangar at Camp Buehring. The comparison, based on Soar Atlas imagery, identifies a major change in the appearance of the structure, with damage visible by April 14, 2026.

In the earlier image, the hangar has a largely intact, light-coloured roof and a regular oval-shaped outline. In the later image, much of the roof appears darkened or disrupted, with visible changes extending across the central section. The contrast provides evidence of significant structural damage to the facility.

The hangar is situated beside a large paved aviation area, indicating its connection to aircraft maintenance or support activities. Damage to such a structure may affect the availability of sheltered working space, although the image does not establish whether aircraft or maintenance equipment were present when the damage occurred.

This image provides visual evidence relevant to the aircraft-related infrastructure reported in Table 45. However, April 14 represents the date by which damage was visible, not necessarily the date of the strike. The location should also be compared with Image 37 before treating the two images as evidence of separate damaged shelters.



Image 37: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing severe roof damage to a large helicopter/UAV maintenance shelter at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, following Iranian strikes. Source: Iranian-released satellite imagery, shared by Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) on X (31 March 2026).

Image 37 provides a closer before-and-after comparison of a large maintenance shelter at Camp Buehring. The satellite images, shared by Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) on March 31, 2026, show a marked change in the structure's roof following reported Iranian strikes.

The earlier image shows a light-coloured, curved roof with a relatively uniform surface. In the later image, the upper section appears torn open, exposing a darkened interior area and leaving part of the roof visibly distorted. The remaining lower section retains much of its original shape, indicating that the visible damage is concentrated towards one end of the structure. The close-up is particularly useful for examining the physical nature of the

damage. Unlike the wider view in Image 36, it shows the disruption to the curved roof more clearly. However, the imagery does not establish whether the supporting framework remained structurally sound or whether the shelter could subsequently be repaired.



Image 38: Satellite imagery of two structures at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, before (top) and after (bottom) reported Iranian strikes. The red boxes mark structures that Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) reported as destroyed on 15 April 2026.

Image 38 presents satellite comparisons of two structures at Camp Buehring, showing their condition before and after reported Iranian strikes. The upper images show the buildings with recognisable roof outlines, while the lower images reveal substantial changes at the same locations. Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) reported the structures as destroyed on April 15, 2026.

The structure on the left appears to have lost much of its original roof, leaving an irregular area of debris and darkened material.

The second structure, located beside a paved aviation area, shows a similarly severe change, with a dark central area replacing much of its previously visible roof. These differences provide strong visual evidence of extensive physical damage at both marked locations.

The comparison is significant because it documents damage to two identifiable structures rather than relying solely on reports of intended targets. Nevertheless, the imagery does not establish their precise military functions, whether equipment was stored inside them, or the exact dates on which the damage occurred.

In relation to Table 45, the image provides additional evidence of damage to buildings within the installation. However, the two structures should not automatically be assigned to the July warehouse or helicopter shelter reports, since the damage was already visible in imagery published during April. Together, Table 45 and Images 35–38 document reported attacks and visible structural damage across Camp Buehring, including aviation-related shelters and other military buildings. However, uncertainty surrounding strike dates, facility functions, and possible overlapping imagery prevents a definitive assessment of the total number of distinct facilities destroyed.

6.4.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Camp Buehring

This subsection assesses the illustrative replacement costs of military facilities reportedly damaged or targeted at Camp Buehring during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The assessment covers recreational facilities, maintenance buildings, power infrastructure, aircraft shelters, ammunition storage, and military support facilities.

Table 46 presents lower, upper, and average replacement-cost estimates based on comparable U.S. military construction projects. To minimise potential double counting, only selected facilities are included in the aggregate. The estimates represent hypothetical full replacement costs rather than confirmed financial losses.

Table 46: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Camp Buehring

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Gym and Athletic Field	$20M	$20M	$20M	Assumes one fitness facility at $20M, based on the Fort Carson contract exceeding $20M. Athletic field excluded; upper limit unverified [260].
2.	Garage	$10M	$30.5M	$20.25M	Assumes one garage at $10–30.5M, based on government construction estimates and the Fort Campbell maintenance facility [261, 262]. ,

3.	Dining Area	$5.2M	$17.9M	$11.55M	Assumes one dining facility at $5.2–17.9M, based on Bagram and Kunsan Air Base construction projects [263, 264]. ,
4.	Power Plant	$5M	$15M	$10M	Assumes one military microgrid at $5–15M, based on a USACE procurement estimate; not comparable to a conventional power station [265].
5.	Ammunition Depot	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Assumes one ammunition depot at $3.74–10M, using a military storage facility benchmark; excludes ammunition inventory [22, 23].
6.	Electronic Warfare Unit	$5M	$10M	$7.5M	Assumes one electronic warfare facility at $5–10M, based on a USACE FY2026 project forecast; specialised equipment excluded [266].
7.	Flight Control Tower	$20M	$40M	$30M	Assumes one flight control tower at $20–40M, based on the Fort Riley construction estimate [267].
8.	Medical Center	$25M	$100M	$62.5M	Assumes one medical facility at $25–100M, based on the Kwajalein clinic procurement estimate, not an awarded price [268].
9.	Helicopter Shelter	$5.68M	$6.25M	$5.965M	Assumes one helicopter shelter at $5.68–6.25M, based on Kunsan hardened aircraft shelter projects ($102.3M/18 and $125M/20); aircraft type differs [95, 96].
10.	Warehouse	$4.5M	$32M	$18.25M	Assumes one warehouse at $4.5–32M, based on Aviano Air Base and Anniston Army Depot construction benchmarks [91, 92].
11.	U.S. Troop Quarters	$6.28M	$6.28M	$6.28M	Assumes one accommodation building at $6.28M, based on the Fort Bliss barracks project ($62.8M/10) [269].
12.	Two Helicopter Hangars	$63.776M	$164M	$113.888M	Assumes two helicopter hangars at $31.888–82M each, based on Dammam and Wheeler Army Airfield projects; benchmarks include supporting facilities [270, 271].
13.	Military Equipment Warehouses *	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Assumes one equipment warehouse at $3.74–10M, based on U.S. Army storage construction benchmarks; inventory excluded [22, 23].
14.	Three Ammunition *	$2.7M	$9M	$5.85M	Assumes three ammunition magazines at $0.9–3M each, based on Hill AFB and an illustrative allocation of Fort Carson project costs [272, 273].
15.	Equipment Storage Hangars *	$4.5M	$32M	$18.25M	Assumes one equipment storage hangar at $4.5–32M, based on military storage construction benchmarks; specifications unknown [240].
	Illustrative Total *	**$174.176M**	**$451.930M**	**$313.053M**	

Valuation Note: *(*) Indicates entries excluded to avoid potential double counting. Only the 12 unmarked entries were included. Estimates represent illustrative full replacement costs, not verified losses.*

Table 46 presents illustrative replacement-cost estimates for 15 categories of military facilities at Camp Buehring. The aggregate covers 12 selected entries, ranging from $174.176 million to $451.930 million, with an average of approximately $313.053 million.

The largest estimated component is two helicopter hangars, valued at an average of $113.888 million, representing approximately 36% of the total. Other significant estimates include the medical centre ($62.50 million), flight control tower ($30 million), garage ($20.25 million), and gym facility ($20 million). These values are based on comparable construction projects rather than verified replacement requirements.

The assessment also includes storage facilities, ammunition infrastructure, personnel accommodation, and a helicopter shelter. However, several July incidents in Table 45 remain independently unverified, while some reported warehouses and ammunition facilities may overlap. Three potentially duplicate entries were therefore excluded from the aggregate.

Overall, the estimated $313.053 million represents the illustrative replacement value of selected military infrastructure under the stated assumptions. The actual financial losses remain uncertain because the extent of physical damage, facility specifications, and possible duplication have not been fully established.

6.5. Kuwait International Airport

Kuwait International Airport experienced several reported incidents affecting civilian aviation infrastructure during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The reported damage involved Terminal 1, aviation fuel storage tanks, radar systems, and other airport facilities. Kuwaiti authorities confirmed material damage in several incidents, while Reuters reported additional damage to fuel infrastructure and the airport terminal.

Table 47: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Kuwait International Airport

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
52.	February 28, 2026	1. Terminal (T1)	Material damage confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities [274].	High	Kuwait confirmation
53.	March 8, 2026	1. Fuel Storage Tanks	Fuel tank damage confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities [275].	low	
54.	March 12, 2026	1. Unspecified facilities	Material damage confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities [276].	High	
55.	March 14, 2026	Airport radar system	Radar strike confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities [277].	High	
56.	March 25, 2026	1. Fuel Tanks	Fuel tank damage reported by Reuters [278].	low	Reuters
57.	March 28, 2026	1. Radar System	Radar damage confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities [279].	High	Kuwait confirmation
58.	April 1, 2026	1. KAFCO aviation fuel storage tanks	Fuel tank damage confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities [280].	High	
59.	June 3, 2026	1. Terminal (T1)	Terminal damage independently verified [281].	High	Reuters

Table 47 records eight reported incidents at Kuwait International Airport between February 28 and June 3, 2026. The earliest incident involved material damage to Terminal 1, confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities. Further reports identified damage to fuel storage tanks, airport radar systems, and unspecified facilities during March and April.

Fuel infrastructure was repeatedly affected, with incidents recorded on March 8, March 25, and April 1. These reports include damage to aviation fuel storage facilities associated with KAFCO. However, the available information does not establish whether each incident involved different tanks or repeated damage to the same facilities.

Radar infrastructure was also identified as damaged on March 14 and March 28, while Reuters independently verified further damage to Terminal 1 on June 3. The two terminal incidents should be retained as separate reported events unless evidence establishes that the later report concerns previously documented damage. Overall, the incidents demonstrate how the war affected civilian aviation infrastructure, including passenger facilities, fuel storage, and airport radar systems.

6.5.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Kuwait International Airport

Kuwait International Airport is primarily a civilian aviation facility, although its historical use by U.S. military forces for air logistics has been documented. However, the available evidence does not establish whether the specific facilities damaged during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, including Terminal 1, fuel storage tanks, and airport radar systems, were operated or used by U.S. forces or Kuwaiti civilian authorities at the time of the attacks.

For the purposes of this report, these facilities are included in the assessment of infrastructure associated with the U.S. military presence in Kuwait because of the airport's documented historical role in supporting U.S. military logistics and the potential relevance of its aviation infrastructure to military operations. This inclusion is an analytical classification rather than a determination of U.S. ownership, operational control, or military use of the damaged facilities. It also does not establish that these facilities constituted military objectives under international humanitarian law.

Table 48 presents illustrative replacement and repair costs for the reported damage, using publicly available construction, rehabilitation, and military infrastructure benchmarks. To minimise potential double counting, repeated reports involving terminals, fuel storage facilities, and radar systems are consolidated into selected asset categories. The resulting estimates represent hypothetical financial benchmarks rather than verified U.S. military losses or confirmed reconstruction expenditures.

Table 48: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Kuwait International Airport

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Terminal (T1)	$1.58M	$3.15M	$2.37M	Illustrative partial-repair scenario equivalent to 10%–20% of the $15.76M historical T1 rehabilitation budget. The average is ($1.58M + $3.15M) / 2 = $2.37M. This concerns repairs, not construction of a new terminal [282].

2.	Fuel Storage Tanks	$17.00M	$35.00M	$26.00M	Assuming replacement of one complete fuel-storage facility, the lower estimate is $17M, based on the Fresno Air National Guard Base fuel project, and the upper estimate is $35M, based on the General Mitchell Airfield fuel project. The average is ($17M + $35M) / 2 = $26M [249, 283].
3.	Airport Radar System	$15.00M	$40.00M	$27.50M	Assuming replacement of one complete radar installation, the lower estimate is $15M and the upper estimate is $40M, based on the previously adopted FPS-117-class military radar benchmark [284]. This is an illustrative comparison because the civilian airport radar model remains unidentified.
4.	Fuel Tanks*	$17.00M	$35.00M	$26.00M	See number 2.
5.	Radar System*	$15.00M	$40.00M	$27.50M	Assuming replacement of one complete radar installation, the lower estimate is $15M and the upper estimate is $40M, based on the previously adopted military long-range radar benchmark [284].
6.	KAFCO Aviation Fuel Storage Tanks*	$17.00M	$35.00M	$26.00M	Assuming replacement of one complete aviation fuel-storage facility, the estimate ranges from $17M (Fresno) to $35M (General Mitchell), with an average of $26M. Potential overlap with the fuel-storage facilities recorded in the March 8 and March 25 incidents [249, 283].,
7.	Terminal (T1)*	$1.58M	$3.15M	$2.37M	See number 1.
	Illustrative Total	**$33.58M**	**$78.15M**	**$55.87M**	

Valuation Note: (*) Indicates entries excluded to avoid potential double counting

Table 48 presents seven estimated cost entries for infrastructure reportedly damaged at Kuwait International Airport. After excluding four potentially overlapping entries, the illustrative total ranges from $33.58 million to $78.15 million, averaging approximately $55.87 million. The assessment covers three principal asset categories: Terminal 1, aviation fuel storage infrastructure, and airport radar systems.

Fuel storage facilities represent the largest component, with an average estimated replacement value of $26 million, followed by airport radar infrastructure at $27.50 million. Terminal 1 is assessed separately using an illustrative partial-repair scenario averaging $2.37 million, rather than assuming the complete replacement of the passenger terminal. The radar estimate is based on a military radar benchmark, although the specifications of the airport's civilian radar system remain unidentified.

The assessment excludes repeated entries for fuel tanks, radar systems, and Terminal 1 to reduce the risk of counting the same infrastructure more than once. However, these exclusions do not establish that the reported incidents were identical or that no additional damage occurred during subsequent attacks.

Importantly, the estimated $55.87 million should not be interpreted as confirmed U.S. military losses. Although Kuwait International Airport has historically supported U.S. military logistics, the ownership, operational control, and military use of the specific damaged facilities have not been established. The figures therefore represent illustrative costs associated with damaged airport infrastructure included in the report's broader assessment of the consequences of the war.

6.6. Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base

Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base is a Kuwaiti military installation associated with the country's naval forces. During the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, the base was identified in several reports of Iranian attacks targeting naval infrastructure, military accommodation, equipment hangars, and personnel assembly facilities. However, the available evidence does not establish that the specific facilities reportedly targeted were owned or operated by U.S. forces.

The following table documents four reported incidents between February 28 and April 5, 2026. While Kuwaiti authorities confirmed a drone interception near the base, subsequent reports originated primarily from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), without independent confirmation of the reported physical destruction. The incidents are therefore included to document the reported attacks while distinguishing confirmed interceptions from unverified damage claims.

Table 49: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base, Kuwait

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
60.	February 28, 2026	1. Naval Base (Specific Facility Not Identified)	Drone interception confirmed by Kuwait; no base damage reported [285].	High	Iranian Claim
61.	March 1, 2026	1. Three Naval Infrastructure Buildings	IRGC-reported destruction; damage not independently verified [286].	Low	
62.	March 11, 2026	1. Equipment Hangars 2. Troop Accommodation 3. Assembly Facilities	IRGC-reported strikes; damage not independently verified [287].	Low	
63.	April 5, 2026	1. Military Commanders 2. Officers Assembly Point	IRGC-reported strike; damage not independently verified [288].	Low	

Table 49 records four reported incidents at Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base between February 28 and April 5, 2026. The earliest incident involved a drone interception confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities, with no reported damage to the installation. On March 1, the IRGC reported the destruction of three naval infrastructure buildings, although the claimed damage was not independently verified.

The March 11 incident reportedly targeted equipment hangars, troop accommodation, and assembly facilities. A further attack reported on April 5 identified military commanders and an officers' assembly point as targets. Both incidents were attributed to IRGC statements, and the available evidence does not independently establish the extent of physical damage or casualties.

Unlike several other installations examined in this report, Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base lacks independently verified evidence of structural destruction in the records presented. Furthermore, the available information does not establish whether the reported targets were Kuwaiti naval facilities or infrastructure used by U.S. forces. The four incidents should therefore be treated as records of reported military activity rather than four confirmed cases of damage.

Overall, the available evidence is insufficient to determine the number of facilities damaged or their financial replacement value. Any subsequent cost assessment should distinguish hypothetical infrastructure values from independently verified losses and should not automatically attribute damage to the United States.

6.6.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base, Kuwait

The reported Iranian attacks on Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base involved naval infrastructure, equipment hangars, troop accommodation, and military assembly facilities. Although the installation belongs to Kuwait's naval forces, its inclusion in this assessment reflects the wider geographical scope of attacks on military infrastructure in countries hosting U.S. forces. This classification does not establish U.S. ownership or operational control of the targeted facilities.

Table 50: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base, Kuwait

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Naval Base (Specific Facility Not Identified)	-	-	-	Actual sizes and functions unknown.
2.	Three Naval Infrastructure Buildings	$15.00M	$36.90M	$25.95M	Assumes full replacement of three buildings at $5–12.3M each, using military headquarters benchmarks [144, 149]. Actual sizes and functions unknown.
3.	Equipment Hangars	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].

4.	Troop Accommodation	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
5.	Assembly Facilities*	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
6.	Military Commanders	$5.00M	$12.30M	$8.65M	Assumes one command building using Fort Jackson headquarters ($5M) and a battalion headquarters/company facility ($12.3M) [143, 144].
7.	Officers Assembly Point*	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	See number 5.
	Illustrative Total	**$42.58M**	**$141.07M**	**$91.84M**	

Valuation Note: (*) *Indicates entries excluded to avoid potential double counting. Only unmarked, costed entries were included. Estimates represent illustrative replacement costs, not verified losses.*

Table 50 provides replacement-cost estimates for seven reported facility categories at Mohammed Al-Ahmad Naval Base. Five costed entries are included in the aggregate, producing an illustrative range of $42.58 million to $141.07 million, with an average of approximately $91.84 million.

The largest estimated component is three naval infrastructure buildings, valued at an average of $25.95 million. Other substantial components include troop accommodation ($16.79 million), military assembly facilities, equipment hangars ($6.87 million), and a command building ($8.65 million). These figures are based on comparable military construction projects, although the actual specifications of the reported targets remain unknown.

To reduce potential double counting, the officers' assembly point is excluded because it may overlap with the broader assembly facilities category. The unspecified naval base entry is also left unpriced. However, the absence of independent damage verification means that even the included facilities cannot be treated as confirmed replacement requirements.

The estimated $91.84 million therefore represents a hypothetical replacement value rather than established financial damage. Since the installation is Kuwaiti and the available evidence does not demonstrate U.S. ownership or control of the affected facilities, the total should be reported separately from independently verified U.S. military losses.

6.7. Camp Doha

Camp Doha, Kuwait, was historically associated with U.S. Army operations and military logistics in the Gulf region. During July 2026, Iranian sources identified the installation in reports of attacks against ammunition storage, logistics infrastructure, and U.S. troop positions.

Unlike installations where physical damage has been documented through satellite imagery or independent investigations, the three incidents recorded at Camp Doha rely on Iranian reports. The available evidence does not independently confirm the strikes' physical consequences or establish whether the facilities described were operational at the time. These reports are nevertheless included to document the range of military targets identified by Iranian sources during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran.

Table 51: Reported Iranian Attacks on Camp Doha, Kuwait

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
64.	July 22, 2026	1. U.S. Army Ammunition Depots 1. Logistical Equipment of the U.S. Army Land Forces Command Center	Attack reported; damage not independently verified [257, 289].	Low	Iranian Claim
65.	July 23, 2026	1. Ammunition warehouses 2. logistics warehouses			
66.	July 24, 2026	1. U.S. Troop Positions			

Table 51 identifies three reported incidents at Camp Doha on July 22, 23, and 24, 2026. The reports describe attacks against U.S. Army ammunition depots, logistical equipment associated with a land forces command centre, ammunition and logistics warehouses, and troop positions. The reported targets suggest an emphasis on military supply and support infrastructure rather than aircraft or air-defence systems.

Ammunition depots and logistics warehouses appear in consecutive reports, raising the possibility that the same facilities were referenced more than once. However, the available information is insufficient to determine whether these were separate strikes against distinct locations or repeated descriptions of earlier attacks.

All three incidents are classified as low confidence because their reported outcomes have not been independently verified. No confirmed damage assessment, identifiable satellite evidence, or reliable estimate of the affected facilities' condition is provided in the records.

Consequently, the table documents Iranian-reported military activity rather than established physical losses. Any replacement-cost assessment would require additional evidence identifying the facilities, confirming their existence and operational status in 2026, and establishing whether they sustained damage

6.7.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Camp Doha, Kuwait

The financial assessment of Camp Doha presents particular challenges because the reported attacks occurred at a site historically used by U.S. forces, while its operational status in 2026 remains unverified. Iranian reports identified ammunition depots, logistics warehouses, and troop positions as targets, but no independent evidence has established the destruction of these facilities or confirmed their continued use by U.S. forces.

Rather than treating the reported targets as verified losses, Table 52 applies comparable U.S. military construction costs to illustrate their potential replacement value. The resulting figures are hypothetical and should not be interpreted as actual U.S. military expenditure or confirmed damage.

Table 52: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Camp Doha, Kuwait

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Ammunition Depots	$15M	$30M	$22.5M	One ammunition depot assumed; provisional construction comparisons [251].
2.	Logistical Equipment of the U.S. Army Land Forces Command Center	-	-	-	Actual sizes and functions unknown.
3.	Ammunition warehouses*	$15M	$30M	$22.5M	See number 1.
4.	logistics warehouses	$23.00M	$32.90M	$27.95M	Assumes one warehouse using USACE benchmarks of $23–32.9M; average $27.95M. Historical, unadjusted replacement costs; size and quantity unknown. Contents excluded [130, 131].
5.	U.S. Troop Positions	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
	Illustrative Total	**$44.28M**	**$90.19M**	**$67.24M**	

Valuation Note: *(*) Indicates entries excluded to avoid potential double counting. Unpriced assets are also excluded. Estimates represent illustrative replacement costs, not verified losses.*

Table 52 presents illustrative replacement-cost estimates for military facilities targeted at Camp Doha in July 2026. The estimated total ranges from $44.28 million to $90.19 million, averaging approximately $67.24 million. The assessment covers ammunition depots, logistics warehouses, and troop accommodation, using comparable U.S. military construction benchmarks.

Logistics warehouses represent the largest estimated component ($27.95 million), followed by ammunition depots ($22.50 million) and troop accommodation ($16.79 million). Ammunition warehouses are excluded from the aggregate to avoid potential double counting, while logistical equipment remains unpriced because its specifications are unknown.

However, the reported damage has not been independently verified, and Camp Doha's operational status in 2026 remains uncertain. Consequently, these figures represent hypothetical replacement costs rather than confirmed U.S. military losses.

6.8. Ports and Maritime Facilities

The 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran also affected Kuwait's ports and maritime infrastructure, extending the consequences of the conflict beyond established military bases. Reported attacks involved Port Shuaiba, Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port, Shuwaikh Port, and Bubiyan Island, targeting facilities with different civilian, commercial, and military functions.

These incidents require particular attention because damage to port infrastructure does not necessarily indicate damage to U.S. military assets. While U.S. casualties were confirmed at Port Shuaiba, the other locations included Kuwaiti maritime infrastructure whose ownership and operational relationship with U.S. forces remain distinct. The following table documents the reported incidents, distinguishing officially confirmed damage from Iranian claims that have not been independently verified.

Table 53: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Ports and Maritime Facilities in Kuwait

No.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
67.	March 1, 2026	Port Shuaiba	Tactical Operations Centre	AP confirmed a drone strike and six U.S. deaths [3].	High	Iranian Claim
68.	March 27, 2026	Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port	Port Infrastructure	Kuwaiti Public Works Ministry confirmed drone and cruise-missile attacks causing material damage [290, 291].	High	Official Confirmation
69.	March 27, 2026	Shuwaikh Port	Port Infrastructure	Kuwait Ports Authority confirmed drone strikes and material damage [290, 292].	High	
70.	July 21, 2026	Bubiyan Island	Tactical Radar System	IRGC claimed radar destruction; no independent confirmation [293].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 53 documents four reported incidents affecting Kuwait's ports and maritime facilities between March 1 and July 21, 2026. The most consequential incident occurred at Port Shuaiba on March 1, where a drone strike killed six U.S. military personnel, as confirmed by the Associated Press. The reported target was a tactical operations centre, distinguishing this incident from attacks on civilian port infrastructure.

On March 27, Kuwaiti authorities confirmed attacks causing material damage at Mubarak Al-Kabeer Port and Shuwaikh Port. These incidents demonstrate the wider impact of the war on maritime infrastructure, although the available evidence does not establish that the damaged facilities were operated by U.S. forces.

The July 21 incident on Bubiyan Island involved an Iranian claim of destroying a tactical radar system, without independent confirmation. Overall, the four records illustrate the different consequences of attacks on military facilities and civilian maritime infrastructure.

6.9. Oil and Petroleum Facilities

Kuwait's oil and petroleum sector was also affected by Iranian drone attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Unlike the military installations examined in earlier sections, the facilities targeted in these incidents formed part of Kuwait's national energy infrastructure, including oil refineries, fuel storage facilities, and administrative buildings operated by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) and its subsidiaries.

The inclusion of these incidents highlights the wider economic and civilian consequences of the war beyond U.S. military installations. Although Kuwait's petroleum infrastructure may support broader national and international energy requirements, the available evidence does not establish that the specific damaged facilities were owned, operated, or used by U.S. forces. The following table documents the reported attacks and officially confirmed damage without classifying these facilities as U.S. military assets.

Table 54: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Oil and Petroleum Facilities in Kuwait

No.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
71.	March 19, 2026	Mina Al-Ahmadi Refinery	Refinery Operational Unit	KPC confirmed a drone strike and limited fire; no injuries [294].	High	Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
72.	March 19, 2026	Mina Abdullah Refinery	Refinery Operational Unit	KPC confirmed a separate drone strike and fire; no injuries [294].		
73.	April 5, 2026	Oil Sector Complex, Shuwaikh	KPC Headquarters; Ministry of Oil Building	KPC confirmed drone impact, fire and material damage [295].		
74.	April 5, 2026	KNPC and PIC Operational Facilities	Refining and Petrochemical Facilities	KPC confirmed drone strikes, fires and significant damage at multiple subsidiary facilities [296].		
75.	April 8, 2026	KPC-Affiliated Facilities	Refineries; Fuel Storage Tanks	Kuwaiti Interior Ministry confirmed attacks and damage to refineries and fuel storage tanks [297].		Official Ministry Statement

Table 54 documents five reported incidents affecting Kuwait's oil and petroleum infrastructure between March 19 and April 8, 2026. On March 19, separate drone strikes affected Mina Al-Ahmadi and Mina Abdullah refineries, causing fires that were confirmed by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. No injuries were reported in either incident.

On April 5, further attacks affected the Oil Sector Complex in Shuwaikh, including KPC headquarters and the Ministry of Oil building. KPC also reported damage to operational facilities associated with Kuwait National Petroleum Company and Petrochemical Industries Company. These incidents extended the reported damage beyond refinery operations to administrative and petrochemical infrastructure.

The April 8 incident involved additional attacks on KPC-affiliated facilities, including refineries and fuel storage tanks, as confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities. However, the available information does not establish whether all the facilities reported in April were distinct from those previously damaged, creating a potential risk of double counting. Overall, these incidents demonstrate the wider consequences of the war for Kuwait's energy

sector. While the reported damage was confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities, the affected facilities are classified as Kuwaiti petroleum infrastructure rather than U.S. military losses.

6.10. Power Generation and Water Desalination Facilities

Power generation and water desalination facilities were among the essential civilian infrastructure affected in Kuwait during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. These installations provide electricity and desalinated water, making damage to their infrastructure particularly significant for civilian life and the continuity of public services.

Table 55: Reported Attacks and Damage at Power Generation and Water Desalination Facilities in Kuwait

No.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
76.	March 29, 2026	Unidentified Power and Desalination Plant	Service Building	Kuwaiti Electricity Ministry confirmed building damage and one worker killed [298].	High	Ministry of Electricity
77.	April 3, 2026	Unidentified Power and Desalination Plant	Plant Components	Kuwaiti Electricity Ministry confirmed damage to plant components [299].		
78.	April 5, 2026	Power and Desalination Plant 1 (Unidentified)	Power Generation and Desalination Infrastructure	Kuwaiti Electricity Ministry confirmed damage at two plants and two generation units shut down [300].		
79.	April 5, 2026	Power and Desalination Plant 2 (Unidentified)		Same official statement; second plant confirmed damaged [300].		
80.	April 8, 2026	Power and Desalination Plant 1 (Unidentified)		Kuwaiti Defence Ministry confirmed three plants struck by drones [301].		
81.	April 8, 2026	Power and Desalination Plant 2 (Unidentified)		Same official statement; second plant included [301].		
82.	April 8, 2026	Power and Desalination Plant 3 (Unidentified)		Same official statement; third plant included [301].		
83.	July 17, 2026		1. Plant Facilities			

		Unidentified Power and Desalination Plant	2. Electricity Generation Units	Kuwaiti Electricity Ministry confirmed damage, fire and temporary unit shutdowns [302].		
84.	July 18, 2026	Unidentified Power and Desalination Plant	Plant Components 2. Electricity Generation Units	Kuwaiti Electricity Ministry confirmed fire and precautionary generation-unit shutdowns [303].		
85.	July 19, 2026	Same Plant as July 18	1. Plant Facilities 2. Electricity Generation Units	Kuwaiti Electricity Ministry confirmed a second attack on the same plant [304].		

Table 55 documents ten incident records affecting Kuwait's power generation and water desalination infrastructure between March 29 and July 19, 2026. The earliest reported attack damaged a service building and killed one worker. Further incidents in April affected plant components and electricity generation facilities, including attacks on two plants on April 5 and three plants on April 8.

The July incidents involved additional damage, fires, and temporary shutdowns of electricity generation units. On July 19, Kuwaiti authorities confirmed a second attack on the same plant affected on July 18, indicating a separate reported incident rather than simply a repeated account of earlier damage.

Although the incidents were confirmed by Kuwaiti authorities, the identities of several affected plants remain unspecified. Consequently, the April records may contain overlapping facilities, while repeated attacks in July should not automatically be counted as damage to different assets. These incidents demonstrate the consequences of the war for Kuwait's essential civilian infrastructure, including electricity and water services.

6.11. Government and Diplomatic Facilities

The effects of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran extended to government and diplomatic facilities in Kuwait, affecting both U.S. diplomatic property and Kuwaiti public institutions. Reported incidents involved the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City, the Public Institution for Social Security headquarters, the Ministries Complex, and an unidentified government facility.

These locations differ from the military bases examined earlier in this report. Although the U.S. Embassy represents U.S. government property, it is not automatically classified as a military installation, while the other affected buildings belong to Kuwait's civilian government infrastructure. Their inclusion provides a broader account of the war's consequences for public administration, and civilian institutions.

Table 56: Reported Attacks and Damage at Government and Diplomatic Facilities in Kuwait

No.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source

86.	March 2, 2026	U.S. Embassy, Kuwait City	Embassy buildings and warehouse	U.S. State Department cables documented damaged windows and a warehouse fire; AFP diplomatic sources confirmed drone impacts [305, 306].	High	Official Confirmation
87.	March 8, 2026	Public Institution for Social Security Headquarters	Social security headquarters	Reuters footage confirmed façade damage and smoke; Bloomberg reported a fire following a drone attack [307, 308].		Reuters Visual Evidence
88.	April 4, 2026	Ministries Complex	Government ministries building	Kuwaiti Finance Ministry confirmed major damage from a drone strike; Kuwait Fire Force confirmed fires [309, 310].		Official Confirmation
89.	August 1, 2026	Unspecified Government Facility	Government facility	Kuwaiti Defence Ministry reported the facility targeted by drones; debris caused material damage, but facility-specific impact remains unclear [311].		

Table 56 documents four reported incidents affecting government and diplomatic facilities in Kuwait between March 2 and August 1, 2026. The first involved the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City, where U.S. State Department records documented damaged windows and a warehouse fire, while diplomatic sources confirmed drone impacts. This incident represents damage to U.S. diplomatic property rather than a confirmed U.S. military facility.

On March 8, Reuters footage documented façade damage and smoke at the Public Institution for Social Security headquarters, while Bloomberg reported a fire following a drone attack. A subsequent strike on April 4 caused major damage to the Ministries Complex, as confirmed by Kuwait's Ministry of Finance and the Kuwait Fire Force.

The final incident, recorded on August 1, involved an unidentified government facility. Kuwaiti authorities reported material damage associated with drone debris, although the precise location and extent of damage remain unclear.

6.12. Other Civilian, Commercial and Industrial Infrastructure

Beyond military installations and major public infrastructure, the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran also affected private businesses, commercial facilities, and civilian transport infrastructure in Kuwait. Reported incidents involved logistics warehouses, a border crossing, a Chinese company's project site, and private vehicles on Bubiyan Island.

Table 57: Reported Attacks and Damage to Civilian, Commercial and Industrial Infrastructure in Kuwait

No.	Date	Base/location	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
90.	March 29, 2026	Private Logistics Warehouses	Logistics Warehouses	Kuwaiti Defence Ministry confirmed warehouse damage; no casualties [312].	High	Official Ministry Statement
91.	July 23, 2026	Abdali Border Crossing	Border Crossing Infrastructure	Kuwaiti Army confirmed drone impact and material damage; no casualties [313].		
92.	July 30, 2026	Chinese Company Project	Commercial Project Site	Kuwaiti Defence Ministry confirmed one death and material damage; Chinese Embassy identified a subcontractor vehicle as the impact site [314, 315].		
93.	August 1, 2026	Bubiyan Island	Private Company Vehicles	Kuwaiti Defence Ministry reported vehicles targeted and material damage from falling debris; vehicle-specific damage unconfirmed [311].		

Table 57 records four incidents affecting civilian and commercial infrastructure in Kuwait between March 29 and August 1, 2026. The first involved damage to private logistics warehouses, confirmed by Kuwait's Ministry of Defence, with no casualties reported. On July 23, a drone impact caused material damage at the Abdali border crossing, affecting infrastructure associated with cross-border movement.

The July 30 incident involved a Chinese company's project site, where Kuwaiti authorities confirmed material damage and one death. The Chinese Embassy subsequently identified a subcontractor's vehicle as the impact location, highlighting the consequences of the conflict for foreign commercial operations and workers.

On August 1, Kuwaiti authorities reported that private company vehicles on Bubiyan Island were affected by falling debris. However, the available evidence does not establish the precise extent of vehicle damage.

Taken together, these incidents demonstrate the broader effects of the war on civilian businesses, transport infrastructure, and commercial activities. Although material damage was officially reported, the facilities should not be classified as U.S. military losses.

6.13. Missile and Drone Interceptions at Unspecified Locations in Kuwait

In addition to the attacks on identifiable military and civilian facilities, Kuwait's Ministry of Defence reported numerous missile and drone interceptions during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. These incidents involved ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles, but the official announcements did not consistently identify the intended targets or the locations where interceptions occurred.

Unlike the preceding sections, which document attacks on specific installations, this section records others activity across Kuwait. The incidents are included to illustrate the scale of reported aerial threats without assuming that the intercepted projectiles were directed at U.S. military bases or caused physical damage to identifiable facilities.

Table 58: Reported Missile and Drone Interceptions in Kuwait During the 2026 War with Iran

No.	Date	Intercepted projectiles	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
94.	March 7, 2026	Seven drones	Kuwaiti Defence Ministry confirmed interceptions.	High	Official Ministry Statement
95.	March 10, 2026	Six drones			
96.	March 31, 2026	Five ballistic missiles; Seven drones			
97.	April 1, 2026	Three cruise missiles; 15 drones engaged			
98.	April 2, 2026	Two ballistic missiles; 13 drones			
99.	April 4, 2026	Eight ballistic missiles; 19 drones			
100.	April 6, 2026	14 ballistic missiles; 2 cruise missiles; 46 drones			
101.	April 7, 2026	17 drones			
102.	April 8, 2026	Multiple drones; exact number unknown			
103.	April 10, 2026	Seven drones			

Table 58 presents ten records of missile and drone interceptions reported by Kuwait's Ministry of Defence between March 7 and April 10, 2026. The incidents involved different combinations of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones, with particularly large numbers reported on March 31 and April 6.

The April 6 announcement recorded 14 ballistic missiles, two cruise missiles, and 46 drones, representing the largest reported number of projectiles in the table. Other significant incidents included the interception of eight ballistic missiles and 19 drones on April 4, and five ballistic missiles and seven drones on March 31.

Although these reports provide official confirmation the missile and drone interceptions in Kuwait, they do not establish the intended targets, precise interception locations, or resulting physical damage.

Consequently, these records are excluded from the assessment of replacement costs and confirmed infrastructure losses. They are retained separately to document the wider scale of missile and drone activity affecting Kuwait during the conflict.

7. Jordan

Jordan was among the countries affected by the expansion of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Its strategic location, proximity to Israel, Iraq, and Syria, and longstanding military relationship with the United States placed it within the wider geographical scope of the conflict. The presence of U.S. military personnel, aircraft, air-defence systems, and supporting infrastructure at Jordanian installations made several facilities targets of reported Iranian attacks. Consequently, the conflict extended beyond the principal belligerents, exposing Jordanian territory to missile and drone activity and the associated risks to military and civilian infrastructure.

The Jordan assessment documents 52 incident records between February and September 2026, including 33 records involving identified military installations, five incidents in Aqaba, and 14 records concerning attacks or interceptions at unspecified locations. These incidents involved air-defence radars, aircraft hangars, drone shelters, command-and-control facilities, fuel storage, personnel accommodation, and other military infrastructure. However, the records include both independently documented damage and unverified Iranian or Iraqi armed group claims, and therefore should not be interpreted as 52 confirmed attacks.

Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base was the most frequently recorded installation, with 19 incidents. Satellite imagery documented damage to aircraft hangars, drone shelters, and other structures, particularly during July 2026. Additional incidents were reported at King Faisal, Prince Hussein, and King Hussein air bases, although the available evidence varies considerably in strength. Some reported attacks were corroborated by satellite investigations or official statements, while others remain independently unverified.

The financial assessment covers four military installations, producing a combined illustrative replacement and repair cost range of approximately $1.50 billion to $2.81 billion, with a reported average of $2.15 billion. These estimates are based on U.S. military construction and procurement benchmarks and assumptions concerning the affected facilities. They do not represent confirmed U.S. military losses or actual reconstruction expenditure. Potential overlaps between reported damage to hangars, radar systems, and other infrastructure further limit their precision.

Other locations, including Camp Titin and Tower 22, could not be assigned replacement costs because the available information did not sufficiently identify the affected facilities or establish the extent of damage. Similarly, missile and drone interceptions in Aqaba and at unspecified locations were documented separately without assuming that they caused damage to U.S. military installations.

Overall, Jordan's experience illustrates how the presence of foreign military infrastructure can expose host countries to the wider consequences of regional warfare. The following sections examine the reported attacks, available evidence, and illustrative financial estimates while distinguishing verified structural damage from unconfirmed claims and recognising the broader risks to civilian safety and national sovereignty.

7.1. Muwaffaq Al Salti Airbase

Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base in Jordan was the subject of repeated Iranian-reported missile and drone attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The incident register covers 19 records between March and September 2026, involving air-defence systems, aircraft hangars, drone shelters,

command facilities, and military support infrastructure. While many reported attacks remain independently unverified, satellite imagery published in July and September provides evidence of physical damage to several structures. Images 39–44 illustrate the geographical distribution and visible consequences of these incidents, although the precise dates of impact, the functions of certain structures, and possible overlaps between damage reports require careful consideration.

Table 59: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base, Jordan

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
1.	March 2026	1. THAAD Missile Defense Radar 1. Air Defense Radar / Sensor	Radar damage reported by ABC News; corroborated by satellite imagery [258, 316].	High	Satellite Imagery
2.	March 26–April 1, 2026	1. Logistics Depots 2. Support Equipment Storage 3. U.S. Personnel Accommodation	Iranian Army-reported attack; damage not independently verified [317].	Low	Iranian Claim
3.	March 29, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Kataib Jund al-Karar-reported attack; damage not independently verified [318].	Low	Iranian Claim
4.	April 2, 2026	1. U.S. Fighter Aircraft	Iranian Army-reported attack; aircraft damage not independently verified [317].	Low	Iranian Claim
5.	April 5, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Saraya Awliya al-Dam-reported attack; damage not independently verified [319].	Low	Iranian Claim
6.	June 10, 2026	1. F-35 Aircraft Hangars 2. Command and Control Center 3. Two Other Unspecified Targets	IRGC-reported strikes; damage not independently verified [320].	Low	Iranian Claim
7.	July 9, 2026	1. U.S. Command and Control Center 2. Air Base Facilities	IRGC-reported attack; Jordan reported missile interceptions [321].	Low	Iranian Claim
8.	July 12, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iranian-reported attack; impact and damage not independently verified [322].	Low	Iranian Claim
9.	July 15, 2026	1. F-15 Aircraft Hangars 2. F-35 Aircraft Hangars 3. F-16 Aircraft Hangars	IRGC-reported destruction; losses not independently verified [323].	Low	Iranian Claim
10.	July 15, 2026	1. F/A-18 Aircraft Parking Areas		Low	Iranian Claim

		2. Large Military Equipment Hangars	Iranian Army-reported attack; damage not independently verified [324].		
11.	July 16, 2026	1. U.S. Command and Control Center 2. Fighter Aircraft Ramp	IRGC-reported destruction; damage not independently verified [325].	Low	Iranian Claim
12.	July 17, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iranian missile strike confirmed by U.S. officials; damage extent unclear [326].	High	Iranian Claim
13.	July 15-17, 2026	1. Airfield Hangar	Hangar damage independently verified by satellite imagery [11].	High	Satellite Imagery
14.	July 17-22, 2026	1. Several Buildings; Estimated 20 structures	Structural damage documented through imagery and verified reporting.	High	Satellite Imagery
15.	July 22, 2026	1. Two Hangars	Hangar damage independently verified through satellite imagery.	High	Satellite Imagery
		2. Three Drone Shelters	Drone shelter damage independently verified through satellite imagery.	High	Satellite Imagery
16.	July 24, 2026	1. Aircraft Hangars 2. Aviation Maintenance Hangars 3. Military Barracks	Iranian-reported attack; Jordan reported no material damage [10].	Low	Iranian Claim
17.	July 28, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Missile attack attempt confirmed; no base damage verified.	High	Iranian Claim
18.	August 30–31, 2026	1. Aircraft Maintenance Facilities 2. Fighter Aircraft Deployment Areas	Iranian-reported attack; Jordan reported intercepting eight missiles [327].	High	Iranian Claim
19.	September 8–9, 2026	1. Two Aircraft Shelters 2. Taxiway 3. Additional Aircraft Hangars 4. Aircraft Shelters and 5. Maintenance Areas	Aircraft damage confirmed by U.S. official; structural impacts identified through imagery [328].	Medium	U.S. official

The 19 incident records, as seen in Table 59, document a series of reported attacks against Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base, with the most substantial independently documented structural damage concentrated in July 2026. Earlier reports included damage to a THAAD air-defence radar, while subsequent Iranian statements identified aircraft facilities, command centres, logistical infrastructure, and personnel accommodation as targets. However, most of these claims lack independent confirmation of physical damage.

Satellite imagery provides stronger evidence for several July incidents. Images 40–43 identify damage affecting aircraft hangars, drone shelters, and other buildings within the installation. The *New York Times* visual investigation (Image 41) identifies damaged hangars, three drone shelters, and burned structures. These findings are relevant to Rows 13–15, particularly the reports of hangar damage between July 15 and 22. Nevertheless, the imagery does not establish that each reported strike produced a separate set of losses. Some structures shown in different images may represent the same damage documented by multiple sources.

Image 39 presents satellite imagery dated July 25, 2026, showing an area identified by MizarVision as a suspected fuel bladder at Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base. The inset highlights possible damage within the installation. However, the imagery does not independently establish the facility's function, the nature of the damage, or the date of impact. This observation may be relevant to the July attack records, but it cannot yet be assigned confidently to a specific incident or treated as a separately verified fuel-storage loss.

The suspected fuel-storage area is particularly relevant because fuel infrastructure supports aircraft operations and other activities within military installations. Nevertheless, the available imagery does not establish whether the identified structure contained fuel at the time of the reported strikes or whether its operational capacity was affected. Unlike the more clearly documented hangar and drone shelter damage shown in Images 40–43, the evidence in Image 39 remains inconclusive.



Image 39: Satellite imagery dated 25 July 2026 showing visible damage to a suspected fuel bladder at Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, Jordan, following a reported Iranian strike. Source: Soar Atlas satellite imagery, shared by MizarVision (@MizarVision) on X (27 July 2026).

Image 40 identifies three categories of reportedly damaged infrastructure: drone hangars, CAS/ISR aircraft hangars, and troop barracks. The annotated satellite imagery, shared by Egypt's Intel Observer on July 20, highlights visible changes at geographically separate locations within the base. These observations are relevant to the July incidents recorded in Rows 9–16. However, the precise functions of the structures and the relationship between the visible damage and individual Iranian-reported strikes have not been independently established.




Image 40: Satellite imagery showing reported strike damage to drone hangars, CAS/ISR aircraft hangars, and troop barracks at Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, Jordan, following Iranian strikes in July 2026. Source: Satellite imagery analysis shared by Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) on X (20 July 2026).



Image 41: Satellite imagery captured on 20 July 2026," visual presentation by Leanne Abraham, The New York Times, 22 July 2026.

Image 41 presents satellite imagery captured on July 20, 2026, and published by *The New York Times* on July 22. The annotated image identifies two damaged hangars, three damaged drone shelters, and additional burned structures at Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base. It provides important visual support for the structural damage recorded in Rows 13–15. The image also establishes the spatial distribution of the affected facilities, although it does not independently determine the exact date of each impact or confirm the destruction of aircraft housed within the structures.

The distribution of damage across different sections of the air base indicates that the visible impacts were not confined to a single building or operational area.

The affected structures include aviation-related facilities and buildings whose specific functions remain uncertain. However, the imagery alone cannot establish whether the damage resulted from one attack or several separate strikes during July 2026.

Some of the damaged hangars and drone shelters identified in Image 41 may correspond to structures documented in Images 40, 42, and 43. Treat these overlapping observations as supporting evidence of the same physical damage, not additional losses, unless you can geographically identify separate facilities.

Image 42 provides a closer view of an aircraft hangar showing substantial roof damage and darkened areas around the affected structure. The satellite imagery, shared by Al-Biruni.ID on July 25, supports the identification of physical damage to aviation infrastructure during the July attacks. This evidence

is relevant to the hangar damage documented in Rows 13–15. However, the structure may also appear in Images 40 and 41, and should not be counted as an additional damaged hangar without a geographical comparison.



Image 42:Satellite imagery showing visible damage to an aircraft hangar at Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, Jordan, following reported Iranian strikes in July 2026. The imagery highlights extensive damage to the hangar roof and surrounding structure. Source: Soar Atlas satellite imagery, shared by Al-Biruni.ID (@pararealmen) on X, July 25, 2026.

Image 43 shows severe structural damage within an area identified as drone-related infrastructure at Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base. The imagery highlights a heavily damaged central structure and two aircraft-shaped objects identified in the annotation as MQ-9 Reaper drones. Although the image indicates substantial structural damage, the aircraft identification and their damage status require separate verification. The image may overlap with the drone shelter damage shown in Images 40 and 41 and should therefore not be used to establish additional equipment losses without further evidence.



Image 43: Satellite imagery showing extensive damage to three drone hangars at Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, Jordan, following Iranian strikes in July 2026. A U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone may also have sustained shrapnel damage. Source: Iranian-released satellite imagery, shared by Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) on X (20 July 2026).

Image 44 presents satellite imagery circulated on September 11, 2026, showing an aircraft shelter area and several suspected impact locations following reported Iranian missile strikes in September. The imagery is relevant to Row 19, which records reported damage to aircraft shelters, maintenance areas, and a taxiway between September 8 and 9. However, the visible features do not independently establish the number of damaged aircraft, the severity of structural damage, or whether all identified marks resulted from missile impacts.



Image 44: Satellite imagery showing possible damage to a fighter aircraft shelter and several suspected impact craters at Muwaffaq al-Salti Air Base, Jordan, following reported Iranian ballistic missile strikes in September 2026. The extent and cause of the visible damage remain unconfirmed. Source: Satellite imagery shared by Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT) on X (11 September 2026).

Taken together, Images 39–44 provide visual evidence of damage to several facilities at Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base, particularly aircraft hangars, drone shelters, and other military structures affected during July 2026. The satellite imagery strengthens the documentation of physical damage, while also highlighting important uncertainties regarding the precise timing of individual strikes, the functions of certain facilities, and the extent of equipment losses. The September imagery suggests possible additional impacts, though their severity remains less clear.

7.1.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Muwaffaq Al Salti Airbase

The financial assessment of Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base examines the illustrative replacement value of military infrastructure identified in reported Iranian attacks and subsequent satellite investigations during 2026. Table 60 covers air-defence radars, aircraft hangars, drone shelters, command facilities, accommodation buildings, logistics infrastructure, and airfield surfaces. The estimates draw on publicly available U.S. military procurement and construction benchmarks, applying assumed quantities where the actual specifications of the affected facilities are unknown. Because several entries originate from unverified attack claims or may describe the same structures documented in satellite imagery, the estimates should be understood as hypothetical replacement values rather than confirmed financial losses.

Table 60: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Muwaffaq Al Salti Airbase

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	THAAD Missile Defense Radar	$500.00M	$500.00M	$500.00M	As estimated by ABC News [258]
2.	Air Defense Radar / Sensor	$110.00M	$130.00M	$120.00M	Estimated unit cost of $110M–$115M for legacy AN/MPQ-65 radars and $125M–$130M for next-generation LTAMDS radars. The range excludes launchers, interceptors and other battery components [16].
3.	Logistics Depots	$23.00M	$32.90M	$27.95M	Assumes one warehouse using USACE benchmarks of $23–32.9M; average $27.95M. Historical, unadjusted replacement costs; size and quantity unknown. Contents excluded [130, 131].
4.	Support Equipment Storage	$4.5M	$32M	$18.25M	Assumes one equipment storage hangar at $4.5–32M, based on military storage construction benchmarks; specifications unknown [240].
5.	U.S. Personnel Accommodation	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
6.	Fighter Aircraft	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	Based on U.S. military aircraft hangar construction benchmarks ranging from $18.49 million to $61 million [42].

7.	F-35 Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 6.
8.	Command and Control Center	$32.18M	$38.72M	$35.45M	Based on the U.S. Navy FY2026 Bahrain Tactical Operations Center estimate ($32.18M), including an additional $6.54M for secure compartmented facilities [21].
9.	F-15 Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 6.
10.	F-35 Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 6.
11.	F-16 Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 6.
12.	F/A-18 Aircraft Parking Areas	$30.07M	$30.07M	$30.07M	Based on a $30.07 million U.S. combat aircraft parking apron project at Hurlburt Field, used as an illustrative full-replacement benchmark [44].
13.	Large Military Equipment Hangars	$15M	$30M	$22.5M	One ammunition depot assumed; provisional construction comparisons [251].
14.	Fighter Aircraft Ramp	$11.71M	$11.71M	$11.71M	One aircraft-apron construction comparison [252].
15.	Airfield Hangar	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 6.
16.	Several Buildings; Estimated 20 structures	$100.00M	$246.00M	$173.00M	Assumes full replacement of approximately 20 structures at $5–12.3M each, using military headquarters benchmarks as proxies [144, 149]. Actual sizes and functions are unknown.
17.	Two Hangars	$36.98M	$122.00M	$79.50M	Assumes full replacement of two aircraft hangars at $18.49–61M each, based on U.S. military hangar construction benchmarks [42].
18.	Three Drone Shelters	$55.47M	$183.00M	$119.25M	Assumes full replacement of three aircraft hangars at $18.49–61M each, based on U.S. military hangar construction benchmarks [42].
19.	Aircraft Hangars	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 6.
20.	Aviation Maintenance Hangars	$10.00M	$20.00M	$15.00M	Based on a U.S. military aircraft hangar and maintenance shops construction project at Alpena, Michigan, estimated at $10–20 million, used as a full-replacement benchmark [45].

21.	Military Barracks	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks of $6.28–27.29 million. A $24 million galley-and-barracks valuation at NSA Bahrain provides an additional regional comparison [4, 46].
22.	Aircraft Maintenance Facilities	$10.00M	$20.00M	$15.00M	See number 20.
23.	Fighter Aircraft Deployment Areas	$30.07M	$30.07M	$30.07M	Based on a $30.07 million U.S. combat aircraft parking apron project at Hurlburt Field, used as an illustrative full-replacement benchmark [44].
24.	Two Aircraft Shelters	$36.98M	$122.00M	$79.50M	See number 17.
25.	Taxiway	$5.00M	$10.00M	$7.50M	Assumes full construction of one military taxiway at $5–10M, based on the USACE Erbil Airbase project estimate. Actual dimensions and damage extent remain unknown
26.	Additional Aircraft Hangars	$36.98M	$122.00M	$79.50M	See number 17.
27.	Aircraft Shelters	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 6.
28.	Maintenance Areas	$10.00M	$20.00M	$15.00M	See number 20.
	Illustrative Total	**$1,218.42M**	**$2,243.05M**	**$1,730.83M**	

Table 60 presents an illustrative replacement-cost range of $1,218.42 million to $2,243.05 million for the military facilities and infrastructure listed at Muwaffaq Al Salti Air Base. The reported average is approximately $1.73 billion. These figures reflect the estimated cost of replacing the listed assets under the assumptions adopted in the table, rather than the actual financial consequences of the attacks. Air-defence infrastructure accounts for a substantial share of the assessment. The THAAD radar alone is assigned a reference value of $500 million, while a separate air-defence radar or sensor is valued at $110–130 million. However, the available evidence does not conclusively establish whether these entries represent two distinct damaged systems.

Aircraft-related infrastructure also contributes significantly to the total. The assessment includes multiple fighter aircraft hangars, drone shelters, aircraft parking areas, maintenance facilities, and taxiway infrastructure. Satellite imagery presented in Images 40–43 supports the identification of structural damage at several locations, particularly during July 2026. Nevertheless, some of the separately valued hangars and shelters may correspond to the same structures documented in different reports. The estimate for approximately 20 damaged buildings presents a further overlap risk because the building count may include facilities already valued individually.

The remaining estimates cover logistics depots, equipment storage, command facilities, and personnel accommodation. Many of these entries are based on Iranian-reported targets without independent confirmation of damage. In addition, the use of U.S. construction benchmarks for facilities of unknown size, design, and function introduces considerable uncertainty. The full-replacement assumptions may substantially exceed the actual cost of

repairing partially damaged structures. Consequently, the approximately $1.73 billion reported average should be interpreted as a preliminary illustrative valuation of the listed infrastructure, not a verified measure of U.S. military losses.

7.2. King Faisal Air Base

King Faisal Air Base in Jordan appeared in reports of attacks attributed to Iranian forces and Iraqi armed groups during March and July 2026. The incidents involved military infrastructure, personnel accommodation, aircraft preparation facilities, and aviation support structures. While some reports remain unverified, U.S. official statements and open-source satellite investigations provide additional evidence concerning specific incidents. Table 61 distinguishes these findings from claims for which the extent of physical damage has not been independently established.

Table 61: Reported Iranian and Iraqi Armed Group Attacks and Damage at King Faisal Air Base, Jordan

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
20.	March 28, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iraqi fighters-reported attack; damage not independently verified [329].	Low	Iranian Claim
21.	July 15–20, 2026	1. Personnel Accommodation	Residential facility strike confirmed by U.S. officials [330].	High	
22.	July 21–22, 2026	1. Drone Preparation Hangar 2. Helicopter Storage Hangar 3. Personnel Housing	IRGC-reported strike; damage not independently verified.	Low	
23.	July 22–23, 2026	1. F-15E Fighter Jet Preparation Hangar 2. Military Facilities	Hangar damage identified through open-source satellite imagery analysis [235].	High	Satellite Imagery



Image 45:Satellite imagery released by Iranian state media appears to show a hangar destroyed at Jordan's King Faisal Air Base following the July 22 strike. The facility was reportedly used as a U.S. Special Forces ammunition depot. Source: Soar Atlas

Table 61 documents four reported incidents at King Faisal Air Base between March and July 2026. While several attacks remain independently unverified, U.S. officials confirmed a strike involving a residential facility.

Image 45 provides visual evidence of substantial structural damage following the reported July 22 strike, corresponding to Row 23.

The damaged building was reportedly used as a U.S. Special Forces ammunition depot, although its precise function remains unconfirmed. The imagery supports the identification of physical damage but does not establish the extent of equipment losses or the total financial consequences.

The satellite evidence strengthens the documentation of damage at the installation but also raises questions about the identification of the affected facility. Its reported use as an ammunition depot differs from the aircraft preparation hangar listed in Table 61.

Overall, the available evidence confirms structural damage at King Faisal Air Base, although the full extent of the losses remains uncertain. Further verification is required to establish the affected facilities' functions and ensure accurate, non-duplicative financial estimates.

7.2.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at King Faisal Air Base

The estimated replacement costs for King Faisal Air Base focus on five categories of military infrastructure identified in the July 2026 attack reports. Table 62 applies U.S. military construction benchmarks to personnel accommodation, drone and helicopter hangars, and an F-15E aircraft preparation facility. As the extent of physical damage remains uncertain, these estimates represent illustrative full-replacement costs rather than confirmed financial losses.

Table 62: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at King Faisal Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Personnel Accommodation	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
2.	Drone Preparation Hangar	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	Based on a U.S. Army drone hangar project at Fort Carson, estimated at $15–20 million, including maintenance and supporting facilities [41].
3.	Helicopter Storage Hangar	$5.68M	$6.25M	$5.965M	Assumes one helicopter shelter at $5.68–6.25M, based on Kunsan hardened aircraft shelter projects ($102.3M/18 and $125M/20); aircraft type differs [95, 96].
4.	Personnel Housing	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	See number 1.
5.	F-15E Fighter Jet Preparation Hangar	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	Based on U.S. military aircraft hangar construction benchmarks ranging from $18.49 million to $61 million [42].
	Illustrative Total	**$51.73M**	**$141.83M**	**$96.78M**	

Table 62 estimates the combined replacement value of the five listed facilities at $51.73 million to $141.83 million, with a reported average of $96.78 million. The F-15E fighter jet preparation hangar represents the largest individual component, with an estimated average value of $39.75 million, followed by the drone preparation hangar at $17.50 million.

Personnel accommodation and housing are each assigned an average replacement value of $16.79 million, although these entries may refer to overlapping facilities. The helicopter storage hangar contributes a further $5.965 million. Because several facilities were identified through Iranian-reported attacks without independently verified damage, the estimates remain provisional. The total should therefore be interpreted as an illustrative valuation of the listed infrastructure, rather than a confirmed assessment of destruction or reconstruction expenditure.

7.3. Prince Hussein Air Base

Prince Hussein Air Base in Jordan was identified in several Iranian and Iraqi armed group reports as a target during the 2026 conflict. Between March and September, reported attacks focused on command facilities, drone hangars, ammunition depots, fuel storage, and airfield infrastructure. Although the reports describe extensive damage, independent confirmation remains limited.

Table 63: Reported Iranian and Iraqi Armed Group Attacks and Damage at Prince Hussein Air Base, Jordan

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
24.	March 28, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iraqi resistance-reported attack; damage not independently verified [331].	Medium	Iranian Claim
25.	July 12, 2026	1. Command-and-Control Center 2. MQ-9 Drone Hangars	IRGC-reported destruction; damage not independently verified [332].	High	
26.	July 13, 2026	1. Fuel Storage Tanks 2. Ammunition Storage Facilities 3. Missile Depots	IRGC-reported fires; damage not independently verified [333].	High	
27.	July 22, 2026	1. Drone Preparation Hangar 2. Aircraft Preparation Hangar 3. Helicopter Storage Hangar 4. Personnel Housing	IRGC-reported attack; damage is not verified [334].	High	
28.	September 2, 2026	1. RQ-4 Drone Hangars 2. MQ-9 Drone Hangars 3. Technical Infrastructure 4. Airfield Runway	IRGC-reported attack; possible runway impact, but structural and aircraft losses unverified [335].	High	
29.	September 2, 2026	1. Counter-Drone Surveillance Radar System	Iranian media-reported radar damage; imagery inconclusive [336].	Medium	

Table 63 presents six reported incidents at Prince Hussein Air Base between March 28 and September 2, 2026. The March incident involved an attack reported by Iraqi resistance groups, while the July reports attributed to the IRGC identified command-and-control facilities, MQ-9 drone hangars, fuel tanks, ammunition depots, aircraft preparation facilities, and personnel housing as targets.

The September 2 reports introduced additional claims involving RQ-4 and MQ-9 drone hangars, technical infrastructure, the runway, and a counter-drone surveillance radar. However, the available evidence does not independently establish the reported destruction or the extent of structural damage. The possible runway impact and radar damage also remain inconclusive. Overall, the records demonstrate repeated targeting claims against the installation, but they do not establish six independently verified damaging strikes.

7.3.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Prince Hussein Air Base

The financial assessment of Prince Hussein Air Base considers the potential replacement and repair costs of military infrastructure identified in Iranian-reported attacks during July and September 2026. Table 64 applies U.S. military construction and procurement benchmarks to 14 listed facilities, including aircraft hangars, ammunition storage, fuel infrastructure, personnel housing, and surveillance systems. Given the limited independent verification of physical damage, these valuations remain illustrative rather than confirmed financial losses.

Table 64: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Prince Hussein Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Command and Control Center	$32.18M	$38.72M	$35.45M	Based on the U.S. Navy FY2026 Bahrain Tactical Operations Center estimate ($32.18M), including an additional $6.54M for secure compartmented facilities [21].
2.	MQ-9 Drone Hangars	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	Based on a U.S. Army drone hangar project at Fort Carson, estimated at $15–20 million, including maintenance and supporting facilities [41]
3.	Fuel Storage Tanks	$17.00M	$35.00M	$26.00M	Assuming replacement of one complete fuel-storage facility, the lower estimate is $17M, based on the Fresno Air National Guard Base fuel project, and the upper estimate is $35M, based on the General Mitchell Airfield fuel project. [249, 283].,
4.	Ammunition Storage Facilities	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].
5.	Missile Depots	$5.55M	$5.55M	$5.55M	Assumes replacement of one earth-covered missile or ammunition storage magazine, using the $5.55M White Sands Missile Range construction contract as an illustrative benchmark. Stored missiles are excluded
6.	Drone Preparation Hangar	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	See number 2.
7.	Aircraft Preparation Hangar	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	See number 2.
8.	Helicopter Storage Hangar	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	See number 2.

9.	Personnel Housing	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
10.	RQ-4 Drone Hangars	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	See number 2.
11.	MQ-9 Drone Hangars	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	See number 2.
12.	Technical Infrastructure	$1.62M	$9.36M	$5.49M	Assumes replacement of one communications infrastructure component, using U.S. military construction benchmarks of $1.624–9.360M [23].
13.	Airfield Runway	$4.5M	$64.4M	$34.45M	Lower: $4.5M, based on partial runway repairs at Hill AFB [239]. Upper: $64.4M, based on a broader runway rehabilitation estimate attributed to Osan AFB [240], pending source verification. Average: $34.45M.
14.	Counter-Drone Surveillance Radar System	$6.23M	$10.90M	$8.56M	Assumes replacement of one counter-drone surveillance radar system, using FY2025 U.S. Army procurement benchmarks of $6.23–10.90M per radar, including production and integration [23].
	Illustrative Total	**$167.10M**	**$321.22M**	**$244.16M**	

Table 64 estimates the combined illustrative replacement and repair value of the listed facilities at between $167.10 million and $321.22 million, with an average of $244.16 million. Aviation infrastructure represents a substantial component of the assessment, including MQ-9 and RQ-4 drone hangars, aircraft preparation facilities, and helicopter storage structures. The runway also contributes significantly to the estimated range, reflecting the difference between partial repair and broader rehabilitation benchmarks.

Other estimated costs relate to command-and-control infrastructure, fuel storage, ammunition and missile depots, personnel accommodation, and counter-drone surveillance equipment. However, most of these facilities were identified through Iranian reports without independent confirmation of physical damage.

Consequently, the estimated $244.16 million average should be interpreted as a hypothetical infrastructure valuation rather than verified military losses. The actual financial impact depends on the number of distinct facilities damaged, their specifications, and the extent of necessary repairs or replacement.

7.4. King Hussein Air Base

King Hussein Air Base in Jordan was identified in reports of military infrastructure damage and subsequent Iranian attacks during July and August 2026. The reported incidents involved aircraft hangars, radar systems, maintenance infrastructure, and fighter aircraft deployment areas.

Table 65: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at King Hussein Air Base, Jordan

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
30.	July 2026	1. Hangars 2. Radar System	Damage reported as verified by *The New York Times* [11].	High	Satellite Imagery
31.	August 30–31, 2026	1. Technical and Maintenance Infrastructure 2. Fighter Aircraft Deployment Areas	IRGC-reported attack; damage not independently verified [337].	Low	Iranian Claim

Table 65 records two incidents involving King Hussein Air Base. The July report identifies damage to aircraft hangars and a radar system, with verification attributed to *The New York Times*. This provides stronger evidence of physical damage than the subsequent Iranian-reported attack.

The August 30–31 incident involved technical and maintenance infrastructure and fighter aircraft deployment areas. However, the IRGC's reported attack has not been independently corroborated, and the extent of any resulting damage remains unknown.

The available evidence therefore supports distinguishing the reported July damage from the unverified August targets.

7.4.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at King Hussein Air Base

To assess the potential financial implications of the reported attacks on King Hussein Air Base, four categories of military infrastructure were selected for illustrative valuation. These include aircraft hangars, a radar installation, technical and maintenance infrastructure, and fighter aircraft deployment areas. Table 66 uses comparable U.S. military construction projects to establish estimated replacement costs, while recognising that the actual damage and specifications of the affected facilities remain uncertain.

Table 66: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at King Hussein Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Hangars	$15.00M	$20.00M	$17.50M	Based on a U.S. Army drone hangar project at Fort Carson, estimated at $15–20 million, including maintenance and supporting facilities [41]
2.	Radar System	$15.00M	$40.00M	$27.50M	Assuming replacement of one complete radar installation, the lower estimate is $15M and the upper estimate is $40M, based on the previously adopted military long-range radar benchmark [284].

3.	Technical and Maintenance Infrastructure	$1.62M	$9.36M	$5.49M	Assumes replacement of one communications infrastructure component, using U.S. military construction benchmarks of $1.624–9.360M [23].
4.	Fighter Aircraft Deployment Areas	$30.07M	$30.07M	$30.07M	Based on a $30.07 million U.S. combat aircraft parking apron project at Hurlburt Field, used as an illustrative full-replacement benchmark [44].
	Illustrative Total	**$61.69M**	**$99.43M**	**$80.56M**	

The financial assessment in Table 66 produces an illustrative total ranging from $61.69 million to $99.43 million, with an average of $80.56 million. Fighter aircraft deployment areas account for the largest individual average valuation at $30.07 million, followed by the radar system at $27.50 million. Aircraft hangars contribute an estimated $17.50 million, while technical and maintenance infrastructure accounts for $5.49 million.

These figures reflect the assumed replacement value of the listed facilities rather than the cost of confirmed damage. The July reports provide stronger evidence concerning hangars and radar infrastructure, whereas the August targets remain independently unverified. Furthermore, the valuation assumes one facility per category despite uncertainty over the number, dimensions, and operational functions of the affected structures. Accordingly, the estimated $80.56 million represents a provisional financial benchmark.

7.5. Camp Titin and Tower 22

The reported incidents at Camp Titin and Tower 22 illustrate contrasting levels of evidence concerning attacks on U.S.-associated military facilities in Jordan. While Iranian sources reported the destruction of Camp Titin in September 2026, satellite-based reporting identified structural damage at Tower 22 during July.

Table 67: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Camp Titin and Tower 22, Jordan

NO.	Date	Base/ location	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confidence	Evidence Source
32.	September 1–2, 2026	Camp Titin	U.S. Marine Corps Camp	IRGC-reported destruction; damage not independently verified [338, 339].	Low	Iranian Claim
33.	July 2026	Tower 22	Unspecified building	Building damage reported as verified by *The New York Times* [11].	High	Satellite Imagery

Table 67 presents two incidents involving separate military locations in Jordan. The September 1–2 report concerning Camp Titin describes an Iranian-claimed attack against a U.S. Marine Corps installation. However, the reported destruction remains independently unverified, and the available information does not identify specific damaged structures.

In contrast, the July incident at Tower 22 is supported by damage reporting attributed to *The New York Times*, providing stronger evidence of physical impacts on an unidentified building. Nevertheless, the precise function of the affected structure and the extent of damage remain unclear.

These differences highlight the need to assess each location independently. While Tower 22 has stronger reported evidence of structural damage, the available information does not sufficiently identify the affected facilities, their specifications, or the extent of damage. Consequently, no replacement-cost estimates were calculated for Camp Titin or Tower 22 due to the lack of detailed and verifiable information required to establish reliable financial benchmarks.

7.6. Aqaba City

Aqaba, Jordan's principal port city, experienced several reported missile and drone incidents during July 2026, including claims involving its airport and military aircraft. Unlike incidents at other Jordanian installations, the available records primarily document successful interceptions announced by the Jordanian Armed Forces rather than independently confirmed damage.

Table 68: Reported Iranian Missile and Drone Attacks, Interceptions, and Claimed Damage in Aqaba, Jordan

No.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1	July 19, 2026	Aqaba Airport Hangar	Jordanian Army: 3 of 4 missiles intercepted; no damage [340].	High	Jordanian Army
2	July 20, 2026	C-17 Transport Aircraft	IRGC claimed aircraft damage; Anadolu reported the claim [341].	Low	
3	July 20, 2026	Unspecified Target Area	Jordanian Army: 3 missiles intercepted; no damage [342].	High	
4	July 22, 2026	Airport Vicinity	Jordanian Army: 4 of 6 missiles intercepted; no damage [343, 344].	High	
5	July 22–23, 2026	Unspecified Target Area	Jordanian Army: 3 missiles and 6 drones intercepted; no damage [345].	High	

Table 68 records five incidents in Aqaba between July 19 and 23, 2026. Jordanian military statements reported the interception of missiles and drones during several incidents, including threats involving the airport and surrounding areas. The official accounts recorded no resulting damage, while the IRGC separately claimed damage to a C-17 transport aircraft on July 20.

The available evidence does not independently confirm the reported aircraft damage or establish that the intercepted projectiles struck airport infrastructure. Accordingly, these incidents should be treated primarily as documented aerial threats and interception events rather than verified destruction of military facilities.

The distinction is important for the financial assessment: without independently established physical damage, neither the airport hangar nor the C-17 aircraft should be assigned a confirmed replacement loss. The records nevertheless illustrate how the conflict extended to Aqaba, exposing civilian aviation infrastructure and surrounding areas to the risks associated with regional military escalation.

7.7. Missile and Drone Attacks and Interceptions at Unspecified Locations in Jordan

Not all missile and drone incidents reported in Jordan during the 2026 conflict could be linked to identifiable military installations. Several attacks were announced by Iranian sources or Iraqi armed groups without specifying their intended targets, while Jordanian authorities separately documented aerial interceptions. To preserve these records without attributing them to particular bases, Table 69 examines incidents involving unidentified locations between February and July 2026, distinguishing reported attacks from officially documented interceptions.

Table 69:Reported Missile and Drone Attacks and Interceptions at Unspecified Locations in Jordan, 2026

No.	Date	Intercepted projectiles	Confident	Evidence Source
1	February 28, 2026	CTP–ISW reported Iranian attacks; targets and impacts unidentified.	Medium	Iranian Claim
2	March 4, 2026	Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed a drone attack; no independent confirmation.	Low	Iraqi Militia Claim
3	By March 6, 2026	Iraqi militia front group claimed an attack; weapon type and damage unverified.	Low	Iraqi Militia Claim
4	March 8, 2026	Rijal al Baas al Shadid claimed three drone attacks; no independent verification.	Low	Iraqi Militia Claim
5	March 18–19, 2026	Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed a drone attack; no independently verified impact.	Low	Iraqi Militia Claim
6	March 24, 2026	Kataib Sarqhat al Quds claimed a drone attack; target unidentified.	Low	Iraqi Militia Claim
7	April 6, 2026	Jordanian Armed Forces reported two drone interceptions and two projectile impacts.	High	Jordanian Army
8	June 9–10, 2026	CTP–ISW reported Iranian missile and drone attacks; no Jordanian base damage confirmed.	Medium	Iranian Claim
9	June 11, 2026	CTP–ISW reported renewed Iranian missile and drone attacks; impacts unidentified.	Medium	Iranian Claim
10	July 8–9, 2026	CTP–ISW reported missiles and drones targeting a U.S. base; all reportedly intercepted.	Medium	Iranian Claim
11	July 12, 2026	CTP–ISW reported Iranian strikes; weapons and damage unspecified.	Medium	Iranian Claim
12	July 14, 2026	CTP–ISW reported Iranian attacks; weapons and impacts unspecified.	Medium	Iranian Claim
13	July 27, 2026	Jordanian authorities reported intercepting two hostile drones; origin unconfirmed.	High	Jordanian Army
14	July 28, 2026	Jordanian air defences reported intercepting one drone; perpetrator unconfirmed.	High	Jordanian Army

The 14 records in Table 69 reveal two distinct patterns. The first consists of attacks reported by Iranian sources and Iraqi armed groups, particularly during March and July 2026. These accounts frequently lack identifiable targets, independently verified impact locations, or evidence of physical damage. Consequently, they cannot be reliably associated with specific U.S. or Jordanian military facilities. The second pattern involves interceptions documented by the Jordanian Armed Forces. On April 6, authorities reported two drone interceptions and two projectile impacts, while subsequent announcements on July 27 and 28 recorded the interception of three additional drones.

8. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia was among the countries directly affected by the expansion of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Its longstanding military relationship with the United States, combined with its strategic position in the Gulf and its importance to global energy markets, placed the country within the wider consequences of the conflict. U.S. military personnel and equipment stationed at Saudi installations became exposed to Iranian missile and drone attacks, while the threats extended to oil facilities, diplomatic premises, industrial areas, and residential communities. The conflict therefore affected not only military operations but also infrastructure and civilian life.

Prince Sultan Air Base, near Al Kharj, became a significant location in the conflict. The installation, which has supported U.S. military operations in the region, experienced repeated attacks and missile threats between February and May 2026. Satellite imagery and reporting by international news organisations documented damage to radar-related infrastructure, aircraft facilities, maintenance shelters, and personnel accommodation. U.S. military statements also confirmed casualties and aircraft damage. These incidents illustrate the vulnerability of military installations that form part of the wider U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

The consequences extended beyond Prince Sultan Air Base. Saudi Arabia's oil and petroleum infrastructure faced repeated drone threats, particularly at Shaybah Oil Field, while incidents were also reported at Ras Tanura and SAMREF refineries and the East–West Oil Pipeline. Although many incoming projectiles were intercepted, some incidents involved physical impacts or disruptions to petroleum operations. The conflict also reached the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, industrial areas, and residential neighbourhoods, where reported strikes caused damage and civilian casualties. These events demonstrate how the effects of regional warfare can extend into economic infrastructure and the everyday lives of people far removed from military decision-making.

This assessment documents 54 incident records between February and July 2026, covering Prince Sultan Air Base, petroleum facilities, other military and civilian locations, and attacks or interceptions at unidentified sites. The evidence includes official Saudi and U.S. statements, satellite imagery, international news investigations, and Iranian reports. These sources provide different levels of certainty, making it necessary to distinguish confirmed impacts and interceptions from claims of damage that remain independently unverified.

The financial assessment focuses on Prince Sultan Air Base, where the available information permits preliminary estimates for selected military facilities. The combined illustrative replacement-cost range is $419.79 million to $525.17 million, with an average of $472.48 million. These figures are based on military construction and procurement benchmarks rather than confirmed reconstruction costs. They also include potentially overlapping damage records and should not be interpreted as verified U.S. military losses. Other affected locations were not assigned replacement costs because sufficient information about the damaged facilities was unavailable.

Saudi Arabia's experience during the war highlights the broader consequences of hosting foreign military forces amid regional confrontation. Military installations, energy infrastructure, diplomatic facilities, and civilian communities faced different forms of exposure to the conflict. The following

sections examine these incidents, their supporting evidence, and their potential financial implications, while recognising that the human and economic consequences of war cannot be measured solely through the replacement value of damaged military infrastructure.

8.1. Prince Sultan Air Base

Prince Sultan Air Base, located near Al Kharj in Saudi Arabia, experienced some of the most extensively documented attacks against U.S.-associated military infrastructure during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Between late February and May, reports identified damage to radar installations, aircraft facilities, personnel accommodation, maintenance shelters, and airfield infrastructure. Unlike locations where evidence was limited to Iranian statements, several incidents at Prince Sultan Air Base were documented through satellite imagery, U.S. military acknowledgements, and international news investigations. Table 70 brings together 22 incident records, distinguishing confirmed physical impacts from reported attacks, missile interceptions, and potentially overlapping damage observations.

Table 70: Reported Iranian Attacks and Damage at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1.	February 28 – March 1, 2026	1. Building Near a Radome / AN/TPY-2 Radar Support Shelter	NYT documented extensive destruction in March 3 imagery; ABC linked the building to a previously housed AN/TPY-2 radar [1, 346].	High	Satellite Imagery
2.	March 1, 2026	1. U.S. Personnel Area	U.S. Army confirmed an attack causing fatal injuries to one soldier, who died March 8 [347].	High	U.S. officials
3.	March 6, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Saudi Ministry of Defense confirmed interception of three ballistic missiles; no base impact reported [348].	High	Saudi Ministry of Defense
4.	March 7, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Saudi Ministry of Defense confirmed a missile fell in an unpopulated area; no base impact reported [349].	High	
5.	March 9, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure 1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Saudi Ministry of Defense reported intercepting a ballistic missile targeting the base; no damage confirmed [350].	High	
6.	March 11, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Saudi Ministry of Defense reported intercepting six missiles followed by three additional missiles; no impacts confirmed [351].	High	
7.	March 12, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Saudi Ministry of Defense confirmed interception of a ballistic missile targeting the base; no damage reported [352].	High	

8.	By March 17, 2026	1. Aircraft Hangar 2. Apron-Side Structure	Soar Atlas identified a strike-related dark area at a hangar in March 17 imagery.	Medium	Satellite Imagery
9.	March 18, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Missile reportedly launched toward the base; no confirmed impacts, casualties, or physical damage [353].	High	Iranian Claim
10.	March 23, 2026	1. Reconnaissance Aircraft Facilities	IRGC reported attacking the base; impacts and physical damage were not independently verified [354].	Low	Iranian Claim
11.	March 27, 2026	1. U.S. personnel facilities	U.S. officials confirmed missile and drone impacts, personnel injuries, and aircraft damage at the base [355].	High	U.S. officials
12.	March 27, 2026	Apron (Taxiway Surfaces)	Satellite images emerged on Mar. 27, 2026, appeared to show signs of damage on an apron used by U.S. aircraft [356]	High	Satellite Imagery
13.	By March 29, 2026	AN/TPY-2 Radar	CNN-reviewed Airbus imagery showed a scorched radar antenna with a missing section; likely associated with the earlier radar-compound strike [357].	High	Satellite Imagery
14.	By March 29, 2026	Airfield Pavement Adjacent Building	Al Jazeera identified three damaged areas in March 29 Sentinel-2 imagery, including scorched pavement, structural damage and a runway-side impact [83].	High	Al Jazeera
15.	By April 2, 2026	C-130 Hangar	Satellite imagery mapping reported Iranian strikes on U.S. military facilities at Prince Sultan Air Base, including the C-130 Hangar.	Medium	Satellite Imagery
16.	By April 2, 2026	Gymnasium	Satellite imagery mapping reported Iranian strikes on U.S. military facilities at Prince Sultan Air Base, including Gymnasium.	Medium	Satellite Imagery
17.	By April 2, 2026	Troop Barracks	AP cited a regional military official who visited the base and observed bombed-out barracks; strike date not established [358].	Medium	Military Official
18.	By April 21, 2026	Warehouse	Faytuks identified damage to a structure or warehouse immediately south of the apron in April 21 imagery [359].	Medium	Media Reporting
19.	By April 2, 2026	Large Maintenance Shelter	Satellite imagery mapping reported Iranian strikes on U.S. military facilities at Prince Sultan Air Base, including Large Maintenance Shelter.	Medium	Satellite Imagery
20.	By April 21, 2026	Apron and Taxiway Surfaces	Faytuks identified three scorched areas; these may overlap with the March 27–29 observations [359].	Medium	Satellite Imagery

21.	By April 21, 2026	Unidentified Military Building	AP-published Airbus imagery showed a destroyed facility at the base; building function and strike date remain unknown [358].	Medium	Satellite Imagery
22.	By May 1, 2026	Dining Facilities / Mess Halls	AP cited a military official who observed bombed-out mess halls during a visit to the base [358].	High	U.S. officials

The 22 records in Table 70 reveal a combination of repeated missile threats, documented infrastructure damage, and casualties at Prince Sultan Air Base. The earliest significant evidence concerns a building near a radome, where satellite imagery dated March 3 showed extensive destruction. ABC News associated the location with a structure previously housing an AN/TPY-2 radar, although the evidence does not establish that the radar itself was destroyed during the initial attack. A separate March 1 incident resulted in fatal injuries to a U.S. soldier, who died on March 8. Later, U.S. officials confirmed additional missile and drone impacts on March 27, involving personnel injuries and aircraft damage.

Saudi Ministry of Defence announcements documented several missile interceptions between March 6 and 12. These records demonstrate continued attacks or threats directed towards the installation but do not establish corresponding damage. In contrast, satellite investigations identified additional affected structures and surfaces, including aircraft hangars, maintenance facilities, troop barracks, warehouses, and sections of the airfield. The March 27–29 and April 21 imagery may document some of the same damaged pavement areas.

Image 46 presents an annotated satellite map identifying several reported strike locations across Prince Sultan Air Base, including aircraft-related facilities, a large maintenance shelter (LAMS), a C-130 hangar, a warehouse, a gymnasium, and troop barracks. It also marks an AN/TPY-2 radar shelter located away from the main airfield complex. The distribution of these markers suggests that the reported attacks concerned multiple categories of military infrastructure rather than a single operational area.




Image 46: Satellite imagery marking reported Iranian strikes on aircraft facilities, radar installations, warehouses, and troop barracks at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, in 2026. Source: Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT), April 2, 2026.



Image 47: Satellite imagery dated March 3, 2026, showing a largely destroyed building near a radome approximately six miles east of Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, following Iranian missile and drone strikes. Source: Planet Labs / The New York Times, March 2026.

Image 47 provides more direct evidence of structural destruction at a radar-associated compound approximately six miles east of Prince Sultan Air Base. Satellite imagery dated March 3, published in reporting by *The New York Times*, shows a heavily damaged building with extensive darkening and apparent roof destruction, while a nearby radome remains identifiable.

This evidence supports Row 1 of Table 70 and establishes substantial damage to a structure within the compound. Nevertheless, the building's reported historical association with an AN/TPY-2 radar does not establish that an operational radar was housed inside it when the strike occurred.

The contrast between the destroyed building and the surrounding structures is striking. While the affected building shows extensive roof damage and darkened areas consistent with a destructive event, several neighbouring buildings appear intact in the image. This suggests that the most severe visible damage was concentrated within a limited part of the compound.

The before-and-after satellite comparison in Image 48 shows extensive destruction at a facility identified as a large maintenance shelter (LAMS). The post-strike image reveals widespread darkening, debris, ssand substantial changes to the structure and surrounding area, indicating severe physical damage. This provides visual support for the reported destruction of maintenance-related infrastructure identified in Row 19 of Table 70.

Although the imagery demonstrates major structural damage, it does not establish the precise strike date, the equipment present inside the shelter, or the financial value of its contents. Accordingly, the visible destruction supports an infrastructure damage assessment but should not be used to infer additional aircraft or equipment losses without separate verification.



Image 48: Before-and-after satellite imagery showing the destruction of a large maintenance shelter (LAMS) at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, following reported Iranian missile strikes. The post-strike image reveals extensive structural destruction, debris, and burn marks across the facility. Source: Satellite imagery circulated by Jackson Hinkle (@jacksonhinklle) on X, April 2, 2026.

Image 49 compares satellite views of a group of structures identified by the source as possible troop accommodation or storage shelters. Several structures that appear intact in the earlier image display substantial darkening and visible structural changes in the later image, consistent with significant damage. The imagery is relevant to the personnel facilities and barracks identified in Rows 11 and 17. However, the exact functions of the

structures remain uncertain, and the available comparison does not establish whether the damage resulted from the March 27 attack or an earlier incident.



Image 49:Before-and-after satellite imagery showing visible damage to several suspected troop accommodation or storage shelters at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, following reported Iranian strikes. Source: Egypt's Intel Observer (@EGYOSINT), March 23, 2026.

Taken together, the available reporting and satellite imagery establish substantial damage to several facilities at Prince Sultan Air Base, including radar-associated infrastructure, maintenance structures, and personnel-related buildings. Nevertheless, the precise number of distinct damaged assets remains uncertain because some reports and images may document the same physical losses.

8.1.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Prince Sultan Air Base

The financial implications of the reported attacks on Prince Sultan Air Base are examined through 17 categories of military infrastructure, ranging from radar equipment and aircraft facilities to personnel accommodation and support buildings. Table 71 applies selected U.S. military procurement and construction benchmarks to estimate the potential costs of replacing these assets. Particular attention is given to the AN/TPY-2 radar, which accounts for a substantial proportion of the valuation, alongside the possibility that multiple damage reports refer to the same structures. The resulting figures represent illustrative replacement costs rather than independently verified financial losses.

Table 71: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Prince Sultan Air Base

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Building Near a Radome / AN/TPY-2 Radar Support Shelter	$5.00M	$12.30M	$8.65M	Assumes full replacement of one building using military headquarters construction benchmarks as proxies [144, 149]. The building's size and function are unverified. The estimate covers the structure only, excluding the radar, radome and equipment.
2.	U.S. Personnel Area	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
3.	Aircraft Hangar	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	Based on U.S. military aircraft hangar construction benchmarks ranging from $18.49 million to $61 million [42].
4.	Apron-Side Structure	$5.00M	$12.30M	$8.65M	Assumes full replacement of one building using military headquarters benchmarks [144, 149]. Actual sizes and functions unknown.
5.	Reconnaissance Aircraft Facilities	$11.71M	$11.71M	$11.71M	One aircraft-apron construction comparison [252].
6.	U.S. Personnel Facilities*	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	See number 2.
7.	Apron (Taxiway Surfaces)	$5.00M	$10.00M	$7.50M	Assumes full construction of one military taxiway at $5–10M, based on the USACE Erbil Airbase project estimate. Actual dimensions and damage extent remain unknown
8.	AN/TPY-2 Radar	$328.57M	$328.57M	$328.57M	Assumes one radar using Raytheon's 2020 production contract: $2,300M ÷ 7 ≈ $328.57M [148]. Contract-average replacement proxy; configuration and support scope may differ.

9.	Airfield Pavement*	$5.00M	$10.00M	$7.50M	See number 7.
10.	Adjacent Building*	$5.00M	$12.30M	$8.65M	See number 4.
11.	C-130 Hangar*	$18.49M	$61.00M	$39.75M	See number 3.
12.	Gymnasium	$20.00M	$20.00M	$20.00M	Assumes one fitness facility at $20M, based on the Fort Carson contract exceeding $20M. Athletic field excluded; upper limit unverified [260].
13.	Troop Barracks*	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	See number 6.
14.	Warehouse	$3.74M	$10.00M	$6.87M	Based on a $3.736M U.S. Army equipment-storage facility benchmark, with a provisional allowance for larger warehouse configurations. Excludes stored military equipment and inventory [22, 23].
15.	Large Maintenance Shelter	$10.00M	$20.00M	$15.00M	Based on a U.S. military aircraft hangar and maintenance shops construction project at Alpena, Michigan, estimated at $10–20 million, used as a full-replacement benchmark [45].
16.	Apron and Taxiway Surfaces*	$5.00M	$10.00M	$7.50M	See number 7.
17.	Dining Facilities / Mess Halls	$6.00M	$12.00M	$9.00M	Assumes full replacement of one mess hall. The range allocates an assumed 25–50% of the $24M combined galley-and-barracks benchmark at NSA Bahrain. The midpoint is $9.00M. Actual size and capacity are unknown.
	Illustrative Total	**$419.79M**	**$525.17M**	**$472.48M**	

Valuation Note (*): *Starred entries indicate possible overlap: rows 6 and 13 with row 2, rows 9 and 16 with row 7, row 10 with row 1, and row 11 with row 3. These matches are provisional because the descriptions alone do not establish asset identity. Each total's average is calculated from its lower and upper totals before rounding.*

The assessment in Table 71 produces an illustrative replacement-cost range of $419.79 million to $525.17 million, with an average of $472.48 million. The AN/TPY-2 radar dominates the valuation at $328.57 million, accounting for approximately 70% of the reported average. This estimate is derived from a Raytheon production-contract benchmark rather than a confirmed replacement expenditure for the specific equipment reportedly damaged at Prince Sultan Air Base.

The remaining estimates cover aircraft hangars, maintenance shelters, personnel accommodation, dining facilities, storage buildings, and airfield surfaces. Satellite imagery and reporting provide evidence of damage to several structures, particularly the building near the radome, the large

maintenance shelter, and personnel-related facilities. Nevertheless, the available information does not establish that every listed asset was destroyed or requires complete replacement. Some estimates also rely on construction comparisons involving facilities of different sizes and functions.

A further limitation concerns potential duplication. The starred entries identify possible overlaps between personnel accommodation records, aircraft hangars, adjacent buildings, and repeated observations of apron or taxiway damage. These entries remain included in the illustrative total because their identities have not been conclusively matched. Consequently, the $472.48 million average is an unadjusted valuation of the listed assets, not a verified measure of distinct physical losses or actual reconstruction costs.

8.2. Oil and Petroleum Facilities

Saudi Arabia's oil and petroleum infrastructure became increasingly exposed to missile and drone threats during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Refineries, oil fields, and pipeline facilities were among the locations affected by reported attacks and interception operations.

Table 72: Reported Iranian Attacks, Interceptions, and Disruption at Oil and Petroleum Facilities in Saudi Arabia

NO.	Date	Base/location	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
23.	March 4, 2026	Ras Tanura Refinery	Refinery Infrastructure	Saudi Energy Ministry confirmed a separate attempted drone attack; no damage.	High	Saudi Energy Ministry
24.	March 7, 2026	Shaybah Oil Field		Saudi Defence Ministry reported 21 drone interceptions targeting Shaybah during the day.	High	
25.	March 9, 2026	Shaybah Oil Field		Saudi Defence Ministry reported nine drones intercepted; other same-day statements may overlap.	High	
26.	March 11, 2026	Shaybah Oil Field		Saudi Defence Ministry confirmed three drone interceptions; additional same-day statements require reconciliation.	High	
27.	March 12, 2026	Shaybah Oil Field		Saudi Defence Ministry confirmed seven drone interceptions; no damage reported.	High	
28.	March 19, 2026	SAMREF Refinery		Saudi Defence Ministry confirmed a drone crashed inside the refinery; damage assessment underway.	High	
29.	April 8, 2026	East–West Oil Pipeline	Pipeline / Pumping Infrastructure	Reuters reported an Iranian strike; Saudi Energy Ministry later confirmed disruption to pipeline throughput.	High	

Table 72 identifies seven incidents affecting four major petroleum locations. Shaybah Oil Field accounted for the largest concentration, with four records between March 7 and 12. Saudi Defence Ministry statements reported the interception of 21 drones on March 7, nine on March 9, three on March 11, and seven on March 12. However, some announcements may overlap within the same reporting periods, and the available evidence does not establish corresponding damage to the oil field's infrastructure.

The remaining incidents present different levels of physical and operational impact. On March 4, the Saudi Energy Ministry confirmed an attempted drone attack against Ras Tanura Refinery without reported damage. At SAMREF Refinery, a drone reportedly crashed inside the facility on March 19, although the extent of any resulting damage remained under assessment. The most clearly documented operational consequence occurred on April 8, when Reuters reported an Iranian strike against the East–West Oil Pipeline, followed by Saudi confirmation of disruption to pipeline throughput.

These findings distinguish successful interceptions from physical impacts and disruptions to petroleum operations. Nevertheless, the incidents demonstrate how regional warfare can threaten energy production and transportation systems, with potential consequences extending beyond the immediate locations of military confrontation.

8.3. Other Military, Diplomatic, Industrial, and Civilian Facilities

The geographical reach of the 2026 conflict in Saudi Arabia extended beyond major military installations to diplomatic premises, industrial areas, and residential neighbourhoods. Table 73 examines seven incidents recorded between March and July 2026, involving locations in Riyadh, Al Kharj, Jubail Industrial City, and King Abdulaziz Air Base.

Table 73:Reported Iranian Attacks, Damage, and Interceptions at Other Military and Civilian Locations in Saudi Arabia

No.	Date	Base/location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
30.	March 2, 2026	U.S. Embassy, Riyadh	Embassy Buildings	Saudi Foreign Ministry confirmed a drone attack causing fire and minor damage; WP reported a possible CIA station impact.	High	Saudi Foreign Ministry
			CIA Station		Low	Iranian Claim
31.	March 3, 2026	Al Kharj	Unidentified Intended Targets	Saudi Defence Ministry reported intercepting two cruise missiles; intended facilities unidentified.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry
32.	March 8, 2026	Al Kharj	Radar Systems	IRGC claimed targeting radar systems; no independently verified damage.	Low	Iranian Claim
33.	March 8, 2026	Residential Area	Residential Buildings	Saudi Civil Defence reported a projectile impact, killing two civilians and injuring 12; origin unresolved.	High	Saudi Civil Defence
34.			Industrial Area		High	

	April 6–7, 2026	Jubail Industrial City	U.S. Energy Companies	Video showed an explosion; IRGC claimed targeting U.S. energy companies. Specific damaged facilities unidentified.	Low	Video Evidence
35.	July 22, 2026	King Abdulaziz Air Base	Airbase Infrastructure	Iranian media reported an attack; warning siren sounded in Dammam. No independently verified impact or damage.	Medium	Iranian Claim
36.	July 27, 2026	Riyadh Vicinity	Unidentified Intended Targets	Saudi authorities reportedly intercepted drones arriving from Iraqi airspace; targets and damage unidentified.	High	Saudi Official Report

The incidents presented in Table 73 demonstrate the diverse consequences of the conflict across Saudi Arabia. On March 2, the Saudi Foreign Ministry confirmed a drone attack on the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh, resulting in a fire and minor damage. The Washington Post separately reported a possible impact involving a CIA station, although this specific claim remains unverified. A more severe civilian incident occurred on March 8, when Saudi Civil Defence reported that a projectile struck a residential area, killing two civilians and injuring twelve others. These incidents illustrate the direct risks posed to diplomatic premises and civilian communities.

Other records concern military and industrial locations, but the available evidence is less conclusive. At Al Kharj, Saudi authorities reported intercepting two cruise missiles on March 3, while the IRGC subsequently claimed to have targeted radar systems on March 8. Video evidence also documented an explosion in Jubail Industrial City during April 6–7, although the precise facilities affected and the extent of damage remain unidentified. The July reports concerning King Abdulaziz Air Base and drone interceptions near Riyadh likewise do not establish independently verified structural losses.

Taken together, the seven records distinguish documented physical impacts from interceptions and unverified targeting claims. We did not calculate replacement-cost estimates for this group of incidents, as the available information does not adequately establish the specifications, quantities, or extent of damage to the affected facilities. The documented civilian casualties also underline consequences that cannot be represented through infrastructure replacement values alone.

8.4. Reported Missile and Drone Attacks and Interceptions at Unspecified Locations in Saudi Arabia

Missile and drone activity across Saudi Arabia during the 2026 conflict extended beyond identifiable military installations. Table 73 brings together incidents reported between February and July 2026 for which we could not establish specific targets. The records draw on Saudi Ministry of Defence announcements, Reuters reporting, and Iranian claims, documenting aerial interceptions, reported missile impacts, and attacks of uncertain location.

Table 74: Reported Missile and Drone Attacks, Interceptions, and Unidentified Targets in Saudi Arabia

No.	Date	Intercepted projectiles	Confident	Evidence Source
37.	February 28, 2026	CTP–ISW reported Iranian attacks against U.S. bases; specific installations and damage unidentified.	Medium	Iranian Claim

38.	March 4, 2026	Saudi Defence Ministry confirmed nine drone interceptions.	High	Official Interception Report
39.	March 5–6, 2026	Saudi reports described missile and drone interceptions.	Medium	Saudi Defence Ministry
40.	March 6–7, 2026	Saudi statements reported drone and missile interceptions.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry
41.	March 22–23, 2026	A missile reportedly fell in an uninhabited area; no facility damage established.	Medium	Reported Missile Impact
42.	March 26–27, 2026	Saudi Defence Ministry reported 26 drone interceptions and six ballistic missiles on March 27; two missiles were intercepted and four fell in Gulf waters or uninhabited areas. Drone debris fell near a military site without reported injuries.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry
43.	March 27–28, 2026	Original reporting listed five drones and one missile; independence from the March 27 reporting cycle remains unverified.	Medium	Reported Aggregate
44.	March 29, 2026	Saudi Defence Ministry reportedly intercepted ten drones; individual targets unidentified.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry
45.	March 30, 2026	Saudi authorities reportedly intercepted seven drones and eight missiles.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry
46.	March 31, 2026	Saudi Defence Ministry reportedly intercepted twelve drones; intended facilities unidentified.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry
47.	April 1, 2026	Saudi Defence Ministry reportedly intercepted three drones; no specific facility damage established.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry
48.	April 2, 2026	Saudi Defence Ministry reportedly intercepted four drones; targets unidentified.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry
49.	April 6–7, 2026	Aggregate reporting described 22 drones and 11 ballistic missiles.	Medium	Reported Launch Totals
50.	April 7–8, 2026	Saudi Defence Ministry reported five ballistic-missile interceptions and nine drone interceptions.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry
51.	April 7–8, 2026	Reuters-linked reporting described additional attacks; exact incident count and targets were not established.	Low	Reported Aggregate
52.	April 20 – May 17, 2026	Reuters reported IRGC-directed Iraqi cells conducted cross-border drone attacks against Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia; precise Saudi attack dates and facilities were not identified.	Medium	Investigative Reporting
53.	May 17, 2026	Saudi Arabia confirmed intercepting three drones entering from Iraqi airspace; no intended facilities or damage identified.	High	Saudi Defence Ministry

54.	July 18, 2026	CTP–ISW reported an Iranian ballistic missile targeting a U.S. airbase near Riyadh; impact and damage unconfirmed.	Medium	Iranian Claim

Table 74 contains 18 incident records, with the greatest concentration occurring between late March and early April 2026. Saudi Ministry of Defence statements provide the strongest evidence for several interception events, including the reported interception of nine drones on March 4, 26 drones on March 27, and further missile and drone interceptions through early April. These announcements establish the occurrence of aerial threats and defensive responses but do not necessarily identify the intended targets or demonstrate damage to military installations.

The records also reveal important limitations in incident classification. The March 27–28 entry may overlap with the preceding reporting cycle, while the April 6–8 records include aggregate figures that cannot confidently be treated as separate attacks. Reuters reporting concerning cross-border drone operations from Iraq provides additional context, although the precise dates and locations of several incidents remain unidentified. Similarly, the February and July reports concerning attacks against U.S. bases do not independently establish successful impacts or physical damage.

Consequently, these 18 records should not be interpreted as 18 independently verified attacks or as evidence of corresponding infrastructure losses. We did not calculate replacement-cost estimates for these incidents because the available information does not identify specific damaged facilities or establish their physical condition. Nevertheless, the records show the geographical spread and persistence of missile and drone activity, along with the wider risks associated with the regional expansion of the war.

9. Iraq

Iraq became an important geographical extension of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, as military operations and retaliatory attacks spread beyond the principal parties to the conflict. The presence of U.S. military and diplomatic facilities, alongside Iraqi security installations and strategic infrastructure, exposed the country to repeated drone and missile attacks. Iranian forces and Iran-backed Iraqi armed groups reported operations against U.S.-associated installations, while Iraqi authorities documented interceptions, explosions, and damage affecting military, government, and civilian facilities. These developments illustrate how the continued presence of foreign military infrastructure can expose host countries to the consequences of regional warfare.

The geographical distribution of reported incidents extended from the Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq to Baghdad and the southern oil-producing provinces. Harir Airbase and military facilities at Erbil International Airport were repeatedly identified as targets, while the former Camp Victory complex and installations surrounding Baghdad International Airport experienced numerous reported attacks. Other locations, including Balad Air Base, Ain al-Asad Air Base, and Camp Taji, were associated with drone threats, rocket attacks, or explosions.

Civilian and commercial infrastructure formed another significant dimension of the attacks. Oilfields, petroleum processing facilities, storage warehouses, and international energy companies experienced drone incidents that resulted in fires, operational disruption, material damage, and injuries to workers. Diplomatic missions and accommodation facilities were also exposed to attacks or nearby interceptions.

This report documents 122 incident records between February and September 2026 in Iraq, organized into 12 categories covering military installations, diplomatic and government facilities, energy infrastructure, and civilian accommodation. The assessment draws on official statements, reporting by international and Iraqi news organisations, satellite imagery, and claims issued by Iranian forces and Iraqi armed groups. It distinguishes independently documented impacts from reported attacks, intercepted weapons, and incidents for which physical damage remains unverified. The records are not necessarily equivalent to 122 separate attacks, as some may concern overlapping operations or different accounts of the same event.

Financial assessments were prepared for three locations: Harir Airbase, Camp Victory, and Erbil International Airport. Their combined illustrative replacement costs range from $1.23 billion to $1.41 billion, with an average of approximately $1.32 billion. These estimates use military procurement and construction benchmarks to assess the potential replacement value of identified facilities and equipment. However, they do not establish that all the assets were destroyed or that the estimated values represent actual U.S. military losses. Uncertainty concerning asset specifications, physical damage, ownership, and possible duplication remains substantial.

By examining both military and civilian impacts, this report assesses the wider consequences of the war for Iraq rather than treating reported attacks solely as losses of U.S. military equipment. It highlights the distinction between the financial value of infrastructure potentially exposed to attack and the damage that can be independently established, while documenting the risks imposed on Iraqi personnel, civilian facilities, and essential economic activities.

9.1. Harir Airbase

Harir Airbase, located in Iraq's Kurdistan Region, was repeatedly identified as a target of Iranian and Iran-backed armed group operations during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Reports of rocket fire, missile launches, and drone attacks emerged from late February onwards, alongside accounts of explosions and aerial interceptions near the installation. Although local authorities confirmed certain attacks, the available evidence provides limited information about their physical consequences.

Table 75: Reported Iranian and Iran-Backed Attacks on Harir Airbase, Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1.	February 28, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Rocket fire and four nearby explosions reported; direct impacts unverified [360].	Medium	Iranian Claim
2.	March 1, 2026 (4:43 AM)	1. Al-Harir Airfield 2. Unspecified Facilities	First attack confirmed by Harir district mayor; no casualties or verified damage [361].	High	
3.	March 1, 2026 (8:15 AM)	1. Al-Harir Airfield 2. Unspecified Military	Second attack confirmed by Harir district mayor; no casualties or verified damage [361].	High	
4.	March 1, 2026	1. Air-Defense Area	Multiple drones reportedly intercepted; no base damage confirmed [362].	Medium	
5.	March 2, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Three drone interceptions reported across two military locations; Harir-specific impacts unverified [363].	Medium	
6.	March 3, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Two explosions reported at Harir Air Base; damage not established [364].	Medium	
7.	March 7–8, 2026	Radar System	Critical Threats cited a reported drone impact on a radar; damage unverified [365].	Low	
8.	March 8, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iraqi militia-reported drone attacks; impacts not independently verified [365].	Low	
9.	March 10, 2026	1. U.S. Headquarters	IRGC-reported five-missile attack; damage not independently verified [366].	Low	
10.	March 15, 2026	1. U.S. Forces Gathering Centre	IRGC-reported attack; destruction and casualties not independently verified [367].	High	
11.	March 26, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iraqi militia-reported drone attack; damage not independently verified [368].	Low	

12.	April 7, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Drone impact reported by Iraqi media; facility damage unverified [369].	Medium	
13.	June 9, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	Iranian state media-reported missile attack; damage not independently verified [370].	Medium	
14.	July 20–21, 2026	1. Al-Harir Air Base Vicinity	Drone intercepted or crashed near the base; no damage confirmed [371, 372].	High	

The incidents recorded in Table 75 were concentrated in March 2026, when repeated reports described explosions, drone activity, and missile attacks around Harir Airbase. The strongest local confirmation concerns two attacks on March 1, separately acknowledged by the Harir district mayor. Neither account established casualties or verified physical damage. Subsequent reports identified a possible radar impact, an attack against a U.S. headquarters, and a gathering centre for U.S. forces. However, these descriptions originated largely from Iranian or Iraqi armed group reporting, without independent evidence establishing the destruction of the identified facilities.

The later records illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing attempted attacks from successful impacts. Reports in April and June provided insufficient detail about affected infrastructure, while the July 20–21 incident involved a drone intercepted or brought down near the base without confirmed damage. Several March records also concern interceptions or explosions whose relationship to particular attack waves remains uncertain. Consequently, the 14 entries should be treated as a record of reported military activity rather than evidence of 14 separate damaging strikes. Harir Airbase experienced repeated reported attacks and aerial threats, but the available evidence does not establish the destruction of identifiable military facilities.

9.1.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Harir Airbase

The reported attacks on Harir Airbase identified several military facilities as potential targets, including radar equipment, military headquarters, and a U.S. forces gathering centre. Although independent evidence of their destruction remains limited, available military procurement and construction benchmarks provide a basis for estimating illustrative replacement costs.

Table 76: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Harir Airbase

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Radar System	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support) [20].
2.	U.S. Military Headquarters	$25.90M	$45.00M	$35.45M	Assumes one military headquarters/support-complex benchmarks [124, 125]. Actual count, size and functions unknown; exclude buildings valued separately.
3.	U.S. Forces Gathering Centre	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].

	Illustrative Total	**$33.29M**	**$77.01M**	**$55.15M**	

Table 76 estimates illustrative replacement costs ranging from $33.29 million to $77.01 million, with a combined average of $55.15 million. U.S. military headquarters account for the largest share, with an average estimated value of $35.45 million, followed by the U.S. forces gathering centre at $16.79 million and the radar system at $2.92 million. These estimates draw on U.S. Army procurement and construction benchmarks, assuming one asset or facility in each category.

The figures represent hypothetical replacement values rather than independently verified financial losses. The actual specifications, quantities, and extent of damage remain unknown, while the headquarters and gathering centre could represent overlapping infrastructure.

9.2. Camp Victory (Former U.S. Base)

The former Camp Victory complex in Baghdad, once a major centre of U.S. military operations in Iraq, appeared repeatedly in reports of drone and rocket attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Between March and April, Iraqi armed groups claimed numerous operations against facilities associated with the former installation, while security reporting described interceptions in the surrounding airport area.

Table 77: Reported Iranian and Iran-Backed Attacks and Damage at Camp Victory (Former U.S. Base), Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
15.	March 1, 2026	1. Unidentified Military Facilities	Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed a drone swarm; airport-area interception reported [373].	Medium	Militia Claim
16.	March 4, 2026		Two drones reportedly intercepted near the former base [373].	Medium	Iraqi Security Source
17.	March 5–6, 2026		Militia claimed an attack; reported interception may concern the same event [374].	Low	Militia Claim
18.	March 7, 2026		Rijal al Baas al Shadid claimed three drone attacks; distinct impacts unverified [374].	Low	Militia Claim
19.	March 8–9, 2026		Drone and missile interceptions reported; separate attack waves unverified [374].	Medium	Iraqi Security Source
20.	March 14, 2026	1. Fabric or Concrete Hangar Entrance	FPV footage showed a drone striking a hangar entrance; damage limited or unverified [375, 376]	Medium	Militia Video
21.	March 14, 2026	1. Metal Hangar Side	A second hangar-side impact was reported; independent distinction from other footage requires verification [376]	Medium	Militia Video

22.	March 15, 2026	1. Unidentified Military Facilities	Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed a rocket barrage; impacts unverified [374].	Low	Militia Claim
23.	March 15, 2026		Kataib Hezbollah FPV attack reported; physical damage not independently established [374].	Medium	Militia Video
24.	March 16–17, 2026		Drone attack claimed; exact strike date and impacts unverified [374].	Low	Militia Claim
25.	March 19–20, 2026		Jaysh al Ghadab reportedly claimed an attack; impact unverified.	Low	Militia Claim
26.	March 21, 2026		Saraya Awliya al Dam claimed a drone attack; damage unverified [377].	Low	Militia Claim
27.	March 22, 2026		Two militia drones reportedly impacted near the base; facility damage unidentified [377].	Medium	Militia Claim
28.	March 22, 2026		Jaysh al Ghadab claimed drone attacks; possible overlap with nearby impacts [377].	Low	Militia Claim
29.	March 24, 2026	1. Radar System	FPV footage circulated; attack date, location and damage not independently authenticated [377, 378]	Low	Militia Video
30.	April 2, 2026	1. Fuel Storage Tanks	Saraya Awliya al Dam FPV attack identified retrospectively; tank damage unverified [373].	Medium	Militia Video
31.	April 6, 2026	1. Unidentified Military Facilities	Iranian military-affiliated media reported an attack; impact unverified	Low	Iranian Claim
32.	April 7, 2026	1. Two Fuel Storage Tanks	Saraya Awliya al Dam FPV attack reported; penetration or destruction unverified [373].	Medium	Militia Video
33.	April 8, 2026	1. Communications Tower	FPV footage released April 28 showed a reported April 8 attack; damage unverified [373].	Medium	Militia Video

Table 77 contains 19 incident records between March 1 and April 8, 2026, with a particularly dense sequence of reported operations during March. The early entries largely concern drone swarms, rocket attacks, and interceptions reported near the former base and Baghdad's airport area. Claims by Saraya Awliya al-Dam, Rijal al-Baas al-Shadid, and other Iraqi armed groups describe repeated attacks, but the available evidence does not consistently establish successful impacts or identify the facilities affected. The March 14–15 records provide more specific visual material, including FPV footage depicting apparent strikes against hangar structures. Nevertheless, the footage does not independently establish the extent of physical damage or confirm that each recording represents a separate attack.

Several March records may also overlap, especially those involving drone interceptions, nearby impacts, and multiple claims issued within the same reporting periods. Furthermore, because Camp Victory is a former U.S. installation, the reported location of an attack does not establish that the targeted structures were under U.S. ownership or operational control in 2026.

9.2.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Camp Victory

Reported drone attacks against Camp Victory identified several types of military infrastructure, including hangar structures, radar equipment, fuel storage tanks, and communications facilities. To assess their potential financial implications, Table 78 applies military construction and equipment benchmarks to six categories of reported targets. The resulting figures represent illustrative replacement costs rather than confirmed damage, as the physical condition and specifications of the identified assets remain uncertain.

Table 78: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Camp Victory

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Fabric or Concrete Hangar Entrance	$0.82M	$0.82M	$0.82M	Assumes replacement of one hangar entrance assembly, using the $823,986 Picatinny Arsenal hangar door replacement contract as a single benchmark. Entrance dimensions and materials are unverified.
2.	Metal Hangar Side	$0.02M	$0.04M	$0.03M	Assumes replacement of 200 m^2 of metal wall cladding at an illustrative rate of $100–200/$m^2$. Actual area is unknown. The estimate covers cladding only and excludes the structural frame.
3.	Radar System	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support) [20].
4.	Fuel Storage Tanks	$17.00M	$35.00M	$26.00M	Assuming replacement of one complete fuel-storage facility, the lower estimate is $17M, based on the Fresno Air National Guard Base fuel project, and the upper estimate is $35M, based on the General Mitchell Airfield fuel project. The average is ($17M + $35M) / 2 = $26M [249, 283].
5.	Two Fuel Storage Tanks	$34.00M	$70.00M	$52.00M	Assumes full replacement of two separate fuel-storage facilities at $17.00M–$35.00M each, based on the Fresno and General Mitchell fuel projects [249, 283].

6.	Communications Tower	$1.00M	$10.00M	$5.50M	Assumed one terminal installation with associated equipment [49].
	Illustrative Total	**$53.95M**	**$120.58M**	**$87.27M**	

Table 78 presents illustrative replacement costs ranging from $53.95 million to $120.58 million, with a combined average of $87.27 million. Fuel storage infrastructure accounts for the largest proportion, with an estimated average of $26 million for one facility and $52 million for two additional facilities. The communications tower contributes $5.50 million, followed by the radar system at $2.92 million. The hangar entrance and metal cladding have substantially lower estimated values of $0.82 million and $0.03 million, respectively.

These estimates rely on assumed asset quantities and replacement benchmarks rather than verified destruction. In particular, the two fuel-storage entries may refer to overlapping facilities or separate attacks on the same infrastructure, creating a substantial risk of double counting. The hangar components may also belong to the same structure. Consequently, the $87.27 million average represents a provisional valuation scenario, not confirmed financial losses.

9.3. Erbil International Airport (U.S.-Led Coalition Military Base)

Erbil International Airport, which hosts facilities associated with the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq's Kurdistan Region, experienced repeated missile and drone threats during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Reports between February and September described attacks on military buildings, air-defence systems, surveillance equipment, and support infrastructure. While satellite investigations identified damage to several structures, many subsequent incidents involved intercepted drones or Iranian claims without independently verified impacts.

Table 79: Reported Iranian and Iran-Backed Attacks on Erbil International Airport, Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
34.	February 28, 2026	1. Four Structures	Four damaged structures identified through satellite imagery [220].	High	Satellite Imagery
35.	March 1, 2026	1. Unspecified Infrastructure	U.S. official confirmed strike; no significant damage reported [379].	Low	U.S. official
36.	March 2, 2026	1. U.S.-Led Coalition Base at Erbil International Airport	Drone interceptions confirmed; no base damage verified [380].	Low	Iranian Claim
37.	March 3, 2026		Multiple drones intercepted; no base damage verified [381].	Low	Iranian Claim
38.	March 4, 2026	1. Unspecified building	Building destruction reported through satellite imagery by The Washington Post [114].	High	Satellite Imagery

39.	March 9, 2026	1. U.S. Military Base near Erbil International Airport	Drone attack reported; no base damage verified [382].	Low	Iranian Claim
40.	March 11, 2026	1. Unidentified Site near Erbil International Airport	Fire observed after drone strike; U.S. facility impact unconfirmed [383].	Low	Iranian Claim
41.	March 23, 2026	1. U.S. Military Base at Erbil International Airport	Drones intercepted; no base damage verified [384].	Low	Iranian Claim
42.	March 28, 2026	1. Airport Perimeter	Drone intercepted near airport; no base damage verified [385].	Low	Iranian Claim
43.	July 15, 2026	1. International Coalition Base and Erbil International Airport	Five drones reportedly intercepted; no base damage verified [386].	Low	Iranian Claim
44.	July 2026	1. Large Military Tent	Tent damage reported as verified by *The New York Times* [11]	Low	*The New York Times*
45.	July 24, 2026	1. Patriot Air Defence System 2.U.S. Personnel Residence	IRGC claimed destruction of Patriot and balloon assets and a strike on personnel accommodation; damage unverified [387].	Low	Iranian Claim
46.	August 14, 2026	1. U.S. Base near Erbil International Airport	Drone interceptions reported; debris damaged nearby civilian area, not confirmed base facilities [388].	Medium	Iranian Claim
47.	September 2, 2026,	1. U.S. Tethered Surveillance Aerostat 2. Aerostat Control System 3. Maintenance Facility 4. Technical Equipment Warehouses 5. Fuel Storage Tanks	IRGC-reported damage; not independently verified [389, 390].	Medium	Iranian Claim

Table 79 records 14 incidents between February and September 2026. The strongest evidence of physical damage concerns four structures identified through satellite imagery on February 28 and a building reported as destroyed by The Washington Post on March 4. Additional reporting attributed damage to a large military tent in July, although its precise extent remains unclear. In contrast, several incidents during March, July, and August involved drone interceptions without confirmed damage to coalition facilities. Iranian reports in July and September also identified Patriot air-defence equipment,

personnel accommodation, a surveillance aerostat, and supporting infrastructure as targets, but the claimed destruction remains independently unverified.

The evidence therefore establishes some structural damage while leaving the scale of equipment losses and the relationship between individual incidents unresolved. The February and March building reports require geographical comparison to determine whether they concern separate structures. Similarly, the reported July and September attacks on surveillance and air-defence equipment cannot be treated as confirmed losses.

9.3.1. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities at Erbil International Airport

Reported attacks on military facilities at Erbil International Airport identified several categories of infrastructure, including air-defence equipment, surveillance systems, maintenance facilities, warehouses, fuel storage, and personnel accommodation.

Table 80: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure at Erbil International Airport

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Patriot Air Defence System	$1,090.00M	$1,100.00M	$1,095.00M	Assumes full replacement of one Patriot battery, including radar, launchers, command-and-control equipment, support equipment and missiles. Based on CSIS and Congressional Research Service estimates of approximately $1.1 billion per complete battery.
2.	Surveillance Balloon	$6.36M	$6.36M	$6.36M	Assumes full replacement of one tethered surveillance aerostat system, using Lockheed Martin's 2011 award for 29 PTDS systems ($184.30M ÷ 29 ≈ $6.36M).
3.	Large Military Tent	$0.11M	$0.11M	$0.11M	Assumes full replacement of one tent using the U.S. Air Force's $108,981.21 benchmark for a 1,488 sq ft General Purpose Shelter.
4.	Aerostat Control System	$0.82M	$0.82M	$0.82M	Uses one contract benchmark of $822,921 for mooring-system spares and associated travel and proposal preparation costs.
5.	Maintenance Facility	$10.00M	$20.00M	$15.00M	Based on a U.S. military aircraft hangar and maintenance shops construction project at Alpena, Michigan, estimated at $10–20 million, used as a full-replacement benchmark [45].
6.	Technical Equipment Warehouses	$1.62M	$9.36M	$5.49M	Assumes replacement of one communications infrastructure component, using U.S. military construction benchmarks of $1.624–9.360M [23].

7.	Fuel Storage Tanks	$17.00M	$35.00M	$26.00M	Assuming replacement of one complete fuel-storage facility, the lower estimate is $17M, based on the Fresno Air National Guard Base fuel project, and the upper estimate is $35M, based on the General Mitchell Airfield fuel project. [249, 283].,
8.	U.S. Personnel Residence	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
9.	Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)	$11.20M	$11.20M	$11.20M	Assumes replacement of one 420K aerostat using the 2020 CBP purchase-order ceiling of $22.40M for two units.
	Illustrative Total	**$1,143.39M**	**$1,210.14M**	**$1,176.77M**	

Table 80 presents illustrative replacement costs ranging from $1,143.39 million to $1,210.14 million, with a combined average of $1,176.77 million ($1.18 billion). The Patriot air-defence system dominates the assessment, accounting for $1,095 million, or approximately 93% of the combined average. Other major categories include fuel storage tanks ($26 million), personnel accommodation ($16.79 million), and maintenance facilities ($15 million). Surveillance equipment, communications-related infrastructure, and technical warehouses contribute comparatively smaller amounts.

These valuations assume replacement of complete systems or facilities, although the available evidence does not establish that all identified assets were destroyed. In particular, the surveillance balloon, its control system, and the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) may represent overlapping components of the same surveillance capability. The Patriot estimate also assumes the loss of an entire battery rather than individual equipment. Consequently, the $1.18 billion figure is an illustrative replacement scenario, not a verified financial loss.

9.4. Baghdad International Airport

Baghdad International Airport became a focal point of reported attacks involving Iranian-backed Iraqi armed groups during March and April 2026. The airport complex contains civilian aviation infrastructure alongside Iraqi military installations and facilities associated with U.S. diplomatic and logistical activities. This concentration of different functions complicates the attribution of individual attacks and their consequences.

Table 81: Reported Iranian and Iran-Backed Attacks on Baghdad International Airport, Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
48.	March 10, 2026	1. Airport Military Facilities	Three drones intercepted; another fell near Victoria Base without casualties or damage [391].	High	Security Source
49.	March 15, 2026	1. Airport Facilities 2.Water Desalination Station	Five rockets hit the airport area, injuring five people [392].	High	Official Confirmation

		3. Mohammad Alaa Air Base Perimeter			
50.	March 19, 2026	1. Airport Facilities	Reported interception by U.S. aircraft; exact incident not independently matched to a source.	Medium	Iranian Claim
51.	March 21, 2026	1. Airport Facilities	Two militia drones intercepted by Iraqi air defences [377].	High	Iranian Claim
52.	March 22, 2026	1. Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service Facility	Rocket struck the CTS facility, injuring five personnel [393].	High	Iranian Claim
53.	March 29, 2026	1. U.S.-Associated Facilities	Drone intercepted near the Diplomatic Support Center; no damage [394].	High	Iranian Claim
54.	March 29, 2026	1. Logistics Support Headquarters	Drone struck the headquarters; damage details unavailable [318].	High	Iranian Claim
55.	March 30, 2026	1. Mohammad Alaa Air Base	Rocket attack destroyed an Iraqi transport aircraft; geolocated footage showed it burning [318].	High	Iranian Claim
56.	March 31, 2026	1. Airport Facilities	Drone intercepted near Abu Ghraib while approaching the airport [395].	High	Iranian Claim
57.	April 1, 2026	1. Logistics Support Headquarters	Drone attack on the diplomatic support facility reported retrospectively; no casualties [396].	Medium	Iranian Claim
58.	April 6, 2026		Unidentified projectile reportedly fired towards the headquarters; impact unconfirmed [397].	Medium	Iranian Claim
59.	April 8, 2026	1. Airport Facilities	U.S. Embassy confirmed multiple militia drone attacks around the airport and diplomatic centre [398].	High	U.S. Embassy
60.	April 8, 2026	2. Personnel or Vehicles near the Airport	Militia drone attacks confirmed in the airport vicinity; specific targeting of personnel remains unverified [399].	Medium	Iranian Claim

The 13 records in Table 81 indicate sustained attacks and aerial threats around Baghdad International Airport between March 10 and April 8, 2026. Among the most significant incidents, five rockets reportedly struck the airport area on March 15, injuring five people, while a separate March 22 strike hit an Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service facility and injured five personnel. On March 30, geolocated footage reportedly documented the destruction of an Iraqi transport aircraft at Mohammad Alaa Air Base. Other incidents involved drone interceptions, reported strikes against logistics headquarters, and attacks near facilities associated with U.S. diplomatic operations. However, several records lack sufficient evidence to establish the precise targets or resulting damage.

The distinction between Iraqi military infrastructure, civilian airport facilities, and U.S.-associated installations is essential when interpreting these incidents. The reported destruction of an Iraqi aircraft, for example, cannot be classified as an U.S. military loss. Moreover, the March 29 and April 1

reports concerning logistics and diplomatic support facilities may describe overlapping attacks, while the two April 8 entries may concern the same reporting cycle.

9.5. Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center

The Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, situated within the wider Baghdad International Airport area, was exposed to repeated drone and rocket threats during March and April 2026. As a facility associated with the U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq, it appeared in several reports of attacks by Iran-backed armed groups. Unlike incidents involving extensive destruction of military infrastructure, the available records primarily describe drone interceptions, nearby impacts, and attacks whose physical consequences remain uncertain. Table 79 documents seven incidents, drawing on U.S. Embassy statements, Iraqi security reporting, and other accounts of activity around the compound.

Table 82: Reported Attacks on Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center, Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
61.	March 10, 2026	1. Guard Tower Area 2. Diplomatic Support Center Compound	Six drones launched; five intercepted and one struck near a guard tower [400, 401]	High	U.S. Embassy
62.	March 12, 2026	1. Diplomatic Support Facility	Drone intercepted approaching the centre; no casualties or damage [402].	High	Iraqi Security Source
63.	March 12, 2026		Second drone intercepted within hours; no casualties or damage [403].	High	
64.	March 28, 2026		Two explosive-laden drones intercepted near the facility [404].	High	
65.	March 30, 2026		Rockets struck the airport area and targeted the diplomatic support headquarters; launch platforms recovered [318, 405].	High	Iranian Claim
66.	March 31, 2026		Drone impact reported in the supplied record; independent source confirmation pending.	Low	
67.	April 8, 2026		U.S. Embassy confirmed multiple militia drone attacks in the vicinity; individual impacts unspecified [406].	High	U.S. Embassy

The seven records in Table 82 show repeated attempts to strike or approach the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Center between March 10 and April 8, 2026. The most clearly documented impact occurred on March 10, when six drones were reportedly launched, five were intercepted, and one struck

near a guard tower. On March 12, two separate drone interceptions were reported within hours of each other, without casualties or damage. Further interceptions occurred on March 28, while the March 30 rocket attack reportedly targeted the diplomatic support headquarters. However, the available information does not establish the extent of any resulting structural damage.

The March 31 record remains particularly uncertain because independent confirmation of the reported drone impact is pending. The U.S. Embassy's April 8 statement provides stronger evidence of continued militia drone activity around the facility, although individual impact locations were not identified. Some incidents may also overlap with attacks recorded in Table 78 concerning Baghdad International Airport.

9.6. Balad Air Base

Balad Air Base in Iraq faced a series of reported drone threats and attempted rocket attacks during March and early April 2026. Unlike installations where satellite imagery documented structural destruction, the incidents at Balad primarily involved intercepted drones, unexploded devices, and weapons discovered before launch.

Table 83: Reported Drone and Rocket Attacks on Balad Air Base, Iraq, 2026

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
68.	March 2, 2026	1. Unspecified Facilities	Explosive-laden drone intercepted before reaching the base; no damage [407]	High	Iranian Claim
69.	March 3, 2026		Two drones reportedly targeted the base; damage unknown [408].	Medium	Iranian Claim
70.	March 10, 2026		Drone shot down before reaching the base; no confirmed damage [407, 409].	High	Iranian Claim
71.	March 11, 2026		Concealed rockets discovered and dismantled before launch [410].	High	Iranian Claim
72.	March 16, 2026		Explosive drone crashed without detonating; no direct facility damage reported [411, 412].	High	Iranian Claim
73.	March 28, 2026		Drone intercepted before reaching the base; no casualties [413].	High	Iranian Claim
74.	March 29, 2026		Drone intercepted by Iraqi air defences; no damage or casualties [414].	High	Iranian Claim
75.	March 31, 2026		Unidentified drone intercepted near the base; no damage [415].	High	Iranian Claim
76.	April 3, 2026		Iraqi security sources reported two drones intercepted outside the base perimeter [416, 417].	High	Iranian Claim

The nine incidents documented in Table 83 reveal repeated aerial threats against Balad Air Base, particularly during the second half of March 2026. Iraqi security reporting described several successful drone interceptions, including incidents on March 2, 10, 28, 29, and 31, followed by the interception of two additional drones outside the base perimeter on April 3. Other records involved two drones reportedly targeting the installation on March 3, concealed rockets discovered before launch on March 11, and an explosive drone that crashed without detonating on March 16. None of these accounts establishes confirmed structural damage to the base.

The pattern differs from locations where successful strikes produced identifiable physical losses. At Balad, the available evidence primarily concerns attempted attacks and defensive interceptions rather than destruction of military facilities. Although the frequency of incidents demonstrates continued threats to the installation, no replacement-cost estimates were calculated, as no specific damaged infrastructure was established. The assessment therefore documents the reported activity without assigning unsupported financial losses.

9.7. Ain al-Asad Air Base

Ain al-Asad Air Base in western Iraq appeared in reports of military attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Unlike other installations subjected to repeated strikes, the available records identify only two incidents, in March and April. These involved an unverified attack and a drone intercepted before reaching its target.

Table 84: Reported Iranian and Iran-Backed Attacks on Ain al-Asad Air Base, Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
77.	March 1, 2026	1. Unspecified Facilities	Attack reported by secondary sources; impact and damage not independently verified [418].	Low	Iranian Claim
78.	April 7, 2026	1. Radar System 2. Martyr Brigadier General Wadah Camp	Iraqi Ministry of Defense confirmed drone interception before impact [419].	High	

Table 84 records two incidents involving Ain al-Asad Air Base. The March 1 attack was reported by secondary sources, but neither its impact nor resulting damage was independently verified. On April 7, the Iraqi Ministry of Defence confirmed the interception of a drone reportedly targeting radar equipment and Martyr Brigadier General Wadah Camp. The interception occurred before impact, with no confirmed damage to either facility.

These findings indicate reported military threats rather than established infrastructure losses. The April incident has stronger official confirmation, while the March report remains uncertain. No replacement-cost estimates were calculated, as neither incident provides verified evidence of physical damage to identifiable military assets.

9.8. Camp Taji

Camp Taji, an Iraqi military installation north of Baghdad, was associated with two reported incidents during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The first involved an unverified rocket or drone attack in March, while the second concerned a major ammunition depot explosion in August.

Table 85: Reported Attacks and Ammunition Depot Explosion at Camp Taji, Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
79.	March 5–6, 2026	1. Unspecified Facilities	Reported rocket or drone attack; impacts and damage unverified [420].	Medium	Critical Threats — Reported Militia Attack
80.	August 2, 2026	1. Iraqi Army 9th Armoured Division Ammunition Depot 2. Stored Tank and Armoured Vehicle Ammunition 3. Unspecified Military Equipment	Depot explosion confirmed; cause disputed between heat-related fire and suspected drone strike [421-423].	High	Iraqi Ministry of Defence

Table 85 documents two incidents at Camp Taji. The March 5–6 report described a possible rocket or drone attack, but neither an impact nor physical damage was independently verified. On August 2, an explosion occurred at an ammunition depot associated with the Iraqi Army's 9th Armoured Division, where tank ammunition, armoured vehicle ammunition, and other military equipment were reportedly stored. Although the explosion was confirmed, its cause remained disputed, with accounts referring to either a heat-related fire or a suspected drone strike.

The August incident therefore provides stronger evidence of a destructive event than the March report, but it cannot be conclusively attributed to an Iranian or Iran-backed attack. No replacement-cost estimates were calculated, because the quantity and value of affected ammunition and equipment remain unspecified.

9.9. US Diplomatic Missions and Government Facilities

Diplomatic missions and government facilities in Iraq were exposed to repeated drone and missile threats during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Reported incidents affected U.S. diplomatic compounds in Baghdad and Erbil, alongside facilities associated with the United Nations and the United Arab Emirates.

Table 86: Reported Attacks on Diplomatic Missions and Government Facilities in Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
81.	February 28, 2026	1. U.S. Consulate	Iranian missiles and drones reportedly targeted the consulate area; direct impact unverified.	Medium	Iranian Claim

82.	March 7, 2026	1. U.S. Embassy	Reported rocket interception; no confirmed embassy impact.	Medium	Iranian Claim
83.	March 7, 2026	1. United Nations Building	Two drone strikes reported approximately 40 minutes apart; damage unknown [424].	Medium	Security Sources
84.	March 9, 2026	1. United Arab Emirates Consulate General	Drone debris fell near consulate; UAE confirmed material damage and no injuries.	High	UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs
85.	March 12, 2026	1. U.S. Consulate Compound	Two drones intercepted before reaching the compound; no damage [425].	High	Iranian Claim
86.	March 16, 2026		Drone attack and interceptions reported; overlap with March 17 wave unresolved [426].	Medium	Iranian Claim
87.	March 17, 2026	1. U.S. Embassy Compound and Entrance Area	Reuters witnessed two drones intercepted and one striking inside the compound; smoke and fire observed [427, 428].	High	Reuters
88.	March 17, 2026	1. U.S. Consulate Compound	More than ten drones reportedly targeted both sites; individual consulate impacts unverified [426].	Medium	Iranian Claim
89.	March 29, 2026		Drone crashed in Karrada while reportedly heading towards embassy; no casualties [428].	Medium	Iranian Claim
90.	April 6, 2026		At least four drones reportedly targeted the compound; impacts unverified.	Medium	Iranian Claim
91.	July 15, 2026	1. U.S. Consulate	Eight drones intercepted over Erbil on July 15; consulate-specific targeting unverified [429].	High	Iranian Claim
92.	July 17, 2026		Eight drones intercepted over Erbil; four separately reported approaching consulate [430, 431].	High	Iranian Claim
93.	July 18, 2026		Air defences intercepted approaching drones; no confirmed damage [431].	High	Security Sources
94.	July 27, 2026		Coalition aircraft intercepted drones over Khalifan; consulate identified as possible target [432].	Medium	Local Security Source

The 14 incidents in Table 86 demonstrate the geographical spread of attacks and aerial threats affecting diplomatic facilities in Baghdad and Erbil. The strongest evidence of direct impacts concerns March 17, when Reuters witnessed drones intercepted near the U.S. Embassy and another striking inside the compound, with smoke and fire observed. On March 9, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed material damage to its consulate following a drone-related incident. Other reports described attacks near a United Nations building, attempted strikes against U.S. consular facilities,

and repeated drone interceptions, particularly during July. However, several incidents lack confirmation that the diplomatic compounds themselves were struck.

The findings highlight the exposure of diplomatic infrastructure to military activity extending beyond established military installations. Nevertheless, intercepted drones should not be counted as successful strikes, and reports from March 16–17 require examination for possible overlap. No replacement-cost estimates were calculated, as the available evidence does not establish the extent or value of damaged diplomatic facilities. The confirmed impacts remain significant, but the overall scale of physical losses cannot be reliably quantified from the available records.

9.10. Other Military Bases and Headquarters and Infrastructure

Beyond Iraq's principal military installations, reported Iranian and Iran-backed attacks extended to military headquarters, radar installations, naval facilities, and strategic infrastructure during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. These incidents affected locations in Basra, Nasiriyah, and other parts of Iraq, including facilities operated by Iraqi security forces.

Table 87:Reported Attacks on Other Military Bases, Headquarters and Infrastructure in Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
95.	February 28, 2026	1. Radar Installation at Basra Operations Command Headquarters	Radar targeted; no confirmed damage [433, 434].	High	Iranian Claim
96.	February 28, 2026	1. Radar Installation	Four drones intercepted; radar also reported targeted [433, 435].	High	Iraqi Joint Operations
		2. Facilities st Imam Ali Airbase			
97.	March 1, 2026	1. Nasiriyah Airbase	Two Iranian drones reportedly intercepted; no impact confirmed.	Medium	Iraqi Military Report
98.	March 2, 2026	1. Iraqi Special Operations Headquarters	Drone reportedly crashed into headquarters; damage unspecified [436].	Medium	Iraqi Security Source
99.	March 2, 2026	1. Unspecified U.S. Military Bases	Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah claimed missile attacks; impacts unverified [436].	Low	Iranian Claim
100.	March 5–6, 2026	1. Basra International Airport	Rocket or drone attack reported; specific impact unverified [437].	Medium	Iranian Claim
101.	March 18, 2026	1. Naval Radar	Four drones reported; radar and other locations targeted, damage extent unclear [438, 439].	Medium	Iraqi Security Sources
		2. Naval Base Berthing Area			

		3. Adjacent Water Desalination Facility 4. U.S.-Used Shelter Area			
102.	March 21, 2026	1. Iraqi National Intelligence Service Headquarters 2. Communications Building	Drone struck headquarters area, killing an Iraqi intelligence officer [440, 441].	High	Iraqi Security Sources
103.	July 15, 2026	1. Grand Faw Port	Unidentified drone crashed; Iraqi port authorities confirmed no casualties or damage [442, 443].	High	Official Confirmation

The nine incidents in Table 87 illustrate the range of military and infrastructure sites exposed to attacks. Early reports described attempts to target radar installations at Basra Operations Command and Imam Ali Airbase, alongside intercepted drones near Nasiriyah Airbase. On March 2, a drone reportedly struck an Iraqi Special Operations headquarters, although the resulting damage was unspecified. Further reports identified naval radar equipment, berthing facilities, a water desalination installation, and military shelters as potential targets. The most consequential confirmed incident occurred on March 21, when a drone struck the Iraqi National Intelligence Service headquarters area, killing an Iraqi intelligence officer.

The available evidence indicates that attacks affected Iraqi military and security infrastructure as well as facilities reportedly associated with U.S. operations. However, several incidents involved interceptions without verified damage, including the July 15 drone crash at Grand Faw Port, where authorities reported no casualties or destruction. No replacement-cost estimates were calculated, as the available records do not establish the quantity, specifications, or extent of damaged infrastructure.

9.11. Oilfields, Refineries and Energy Facilities

Iraq's oil and energy sector experienced a series of reported drone attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, extending the conflict's consequences to civilian and commercial infrastructure. Oilfields, processing facilities, storage warehouses, and international energy companies were affected by explosions, fires, operational disruptions, and precautionary evacuations.

Table 88: Reported Drone Attacks on Oilfields, Refineries and Energy Facilities in Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
104.	March 5, 2026	1. Sarsang Oilfield — Power Unit and Processing Facilities, Duhok	Drone attack caused an explosion, fire and production suspension [444, 445].	High	Reuters
105.	March 5, 2026	1. Rumaila Oilfield	Two drones landed inside the field; foreign personnel evacuated [446].	High	Reuters
106.	March 6, 2026	1. TotalEnergies Headquarters	Drone reportedly targeted company headquarters; damage unconfirmed [447].	Medium	Iraqi Security Source

107.	March 6, 2026	1. Halliburton Facilities	Two drones intercepted before reaching company facilities [447].	High	Iraqi Security Source
108.	March 6, 2026	1. Foreign Oil Company Facilities	Drone or rocket attack reported at Beckers company site; damage unspecified [448].	Medium	Iraqi Security Source
109.	March 10, 2026	1. Majnoon Oilfield	Drone crashed inside field; no casualties or damage [449].	High	Iraqi Security Source
110.	March 16, 2026	1. Communications Tower	Drone struck communications tower; no casualties [412, 450].	High	Unspecified Claim
111.	March 16, 2026	1. KBR Company Office	Second drone struck KBR office; separate impact point [412, 450].	High	Unspecified Claim
112.	March 28, 2026	1. Majnoon Oilfield	Drone fell without exploding; no damage or casualties [451, 452].	High	Iraqi Ministry of Defence
113.	March 28, 2026	1. Baiji Oil Refinery	Drone exploded near refinery; no casualties or confirmed damage [453].	High	Iraqi Security Source
114.	April 1, 2026	1. Castrol Automotive Oil Storage Warehouses	Three drones struck warehouses; extensive fire and destruction [454, 455].	High	Erbil
115.	April 4, 2026	1. North Rumaila Oilfield	Two drones struck equipment storage; three Iraqi workers injured [456].	High	Reuters
116.	April 4, 2026	1. Burjesia Logistics Complex, Foreign Oil Company Storage Facilities	Drone attack caused fire and visible storage-facility destruction [457].	High	
117.	April 4, 2026	1. Bazarkan Oilfield	Six drones reportedly targeted field; storage facilities damaged, no injuries [458, 459].	High	Iraqi Ministry of Oil
118.	July 16, 2026	1. Oil Tanker at Basra Export Terminal Vicinity	Drone incident reported; no confirmed vessel damage or fire [460, 461].	Medium	

The 15 incidents in Table 88 demonstrate the exposure of Iraq's energy infrastructure to drone attacks, with the most significant reported damage concentrated in March and April. On March 5, an attack on the Sarsang Oilfield caused an explosion, fire, and suspension of production, while drones entering the Rumaila Oilfield prompted the evacuation of foreign personnel.

Further impacts were reported at a communications tower and KBR office on March 16. In early April, attacks caused extensive fires and storage-facility damage at Castrol warehouses, the Burjesia logistics complex, and Bazarkan Oilfield. Two drones also struck equipment storage at North Rumaila on April 4, injuring three Iraqi workers.

Other incidents involved intercepted drones, unexploded devices, or attacks without confirmed damage, including those at Majnoon Oilfield, Baiji Refinery, and near the Basra export terminal. The findings illustrate how the conflict disrupted energy operations and exposed civilian workers and

commercial assets to physical danger. No replacement-cost estimates were calculated, as the available evidence does not establish the quantities, specifications, or replacement values of damaged equipment and facilities. Although several incidents provide credible evidence of destruction, their financial consequences cannot be reliably quantified from the available records.

9.12. Hotels and Accommodation Facilities

Hotels and accommodation facilities in Iraq were also exposed to drone threats during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Several reports identified hotels reportedly accommodating U.S. personnel, although their identities and military connections were not independently established.

Table 89: Reported Attacks on Hotels and Accommodation Facilities in Iraq

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
119.	March 3, 2026	1. Unidentified Hotel in Erbil,	Saraya Awliya al-Dam claimed a drone attack; hotel and impact unverified [462]. This hotel is reportedly housing U.S. personnel.	Low	Militia Claim
120.	March 4, 2026		Hotel-specific claim not corroborated; reporting instead identifies Erbil Airport as the target [463]. This hotel is reportedly housing U.S. personnel.	Low	Militia Claim
121.	March 7, 2026	1. Titanic Hotel	Two drone strikes reported against a UN site behind the hotel; hotel impact unconfirmed [424].	Medium	Security Sources
122.	March 16, 2026	1. Al-Rasheed Hotel	Iraqi Interior Ministry confirmed drone collision; no significant damage or casualties [464, 465].	High	Iraqi Ministry of Interior

The four records in Table 89 concern reported attacks affecting hotels in Erbil and Baghdad. On March 3–4, Saraya Awliya al-Dam claimed drone attacks against an unidentified hotel reportedly accommodating U.S. personnel, but neither the hotel's identity nor a direct impact was independently verified. On March 7, two drone strikes were reported against a United Nations facility behind the Titanic Hotel, without confirmation that the hotel itself was struck. The clearest officially documented incident occurred on March 16, when Iraq's Ministry of Interior confirmed a drone collision involving Al-Rasheed Hotel, reporting no significant damage or casualties.

10.Oman

Oman's maritime infrastructure became exposed to the regional consequences of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, as drone attacks and reported military operations extended to ports, energy facilities, and strategic installations. Although Oman was not a principal party to the conflict, its commercial ports and infrastructure associated with foreign military logistics were drawn into the wider pattern of regional escalation.

The reported incidents were concentrated around Duqm Port and the Port of Salalah, where drone activity affected workers' accommodation, fuel storage infrastructure, and commercial operations. Omani authorities confirmed physical damage to accommodation and fuel facilities, while other incidents involved intercepted drones or temporary operational disruption. Beyond these ports, reports identified additional locations, including the Mina Al Fahal Oil Export Terminal, coastal radar installations in Musandam, military logistics facilities, and industrial areas in Sohar.

This report examines 12 incident records between March and July 2026, organised into three geographical and functional categories. The assessment distinguishes officially confirmed impacts from Iranian military claims and incidents for which the location or extent of damage remains uncertain. It also evaluates the potential replacement costs of ten categories of infrastructure, producing an illustrative range of $68.53 million to $164.77 million, with an average of $116.65 million. These figures represent hypothetical replacement values rather than verified U.S. military losses.

10.1. Duqm Port

Duqm Port in Oman was affected by reported drone attacks during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Incidents between March and July involved workers' accommodation, fuel storage infrastructure, and facilities reportedly associated with U.S. naval logistics. Omani authorities confirmed physical impacts in March, while subsequent Iranian claims concerning the destruction of naval support facilities remained independently unverified.

Table 90:Reported Iranian Drone Attacks and Damage at Duqm Port, Oman

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1.	March 1, 2026	1. Mobile Workers' Accommodation Unit	Oman confirmed one drone struck workers' accommodation, injuring one worker; second drone's debris caused no damage [466].	High	Official confirmation
		2. Fuel Storage Tank Area		High	
2.	March 3, 2026	1. Fuel Storage Tank	Oman confirmed multiple drones targeted fuel storage; one struck a tank, causing contained damage without casualties [467].	High	
3.	March 11, 2026	1. Unspecified Area North of Duqm	Oman confirmed one drone intercepted and another fell into the sea; no damage or casualties [468].	Medium	
4.	July 12, 2026	1. U.S. Naval Logistics Support Facilities		Low	Iranian Claim

		2. Aircraft Carrier Refueling Platforms	IRGC claimed destruction of both facilities at Duqm; impacts and damage remain independently unverified [469].		

Table 90 documents four incident records between March 1 and July 12, 2026. On March 1, Omani authorities confirmed that a drone struck workers' accommodation, injuring one worker, while debris from another drone caused no damage. On March 3, a separate attack damaged a fuel storage tank without reported casualties. The March 11 incident involved an intercepted drone and another falling into the sea, with no confirmed damage. These accounts establish physical impacts on accommodation and fuel infrastructure but do not demonstrate the destruction of either facility.

The July 12 incident differs in its evidentiary basis. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed to have destroyed U.S. naval logistics support facilities and aircraft carrier refuelling platforms at Duqm, but independent confirmation of the reported damage remains unavailable.

10.2. Port of Salalah

Port of Salalah, one of Oman's principal maritime and commercial facilities, experienced reported drone incidents during March 2026 amid the wider U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. The incidents involved areas near port storage facilities and fuel storage infrastructure, raising concerns about the exposure of civilian maritime operations and energy facilities to regional military escalation.

Table 91:Reported Drone Attacks and Damage at Port of Salalah, Oman

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
5.	March 3, 2026	1. Port Area / Near Storage Facilities	Two drones were intercepted, and another fell near the port; operations were suspended, with no confirmed physical damage [470].	High	Iranian Claim
6.	March 11, 2026	1. Fuel Storage Tanks	Omani authorities confirmed drone impacts on fuel tanks; fires and physical damage were documented [468].	High	Official confirmation

Table 91 documents two incidents at Port of Salalah on March 3 and March 11, 2026. The first involved two intercepted drones and another falling near the port, resulting in the suspension of operations without confirmed physical damage. On March 11, Omani authorities confirmed drone impacts on fuel storage tanks, with resulting fires and physical damage. The two incidents therefore differ substantially in their documented consequences, with the second providing stronger evidence of direct infrastructure damage.

The findings demonstrate the vulnerability of commercial port operations and fuel storage infrastructure to drone attacks. Although the March 11 incident establishes physical damage, the available information does not identify the number, capacity, or replacement value of the affected tanks.

10.3. Other Facilities

Beyond Oman's principal ports, reported drone incidents and Iranian military claims extended to oil export infrastructure, coastal radar installations, military logistics facilities, and industrial areas. These incidents involved both civilian and military-associated locations, with varying levels of evidence concerning their consequences.

Table 92:Reported Attacks and Damage at Other Facilities in Oman

NO.	Date	Location	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
7.	June 4–5, 2026	Mina Al Fahal Oil Export Terminal	1. Offshore Single-Point Mooring Area — SBM 1 and SBM 2	Reuters reported an offshore explosion; PDO reported normal operations. Attack attribution and physical damage remain unconfirmed [471].	Low	Reuters
8.	July 12, 2026	Musandam Coastal Radar Sites	1. Coastal Surveillance Radar 2. Vessel Detection Radar	Maritime Executive identified coastal radar sites among reported targets; precise facilities, impacts, and damage remain unverified [472].	Medium	Iranian Claim
9.	July 12, 2026	Unidentified Air Base, Central	1. Military Logistics Storage Facilities	Maritime Executive reported logistics stores among targets at an unnamed airbase; impacts and damage remain unverified [473].	Low	
10.	March 13, 2026	Awahi Industrial Area, Sohar	1. Industrial Area 2. Nearby Open Area	Two drone crashes reportedly killed two people and injured 11; no U.S. military target established [474].	High	
11.	July 17, 2026	Ghanem Region, U.S. Air-Control Radar Site	1. U.S. Air-Control Radar	IRGC claimed destruction of a U.S. air-control radar; physical damage remains independently unverified [475].	Low	
12.	July 17, 2026	Salameh Rocks, Naval Radar Site	1. Naval Control Radar	IRGC claimed destruction of a naval surveillance radar; physical damage remains independently unverified [475].	Low	

Table 92 presents six incident records between March and July 2026. The most serious reported human consequences occurred in the Awahi industrial area of Sohar on March 13, where two drone crashes reportedly killed two people and injured 11. At the Mina Al Fahal Oil Export Terminal, Reuters reported an offshore explosion on June 4–5, although Petroleum Development Oman indicated that operations remained normal and physical damage

was not confirmed. The remaining July incidents concerned reported attacks on coastal surveillance radars in Musandam, military logistics storage facilities at an unidentified airbase, and radar installations in Ghanem and Salameh Rocks.

The evidence does not establish that the reported July attacks destroyed the identified military equipment. In particular, the IRGC's claims concerning U.S. air-control and naval surveillance radars remain independently unverified, while the precise facilities affected in Musandam and central Oman are uncertain.

10.4. Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities in Oman

The reported attacks on facilities in Oman identified several categories of potentially affected infrastructure, including workers' accommodation, fuel storage tanks, naval logistics facilities, refuelling platforms, and radar installations. Table 93 applies U.S. military construction and procurement benchmarks to ten asset categories to estimate their potential replacement costs. The assessment includes both infrastructure with documented physical damage and military facilities whose reported destruction remains independently unverified.

Table 93: Estimated Replacement Costs of Military Facilities and Infrastructure in Oman

No.	Targeted Facilities	Lower	Upper	Average	Valuation Justification
1.	Accommodation Unit	$6.28M	$27.29M	$16.79M	Based on U.S. Army barracks construction benchmarks: $6.28M per building at Fort Bliss and $27.29M for a larger facility at Fort McCoy [13, 14].
2.	Fuel Storage Tank	$6.00M	$24.00M	$15.00M	Based on DLA FY2022 fuel infrastructure projects: $6M at Misawa Air Base and $24M at Kadena Air Base. Values are indicative construction benchmarks, excluding fuel inventory and unverified equipment losses [12].
3.	U.S. Naval Logistics Support Facilities	$32.18M	$38.72M	$35.45M	Based on the U.S. Navy FY2026 Bahrain Tactical Operations Center estimate ($32.18M), including an additional $6.54M for secure compartmented facilities [21].
4.	Aircraft Carrier Refueling Platforms	$3.90M	$3.90M	$3.90M	Assumes one ground-based refuelling point. The $39.00M Kunsan project divided by ten points gives $3.90M per point, including an allocated share of shared fuel infrastructure. Actual configuration is unverified.
5.	Fuel Storage Tanks	$6.00M	$24.00M	$15.00M	See number 2.
6.	Coastal Surveillance Radar	$6.23M	$10.90M	$8.56M	Assumes replacement of one counter-drone surveillance radar system, using FY2025 U.S. Army procurement benchmarks of $6.23–10.90M per radar, including production and integration [23].

7.	Vessel Detection Radar	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	Based on U.S. Army AN/TPQ-50 hardware procurement costs ($1.11M–$1.48M) and the UAE's $85M package for 18 radars ($4.72M each including support) [20].
8.	Military Logistics Storage Facilities	$4.61M	$21.80M	$13.20M	Based on a $4.606M DLA operations building construction estimate and a $21.80M U.S. Army Corps of Engineers contract for a three-building logistics complex at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar. Assumes replacement of one logistics operations building, excluding stored equipment and inventory [93, 94].
9.	U.S. Air-Control Radar	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See number 7.
10.	Naval Control Radar	$1.11M	$4.72M	$2.92M	See number 7.
	Illustrative Total	**$68.53M**	**$164.77M**	**$116.65M**	

Table 93 estimates the potential replacement costs of ten categories of military facilities and infrastructure in Oman, ranging from $68.53 million to $164.77 million, with a combined average of $116.65 million. U.S. naval logistics support facilities account for the largest individual share ($35.45 million), followed by accommodation infrastructure ($16.79 million), two fuel-storage categories ($15 million each), and military logistics storage facilities ($13.20 million). The remaining estimates cover aircraft carrier refuelling infrastructure and four radar categories, using U.S. military construction and procurement benchmarks. These valuations assume replacement of individual facilities or complete equipment systems, although the available evidence does not establish that all identified assets were destroyed.

11. Cyprus

Cyprus was drawn into the wider consequences of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran when drone activity affected British military facilities on the island. The incidents highlighted the exposure of foreign military installations to regional attacks, particularly RAF Akrotiri, where British authorities confirmed minor physical damage.

11.1. RAF Akrotiri Air Base

RAF Akrotiri, a British military airbase in Cyprus, experienced a confirmed drone impact and additional aerial threats on March 2, 2026. The incidents involved an aircraft hangar and the wider airfield area, although the reported physical damage was limited.

Table 94:Reported Drone Attacks and Damage at RAF Akrotiri Air Base, Cyprus

NO.	Date	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1.	March 2, 2026	1. Aircraft Hangar	UK Ministry of Defence confirmed a drone struck an aircraft hangar, causing minor external damage without casualties [476].	High	Official conformation
		1. External Hangar Structure		High	
2.	March 2, 2026	1. Airfield Area	Cypriot authorities confirmed two additional drones were intercepted before impact; no damage or casualties reported [477].	High	

Table 94 documents two incident records on March 2, 2026. The UK Ministry of Defence confirmed that a drone struck an aircraft hangar, causing minor external damage without casualties. Cypriot authorities separately confirmed that two additional drones were intercepted before impact, with no reported damage.

The available evidence establishes limited physical damage rather than extensive destruction of military infrastructure. No replacement-cost assessment was

12.Israel

The 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran brought extensive missile and drone attacks to Israeli territory, affecting residential communities, urban infrastructure, industrial facilities, and military-associated locations. Unlike attacks directed primarily at identifiable military bases elsewhere in the region, many reported incidents in Israel occurred within densely populated areas.

Reported incidents extended across the northern, central, and southern regions of the territories under Israeli control, including Jerusalem and its surroundings. Central areas recorded the highest concentration of incidents, particularly in Tel Aviv and neighbouring cities. Attacks in Haifa, Safed, Jerusalem, Dimona, Arad, and Beersheba affected residential areas and civilian infrastructure. Iranian claims also identified military facilities as targets, although several attacks remained independently unverified.

In this report, we examined 70 incident records between February and April 2026, organised into four geographical categories. The assessment draws on Israeli official statements, emergency service reporting, media investigations, and open-source information, alongside Iranian military claims. It distinguishes documented impacts and civilian casualties from intercepted projectiles, unverified attacks, and incidents where the origin of damage remains uncertain. Some records may concern multiple impacts from the same missile wave rather than separate attacks.

Unlike the assessments of several Gulf countries and Iraq, no financial replacement-cost estimates were prepared for Israel, as the available records do not provide sufficiently reliable information about the specifications, quantities, and replacement values of damaged infrastructure. The section therefore concentrates on documenting the geographical distribution of attacks, their reported physical consequences with the expansion of the war.

12.1. Northern Israel

Northern Israel experienced a series of reported Iranian missile attacks during March and April 2026, affecting residential neighbourhoods, urban areas, and energy infrastructure. Incidents in Haifa and Safed involved missile impacts, falling debris, and reported cluster munitions, resulting in civilian casualties and structural damage. Table 95 examines these incidents, distinguishing documented impacts from attacks whose precise causes or physical consequences remain uncertain.

Table 95: Reported Iranian Missile Attacks and Damage in Northern Israel

NO.	Date	Base/ location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
1.	March 19, 2026	Bazan Oil Refinery	1. Refinery Facilities — Intended Target	Iranian missile attack reported; IDF attributed site impact to interception debris.	High	Israeli confirmation
2.	March 24, 2026	Safed	1. Urban Impact Area	Iranian ballistic missile reportedly struck Safed, injuring two people.	High	Iranian Claim

3.	March 24, 2026	Haifa Suburb	1. Residential House	Iranian cluster munition reportedly damaged a residential house.	High	Iranian Claim
4.	March 23, 2026	Safed	1. Unspecified Ground Area	Israeli media reported Iranian missile fragments falling near Safed; no damage confirmed.	Medium	Israeli confirmation
5.	March 30, 2026	Bazan Oil Refinery	1. Oil Refinery Facilities	Fire followed Iranian missile and Hezbollah rocket attacks; the cause remains undetermined.	Low	Iranian Claim
6.	April 5–6, 2026	Haifa	1 Building Struck by Missile Fragment	Iranian cluster munitions reportedly impacted at least ten locations; a missile fragment struck a building, killing four people.	High	Iranian Claim
7.	April 5, 2026	Haifa	1. Residential Building	Iranian missile reportedly struck a residential building, causing severe structural damage and seriously injuring one person.	High	Israeli confirmation
8.	April 7, 2026	Haifa	1. Cluster-Munition Impact Areas	Iranian cluster munitions reportedly impacted Haifa during four ballistic-missile waves; specific building damage not established.	High	Iranian Claim

Table 95 documents eight incident records between March 19 and April 7, 2026, concentrated around Haifa, Safed, and the Bazan Oil Refinery. The most significant reported consequences involved residential areas in Haifa, where missile and cluster-munition impacts caused structural damage, injuries, and fatalities.

The April 5–6 reports included four deaths following a missile fragment striking a building, while a separate April 5 record described severe damage to a residential building. At the Bazan refinery, reported attacks and fires were documented, although the available evidence does not conclusively attribute the damage to direct Iranian missile impacts.

The findings indicate that civilian residential areas experienced documented harm, while the extent of damage to industrial infrastructure remains less certain. Some Haifa incidents recorded on April 5–7 may also concern overlapping attack waves or damage reports.

12.2. Central Israel

Central Israel experienced widespread missile and drone threats during the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, with reported impacts extending across densely populated urban areas, transport infrastructure, and military-associated locations. Unlike attacks concentrated on individual military installations, these incidents affected multiple cities and residential neighbourhoods, particularly during successive waves of ballistic missiles and cluster munitions.

Table 96:Reported Iranian Missile and Drone Attacks and Damage in Central Israel

NO.	Date	Base/ location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
9.	February 28, 2026	Tel Aviv	1. Civilian Urban Area	Israeli media reported an Iranian ballistic missile impact, killing one person and injuring 21.	High	Israeli confirmation
10.	February 28, 2026	Bnei Brak	1. Civilian Urban Area	Israeli media reported an Iranian ballistic missile impact and several injuries.	High	Israeli confirmation
11.	March 1, 2026	Tel Aviv	1. Unspecified Locations	CTP–ISW reported possible Iranian missile impacts or interception debris; overlap with February 28 unresolved.	Medium	Iranian Claim
12.	March 3, 2026	Tel Aviv Area	1. Civilian Areas	CTP–ISW reported an Iranian cluster-munition impact and at least 12 injuries.	High	Iranian Claim
13.	March 4, 2026	Unspecified Locations	1. Unspecified Locations	Iran launched a ballistic missile during simultaneous Hezbollah attacks; the source of the two reported injuries was not established.	Medium	Israeli confirmation
14.	March 5, 2026	Tel Aviv	1. Unspecified Locations	Preliminary reporting suggested an Iranian ballistic missile may have landed; impact unconfirmed.	Low	Iranian Claim
15.	March 5, 2026	Moshav Bareket	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian ballistic missile reportedly landed without casualties or damage.	High	Iranian Claim
16.	March 12, 2026	Palmachim Air Base	1. Airbase Facilities	Iranian Armed Forces claimed a drone attack; no independent impact confirmation.	Low	Iranian Claim
17.	March 12, 2026	Shin Bet Headquarters	1. Security Headquarters	Iranian Armed Forces claimed a drone attack; no independent impact confirmation.	Low	Iranian Claim
18.	March 14, 2026	Ramla	1. Unspecified Locations	OSINT reported an Iranian missile impact causing a fire; facility unidentified.	Medium	Iranian Claim
19.	March 15, 2026	Tel Aviv	1. Unspecified Locations	OSINT reported an Iranian cluster-munition impact; damage unspecified.	Medium	Iranian Claim
20.	March 15, 2026	Bnei Brak	1. Residential Apartment Building	Israeli emergency service reported a suspected Iranian cluster-munition impact and one injury.	High	Israeli confirmation

21.	March 15, 2026	Ramat Gan	1. Unspecified Locations	Israeli emergency service reported an Iranian missile impact injuring one person.	High	Israeli confirmation
22.	March 15–16, 2026	Rishon Lezion	1. Unspecified Locations	Israeli media reported extensive damage from an Iranian cluster munition.	High	Israeli confirmation
23.	March 17, 2026	Six Unspecified Locations	1. Unspecified Locations	Israeli media reported six additional impacts; attribution and individual damage unspecified in this entry.	Medium	Israeli confirmation
24.	March 17, 2026	Rishon Lezion	1. Unspecified Locations	Israeli media reported a separate Iranian cluster-munition impact.	High	Israeli confirmation
25.	March 17, 2026	Holon Railway Station	1. Railway Station Facilities	Iranian missile fragments reportedly struck the station; damage extent unspecified.	High	Iranian Claim
26.	March 18, 2026	Bnei Brak	1. Unspecified Locations	Magen David Adom reported one injury from Iranian projectile shrapnel.	High	Iranian Claim
27.	March 18, 2026	Ramat Gan	1. Residential Impact Area	IDF Home Front Command confirmed two civilian deaths from an Iranian missile strike.	High	Israeli confirmation
28.	March 18, 2026	Moshav Adanim	1. Residential Area	Iranian cluster munition reportedly killed one person and injured four.	High	Iranian Claim
29.	March 22, 2026	Tel Aviv Area	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian cluster submunitions reportedly impacted Jaffa during a missile attack.	High	Iranian Claim
30.	March 22, 2026	Petah Tikva	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian cluster submunitions reportedly impacted the city.	High	Iranian Claim
31.	March 22, 2026	Bat Yam	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian cluster submunitions reportedly impacted the city.	High	Iranian Claim
32.	March 22, 2026	Holon	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian cluster submunitions reportedly impacted the city.	High	Iranian Claim
33.	March 22, 2026	Tel Aviv	1. Unspecified Locations	Israeli media reported Iranian cluster-munition and missile-fragment impacts.	Medium	Israeli confirmation
34.	March 22, 2026	Ben Gurion Airport	1. Airport Facilities	Iran claimed an Arash-2 drone attack; no independent impact confirmation.	Low	Iranian Claim Only

35.	March 20, 2026	Rehovot	1. Unspecified Locations	Israeli OSINT reported a ballistic missile impact; Iranian attribution not established in the supplied entry.	Medium	Iranian Claim
36.	March 24, 2026	Tel Aviv	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian ballistic missile reportedly impacted Tel Aviv, injuring four.	High	Iranian Claim
37.	March 24, 2026	Bnei Brak	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian cluster munitions reportedly injured seven people.	High	Iranian Claim
38.	March 24, 2026	Petah Tikva	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian cluster munitions reportedly impacted the city.	High	Iranian Claim
39.	March 25, 2026	Hadera — Orot Rabin Power Plant Vicinity	1. Ground Impact Area near Power Plant	Iranian missile reportedly impacted nearby; Israel Electric Corporation reported no plant damage.	High	Iranian Claim
40.	March 27, 2026	Unspecified Locations	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian ballistic missile reportedly dispersed submunitions; individual impacts unidentified.	High	Iranian Claim
41.	March 28, 2026	Savyon	1. Residential House	Israeli Army Radio reported Iranian cluster-munition damage to a house.	High	Israeli confirmation
42.	April 1, 2026	Bnei Brak	1. Unspecified Locations	IDF reported Iranian cluster submunitions at three sites, injuring at least ten civilians.	High	Israeli confirmation
43.	April 2, 2026	Petah Tikva	1. Ballistic Missile Ground Impact Area	Iranian ballistic missile reportedly impacted Petah Tikva.	High	Iranian Claim
44.	April 4, 2026	Multiple Locations	1. Cluster-Munition Impact Sites IDF Kirya Headquarters Vicinity 3. Nearby School	Iranian cluster munitions reportedly struck multiple sites, damaging a school; source date discrepancy requires checking.	Medium	Iranian Claim
45.	April 5–6, 2026	Unspecified Locations	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian cluster submunitions reportedly fell at approximately 30 locations; not 30 separate missile attacks.	High	Iranian Claim

46.	April 6, 2026	Central Israel	1. Unspecified Locations	Iran reportedly launched two ballistic missiles amid simultaneous Hezbollah and Houthi attacks; individual shrapnel attribution unresolved.	Medium	Iranian Claim
47.	April 6–7, 2026	Bnei Brak	1. Unspecified Locations	Iranian cluster submunitions reportedly impacted Bnei Brak.	High	Israeli confirmation

Table 96 contains 39 incident records between February 28 and April 7, 2026, covering Tel Aviv, Bnei Brak, Ramat Gan, Rishon Lezion, Petah Tikva, Holon, and other locations. Reported missile and cluster-munition impacts caused civilian deaths, injuries, and residential damage, including two deaths in Ramat Gan on March 18 and damage to residential buildings in Bnei Brak and Rishon Lezion.

Other records concerned Holon Railway Station, areas near the Orot Rabin Power Plant, and reported attacks against Palmachim Air Base, Shin Bet headquarters, and Ben Gurion Airport. However, the latter military and airport-related claims lack independent confirmation of successful impacts. The concentration of incidents in March reflects repeated missile waves and the dispersal of cluster submunitions across multiple locations.

Several entries may describe impacts from the same attack waves, particularly those recorded on March 22 and April 5–7, and should not be interpreted as separate missile launches without further verification.

12.3. Jerusalem and Surrounding Areas

The Jerusalem area and its surrounding communities experienced several reported missile impacts during March 2026, with incidents affecting residential neighbourhoods, religious buildings, and open areas.

Table 97: Reported Iranian Missile Attacks and Damage in Jerusalem and Surrounding Areas

NO.	Date	Base/ location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
48.	March 1, 2026	Beit Shemesh	1. Residential Area	CTP–ISW reported an Iranian missile impact, killing nine people.	High	Iranian Claim
49.	March 1, 2026	Jerusalem	1. Unspecified Urban Locations	CTP–ISW reported possible Iranian missile impacts or interception debris; mechanism unconfirmed.	Medium	Iranian Claim
50.	March 9–10, 2026	Beit Shemesh	1. Open Area — Ballistic Missile Impact	CTP–ISW reported an Iranian ballistic missile landing in an open area without casualties or damage.	High	Iranian Claim

51.	March 11–12, 2026	Jerusalem	1. Urban Impact Area	Israeli Foreign Ministry reported an Iranian missile impact near the two landmarks.	High	Israeli confirmation
52.	March 16, 2026	Beit Shemesh	1. Unspecified Ground Impact Sites	Israeli media reported Iranian projectile fragments falling in the area; damage unspecified.	Medium	Israeli confirmation
53.	March 16, 2026	Jerusalem	1. Synagogue Building	Israeli journalist reported a projectile fragment striking the synagogue; origin unconfirmed.	Medium	Israeli confirmation
54.	March 20, 2026	Beit Shemesh	1. Open Area	Iranian ballistic missile reportedly landed without casualties or damage.	High	Iranian Claim
55.	March 20, 2026	Jerusalem	1. Unspecified Ground Impact Site	Israeli OSINT reported a ballistic missile impact; Iranian attribution not established in the supplied entry.	Medium	Iranian Claim
56.	March 28, 2026	Moshav Eshtaol	1. Residential Buildings	Iranian missile reportedly damaged homes and injured eleven people.	High	Iranian Claim

Of the nine incident records documented in Table 97, the most serious involved residential areas. On March 1, a reported Iranian missile strike in Beit Shemesh killed nine people, while another reported strike in Moshav Eshtaol on March 28 damaged homes and injured eleven.

In Jerusalem, incidents included a missile impact reported by the Israeli Foreign Ministry on March 11–12 and a projectile fragment striking a synagogue on March 16, although the origin of the latter was not established. Other records concerned missile impacts in open areas, falling fragments, and locations where the extent of damage remained unclear.

12.4. Southern Israel

Southern Israel experienced reported Iranian missile and drone attacks during March and April 2026, affecting residential communities, industrial facilities, and military-associated locations across the Negev and surrounding areas. The incidents included strikes in Dimona, Arad, and Beersheba, alongside reported impacts near chemical manufacturing facilities and an unverified attack against Ovda Air Base.

Table 98: Reported Iranian Missile and Drone Attacks and Damage in Southern Israel

NO.	Date	Base/ location name	Targeted Facilities	Verification	Confident	Evidence Source
57.	March 12, 2026	Ovda Air Base	1. Airbase Facilities	Iranian Armed Forces claimed a drone attack; impact unverified.	Low	Iranian Claim

58.	March 18, 2026	Unspecified Location	1. Residential House	Journalist reported an Iranian cluster-munition impact on a house; locality unidentified.	Medium	Israeli confirmation
59.	March 21, 2026	Dimona, Negev	Residential Buildings	Iranian ballistic missile reportedly struck Dimona after an interception failure.	High	Iranian Claim
60.	March 21, 2026	Arad, Negev	Residential Buildings	Separate Iranian ballistic missile reportedly struck Arad; IDF discussed interception failure.	High	Iranian Claim
61.	March 22, 2026	Kiryat Gat	1. Unspecified Ground Impact Site	Israeli media reported an Iranian ballistic missile impact.	Medium	Israeli confirmation
62.	March 22, 2026	Ashkelon	1. Unspecified Ground Impact Site	Israeli media reported a ballistic missile impact; Iranian origin not specified in the supplied entry.	Medium	Israeli confirmation
63.	March 25, 2026	Unspecified Location	1. Ground Impact Site	OSINT reported an Iranian missile impact injuring at least two people.	Medium	Iranian Claim
64.	March 28–29, 2026	Beersheba	1. Residential Area near Homes	Iranian ballistic missile reportedly struck open ground near homes, injuring eleven people.	High	Iranian Claim
65.	March 28–29, 2026	ADAMA Makhteshim Plant, Ne'ot Hovav Industrial Town	1. Agrochemical Manufacturing Building	Physical damage reported; IRGC claimed targeting the plant, but missile versus interception debris unresolved.	Medium	Iranian Claim
66.	March 29, 2026	Turner Stadium Vicinity, Beersheba	1. Unspecified Ground Impact Area	OSINT footage showed smoke following an Iranian missile attack; separate impact unconfirmed.	Medium	Iranian Claim
67.	April 5, 2026	Neot Hovav Industrial Zone	1. Open Area within Industrial Zone	Israeli media reported an Iranian ballistic missile impact; no industrial damage.	High	Israeli confirmation
68.	April 6–7, 2026	Unspecified Location	1. Missile Interception Debris Impact Area	Israeli media reported one injury from intercepted Iranian missile debris.	High	Israeli confirmation
69.	April 7, 2026	Beersheba	1. Cluster-Munition Impact Areas	Iranian cluster submunitions reportedly impacted Beersheba; specific damage unidentified.	High	Iranian Claim

70.	April 7, 2026	Tel Sheva	1. Cluster-Munition Impact Area	Iranian cluster munitions reportedly impacted Tel Sheva, injuring three civilians.	High	Iranian Claim

Table 98 records 14 incidents between March 12 and April 7, 2026. Residential areas were particularly affected, including reported ballistic missile strikes in Dimona and Arad on March 21 and an impact near homes in Beersheba on March 28–29 that injured eleven people. Additional incidents involved cluster-munition impacts in Beersheba and Tel Sheva, where three civilians were reportedly injured. Industrial infrastructure was also exposed, with physical damage reported at the ADAMA Makhteshim plant in Ne'ot Hovav, although whether it resulted from a direct missile impact or interception debris remains unresolved.

13.U.S. Aircraft Losses and Damage

The 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran resulted in substantial reported losses and damage to U.S. military aircraft across several countries in the Middle East. These incidents involved fighter jets, aerial refuelling aircraft, surveillance drones, transport aircraft, and helicopters. While some aircraft were destroyed during combat operations or attacks on military installations, others sustained repairable damage, crashed during operational missions, or were deliberately destroyed by U.S. forces. Distinguishing between these circumstances is essential to understanding the actual extent of military losses.

This section examines 88 U.S. military aircraft documented across 23 incident records, combining 81 aircraft identified in the Congressional Research Service (CRS) assessment with seven additional aircraft identified through supplementary reporting. The analysis uses Congressional Budget Office (CBO) reference unit values and other available procurement benchmarks to estimate the financial value of the aircraft involved.

The combined illustrative reference value is approximately $5.452 billion, comprising $5.140 billion for the principal aircraft register and $312 million for additional reported incidents.

The section is organised into three sections: the consolidated aircraft register, additional reported aircraft incidents and their estimated values, and a summary of the combined assessment. Together, these sections provide a structured examination of reported U.S. aircraft losses while maintaining a clear distinction between documented damage, uncertain claims, and illustrative financial valuations.

13.1. Consolidated U.S. Aircraft Losses, Damage, and Reference Values

This section presents the consolidated record of U.S. military aircraft losses and damage during the 2026 war against Iran, drawing on CRS reporting and CBO reference unit values. Table 99 documents 81 aircraft across 19 incident records, including combat losses, damage sustained during military operations, aviation accidents, and aircraft destroyed by U.S. forces. The assessment distinguishes reported aircraft damage from illustrative reference values, which do not necessarily represent actual financial losses.

Table 99: Consolidated U.S. Aircraft Losses and Damage, Including CBO Reference Unit Values

No.	Date	Type	No.	Base/Incident Location	Country	Damage / Status	Unit Value	Total Value
1.	March 2, 2026	F-15E	3	Kuwaiti airspace	Kuwait	Friendly fire; destroyed	$100m	$300m
2.	March 12, 2026	KC-135	1	Western Iraq	Iraq	Crashed	$170m	$170m

3.	March 12, 2026	KC-135	1	Ben Gurion International Airport (emergency landing)	Israel	Significant vertical tail damage; emergency landing	$170m	$170m
4.	By March 14, 2026	KC-135	5	Prince Sultan Air Base	Saudi Arabia	Reported damaged; repairable	$170m	$850m
5.	March 19, 2026	F-35A	1	Iranian airspace	Iran	Reportedly struck by Iranian ground fire; landed safely	$120m	$120m
6.	March 27, 2026	E-3	1	Prince Sultan Air Base	Saudi Arabia	Direct hit; significant damage	$500m	$500m
7.	April 3, 2026	A-10 Thunderbolt II	1	Iranian/Kuwaiti airspace; no base identified	Kuwait	Destroyed after hit; pilot ejected	$120m	$120m
8.	April 5, 2026	F-15E	1	Iranian airspace	Iran	Destroyed in combat	$100m	$100m
9.	April 5, 2026	MC-130J	2	Temporary landing site	Iran	Destroyed by U.S. forces	$150m	$300m
10.	April 5, 2026	HH-60W	1	Rescue operation; precise site unknown	Iran	Damaged	$50m	$50m
11.	April 4, 2026	MQ-4C	1	Persian Gulf, near the Strait of Hormuz	International waters	Crashed; classified as a Class A aviation mishap	$150m	$150m
12.	May 31, 2026	MQ-1	1	Location undisclosed	Unknown	Reportedly shot down	See Note 1 below	
13.	By August 13, 2026	MQ-9	45	Multiple locations; not individually listed	Multiple	Aggregate losses; cause/site varies	$30m	$1,350m
14.	September 9–10, 2026	F-15E	8	Muwaffaq Salti Air Base	Jordan	Light damage; returned to service	$100m	$800m
15.	September 8, 2026	A-10 Thunderbolt II	1	Muwaffaq Salti Air Base	Jordan	Severely damaged, lost a wing; destruction not officially confirmed	$120m	$120m
16.	September 7, 2026	MQ-1	2	Location undisclosed	Unknown	Reportedly shot down	See Note 1 below	
17.	June 8, 2026	AH-64 Apache	1	Strait of Hormuz	Maritime	Shot down	$40m	$40m

18.	September 14, 2026	AH-6	4	Rescue site undisclosed	Unknown	Destroyed by U.S. forces	—	—
19.	September 14, 2026	MH-60	1	Arabian Sea	Maritime	Crashed	—	—
	TOTAL		**81**	**—**	**—**	**—**	**—**	**$5.14bn**

Table 99 presents a consolidated record of 81 U.S. military aircraft reported destroyed, lost, or damaged across 19 incident entries between March and September 2026. Of these, 73 aircraft have corresponding CBO reference unit values, producing a combined illustrative valuation of $5.14 billion, while eight aircraft remain unpriced due to the absence of sufficiently comparable model-specific benchmarks. The records include combat losses, damage sustained during attacks on military bases, aviation accidents, and aircraft deliberately destroyed by U.S. forces.

The following examines each incident individually, distinguishing its circumstances, reported damage, and relationship to the wider conflict.

Accident 1: Iran did not destroy an **F-15E Strike Eagle** in Kuwaiti airspace; instead, three U.S. F-15E fighter jets were mistakenly shot down over Kuwait in what they labeled as a " friendly-fire" incident by Kuwaiti air defenses (specifically involving a Kuwaiti F/A-18 Hornet) on March 2, 2026, during active combat against Iranian aerial incursions.

Accident 2: A U.S. **KC-135** crashed in western Iraq during military operations. The incident was reported as an aviation accident rather than an attack on an air base.

Accident 3: On 12 March 2026, a U.S. **KC-135R** Stratotanker sustained significant tail damage during an in-flight incident involving another KC-135 over the region. Flight-tracking reports identified the aircraft as 63-8017; it declared an emergency and landed at Ben Gurion International Airport in Israel.

Accident 4: Five U.S. **KC-135 refuelling** aircraft were reportedly damaged on the ground during an Iranian attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

Accident 5: On March 19, 2026, a **U.S. F-35A** reportedly sustained damage from Iranian ground fire during a combat mission over Iran. CENTCOM confirmed that the aircraft made a safe emergency landing at a U.S. air base in the Middle East and that the pilot was in stable condition. The landing base and the extent of damage were not publicly disclosed**.**

Accident 6: A U.S. **E-3 airborne** warning and control aircraft was reportedly struck and severely damaged during an Iranian attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia.

Accident 7: A U.S. **A-10** was reportedly struck by Iranian fire during military operations and subsequently crashed. The pilot ejected, and the incident occurred away from a military base.

Accident 8: One U.S. **F-15E** Strike Eagle was shot down during combat operations over Iran. The aircraft was destroyed in flight, and the incident was not associated with an attack on a military base.

Accident 9: Two U.S. **MC-130J aircraft** were reportedly destroyed by U.S. forces at a temporary landing site in Iran during a personnel recovery operation.

Accident 10: During the recovery of a downed **U.S. F-15E** pilot inside Iran on 3 April 2026, one HH-60W Jolly Green II helicopter sustained multiple hits from small-arms fire, causing minor injuries to crew members. The precise location of the attack and the helicopter's subsequent landing base were not publicly identified.

Accident 11: On April 9, 2026, a U.S. Navy **MQ-4C Triton** crashed during a surveillance mission over the Persian Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz. Flight-tracking data showed the aircraft descending rapidly after transmitting emergency signals. The U.S. Naval Safety Command confirmed the loss on April 14 but withheld the precise crash location. The cause of the incident has not been publicly established.

Accident 12: An **MQ-1 unmanned aircraft** was reportedly shot down during operations involving Iran. The precise loss location was not established in the cited account.

Accident 13: By August 13, 2026, at least 45 U.S. **MQ-9 Reaper drones** had reportedly been lost during the conflict. Four additional MQ-9 shootdowns were reported between August 14 and September 16, bringing the potential cumulative total to at least 49 aircraft. However, not all of these additional incidents have been independently verified, and the precise locations and circumstances of several losses remain unclear.

Accident 14: Eight U.S. **F-15E Strike Eagles** were reportedly lightly damaged during an Iranian attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. The aircraft subsequently returned to service and were not reported destroyed.

Accident 15: A U.S. A-10 was reportedly severely damaged during an Iranian attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, reportedly losing a wing. Its final repairability or whether it was destroyed remains unconfirmed.

Accident 16: Two additional **MQ-1 unmanned aircraft** were reportedly shot down during operations involving Iran. Their individual loss locations were not specified.

Accident 17: A U.S. **AH-64 helicopter** was reportedly shot down over the Strait of Hormuz. The loss occurred during flight rather than at a military base.

Accident18: Four U.S. **AH-6 helicopters** were reportedly destroyed by U.S. forces during recovery operations. The precise location requires further confirmation.

Accident 19: One U.S. **MQ-9** was reportedly destroyed and another seriously damaged at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait following an incident involving intercepted missile debris.

Note1: MQ-1 Valuation Note: Recent U.S. government budget documents provide procurement figures for the MQ-1C Gray Eagle, including approximately $30 million per aircraft based on proposed FY2025 funding. However, these figures should not be applied to aircraft identified only as MQ-1 without confirmation of the variant. The MQ-1B Predator was retired from U.S. Air Force service in 2018, and the available FY2026 budget does not establish a comparable new-aircraft unit price for that model.

Explanation of Table 1:

- The CRS incident count sums to 81;
- Exactly 73 aircraft have matching CBO model-level unit benchmarks; 8 do not (three MQ-1, four AH-6 and one MH-60).
- The $5.140 billion subtotal is a mechanical reference-value calculation, not verified expenditure or physical damage;
- It includes 45 MQ-9 aircraft at $30 million each and eight lightly damaged F-15Es at their full $100 million benchmark;
- These two choices illustrate why the figure must not be called a damage total. CBO lists MH-6, not AH-6, at $18 million; this report does not silently substitute variants.

13.2. Additional Aircraft Incidents and Estimated Values

In addition to the aircraft losses and damage documented in the preceding table, Table 100 presents four additional reported incidents involving seven U.S. military aircraft that were not included in the CRS report. Their combined illustrative reference value is approximately $312 million. However, the extent of damage, aircraft variants, and circumstances of several incidents remain unverified. These estimates are therefore presented separately and should not be treated as confirmed additional losses.

Table 100: Additional Reported U.S. Aircraft Incidents Not Included in the CRS Report

No.	Date	Type	No.	Base/Incident Location	Country	Damage / Status	Unit Value	Total Value
20.	March 23–25, 2026	HH-60M Black Hawk	1	Victory Base Complex	Iraq	Targeted by FPV drone; damage unconfirmed	~$33m	~$33m
21.	April 3-4, 2026	CH-47F Chinook	1	Camp Buehring	Kuwait	Reportedly severely damaged; verification pending	~$70m	~$70m
22.	April 4, 2026	CH-53 (variant unconfirmed)	1	Ali Al Salem Air Base	Kuwait	Reportedly damaged or destroyed; variant and damage unconfirmed	~$77m	~$77m

23.	After September 10, 2026	H-60 family (variant unconfirmed)	4	Undisclosed locations	Unknow	Four helicopters reportedly hit; individual details unverified	~$33m	~$132m
	TOTAL		**7**					**~$312m**

Table 100 identifies four additional reported incidents involving seven U.S. military helicopters, with a combined illustrative reference value of approximately $312 million. The estimates are based on available procurement benchmarks and provisional aircraft-type assumptions, particularly where the precise helicopter variant remains unidentified. As the reported damage has not been independently established in several cases, these figures should not be interpreted as confirmed financial losses or replacement costs. The following valuation notes explain the benchmarks, assumptions, and limitations associated with each estimate.

Accident 20: HH-60M / H-60: An estimated unit value of **$33 million** was adopted based on the average procurement cost of the UH-60M Black Hawk in the U.S. Army's FY2025 aircraft procurement budget. This figure is an approximate reference value, not a confirmed procurement price for each helicopter variant.

Accident 21: CH-47F Chinook: An estimated unit value of **$70 million** was derived from the FY2025 U.S. Army procurement budget for CH-47 helicopters. This estimate is based on programme-level procurement allocations and may include expenditures beyond the aircraft itself.

Accident 22: CH-53: An estimated unit value of **$77 million** was adopted provisionally, assuming the helicopter was a CH-53E Super Stallion. This is a non-governmental estimate adjusted approximately to 2025 values. We did not apply the substantially higher procurement cost of the newer CH-53K because the aircraft variant has not been confirmed.

Accident 23: Estimated Total Value: The combined estimated value of **$312 million** represents the reference value of all seven helicopters, not the actual financial losses or repair costs. Some helicopters may have sustained only limited damage, while damage to others remains unconfirmed.

Accident 24: Valuation Limitations: The CH-53 estimate is conditional on confirmation of the CH-53E variant. Similarly, the estimated value assigned to the four unidentified H-60 helicopters assumes costs comparable to the UH-60M. These estimates should be revised if more precise aircraft identification or official procurement information becomes available.

13.3. Summary of Estimated U.S. Aircraft Losses and Damage

Table 101:Summary of Estimated U.S. Aircraft Losses and Damage

Table No.	Table Title	Number of Aircraft	Estimated Reference Value (USD Million)	Estimated Reference Value (USD Billion)
99	Consolidated U.S. Aircraft Losses and Damage (CRS/CBO Reference Values)	81	$5,140	$5.140
1100	Additional Reported U.S. Aircraft Incidents Not Included in the CRS Report	7	$312	$0.312
Total	**Combined Aircraft Losses and Damage**	**88**	**$5,452**	**$5.452**

Note. The combined estimated reference value of $5.452 billion represents the full unit values of aircraft reported as destroyed, damaged, or potentially affected, rather than confirmed financial losses. Some aircraft sustained repairable damage, while others lack independent confirmation of damage. Aircraft without available unit valuations are included in the aircraft count but excluded from the financial total. Potential overlap between incidents should be reviewed before treating the combined figure as a consolidated estimate of losses.

14.Overall Findings and Conclusions

The findings of this report demonstrate one small part of the military, financial, and civilian consequences of the 2026 U.S.–Israeli war against Iran. Across ten geographical assessments, the report documents 609 incident records involving military installations, civilian infrastructure, and missile or drone activity. These include verified attacks, reported damage, military claims, and interceptions; they do not represent 609 independently confirmed attacks. Repeated incidents affected U.S. military bases and associated infrastructure across the region. Reported targets included aircraft hangars, radar systems, air-defence equipment, fuel storage, accommodation buildings, and command facilities. The distribution of these incidents illustrates how military confrontation extended beyond the principal belligerents into countries hosting foreign military infrastructure. Nevertheless, the available evidence differs substantially between locations, and a reported attack does not necessarily establish damage to a particular asset.

The separate aircraft assessment covers 88 U.S. military aircraft across 23 incident records, with a combined illustrative reference value of approximately $5.452 billion. These records include destroyed aircraft, crashes, repairable damage, and additional incidents that remain incompletely verified. Country assessments likewise identify substantial replacement values for selected installations. None of these figures should be interpreted as equivalent confirmed financial losses. They reflect hypothetical full replacement values, sometimes for assets whose condition, specifications, or exposure remain uncertain.

The valuation exercise also reveals important limitations in public information about wartime losses. Procurement prices and construction benchmarks come from different years and may include different equipment, services, or contractual arrangements. Repeated reports about the same facility can create potential overlap, while the full value of an aircraft or air-defence system can greatly exceed the cost of repairing observed damage. Transparent assumptions and careful separation of incident counts, asset values, and actual losses are therefore essential.

Civilian consequences were documented alongside military incidents. Residential buildings, hotels, airports, ports, energy facilities, telecommunications networks, and other infrastructure appeared in the incident records. Damage and disruption to such facilities can affect livelihoods, mobility, public services, and access to essential resources. Civilian casualties and longer-term social consequences cannot be meaningfully captured by military replacement-cost calculations. Nor should damage to civilian or host-country facilities automatically be classified as a U.S. military loss.

The findings further highlight the relationship between overseas military deployments and risks to surrounding communities. Bases frequently depend on transport, energy, communications, and commercial infrastructure, sometimes situated near populated areas. During regional escalation, attacks and interception debris can therefore create consequences beyond the intended military target. This does not establish that every installation experienced the same risks, but it demonstrates why civilian exposure must remain central to assessments of military conflict.

Overall, the report offers a documented, qualified account of assets exposed to attack rather than a definitive accounting of wartime expenditure. Its findings support stronger transparency in military reporting, independent verification of damage, and scrutiny of the financial commitments associated with overseas deployments.

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