By Tamara Latjman, Anibal García, Silvina Romano, World BEYOND War, November 15, 2025
With the November 16 referendum just days away, the geopolitical dimension of lawfare in Ecuador is becoming clear. The judicial persecution of the leaders of the Citizen Revolution cannot be understood solely as an internal political conflict: it is part of a broader strategy associated with the reproduction of center-periphery asymmetries. In Ecuador, this process has resulted in indebtedness, the sale of the country to the IMF and debt holders, deindustrialization, insecurity, and even the erosion of the idea of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace.
The referendum includes a crucial question on the amendment of Article 5 of the Constitution, which prohibits the installation of foreign military bases on Ecuadorian territory since the closure of the Manta base in 2008. This article reflects the sovereign decision to consider Ecuador—and, by extension, Latin America and the Caribbean—a territory of peace.
All of this is taking place in a context of profound militarization of the Greater Caribbean, accelerated during the Trump administration but embedded in a hemispheric security strategy that, with nuances but without ruptures, has operated as one of the most stable guidelines of US foreign policy toward the region for decades, under both Democratic and Republican administrations. Under the guise of combating drug trafficking or “narco-terrorism,” the United States has increased its forward operational presence in the Greater Caribbean and the eastern tropical Pacific; however, in reality, this expansion is part of a strategy of deterrence and containment against China.
This web of judicialization, intervention in the judicial system, and security forces is driven by a series of geopolitical interests that are often overlooked in analyses focused solely on the domestic impact of the judicialization of politics. However, it is these interests that allow us to understand the magnitude of recent transformations and the role that Ecuador has come to play in the reconfiguration of the regional security landscape.
In recent academic research, we showed how the strengthening of institutional ties between Ecuador and the US security apparatus during the Moreno, Lasso, and Noboa administrations has turned the country into a kind of “extended base” for Washington. This is evident in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which grants immunity to US military personnel and Pentagon contractors, and the Agreement on Operations against Transnational Maritime Activities (SHIPRIDER). Both were signed by Lasso and ratified by Noboa in February 2025, consolidating a legal framework that enables the presence and action of US forces on Ecuadorian territory. Added to this is the exorbitant increase in military and security assistance in recent years—from just $800,000 in 2017 to a peak of $172 million in 2022—as well as the signing of new agreements with agencies such as the DEA and INL, and even with mercenaries and private security companies linked to Erik Prince/Blackwater.
This has created a scenario of deep integration between the Ecuadorian security apparatus and the US military architecture, with direct consequences for the country’s sovereignty and security policy.
In this context, the Galapagos Islands take on a central role. Ecuador, due to its geostrategic location, becomes a priority for the US strategy in the context of its dispute with China. In an interview with CNN, President Daniel Noboa acknowledged interest in establishing a military base in Baltra, although it was later renamed a “non-military base” intended to combat illegal fishing and drug trafficking, or there was talk of Homeland Security facilities in Salinas or Manta. Beyond these variations in official rhetoric, the fact is that formal conditions exist for the entry of US military personnel into Ecuador and the Galápagos in particular.
The evidence is recent and explicit. In December 2024, the Ecuadorian government approved the resolution for the “Comprehensive Security Project in the Insular Region” and its implementation guidelines, activating military cooperation agreements with the United States, SOFA and SHIPRIDER, previously mentioned to enable the installation of US military personnel, ships, aircraft, submarines, and weapons in the archipelago for operations against “illicit transnational maritime activities.” For their part, the US military has directly expressed, in a recent publication of Military Review, its interest in establishing a base in the Galapagos to counter China and Russia.
The United States’ interests in the Galapagos are not new. In 1911, Washington attempted to lease the archipelago for 99 years. In 1942, it built the Baltra air base and deployed 2,474 troops during World War II. The strategic importance of the archipelago is historic and spans different moments in the international order.
Currently, the Galapagos serve a dual purpose for US interests: offensive and defensive. From there, it is possible to provide military coverage for Mesoamerica and Mexico’s new Trans-Isthmus Corridor, the Panama Canal, and the Port of Chancay in Peru, a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. At the same time, the archipelago operates as a complementary—albeit unofficial—extension of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) and the Indo-Pacific Strategy, connecting the eastern Pacific with the security architecture designed to deter China.
Ecuador and the US security polygon in the Asia-Pacific
Fuente: Lajtman, García Fernández y Romano (2025)
The referendum on the installation of military bases, in this sense, is not an isolated episode, but rather a turning point in Ecuador’s deep integration into the United States’ security strategy. The combination of lawfare, militarization, and constitutional reforms opens the door to the consolidation of a subordinate role in the regional geopolitical framework, weakening sovereignty in a scenario of imminent conventional war in the Greater Caribbean.
A Días Del Referéndum En Ecuador
Por: Tamara Latjman, Anibal García, Silvina Romano, 15 de noviembre de 2025
A días del referéndum del 16 de noviembre, la dimensión geopolítica del lawfare en Ecuador emerge con claridad. La persecución judicial contra los líderes de la Revolución Ciudadana no puede entenderse solo como un conflicto de política interna: forma parte de una estrategia más amplia asociada a la reproducción de asimetrías centro–periferia. En Ecuador, este proceso se ha traducido en endeudamiento, venta del país al FMI y a tenedores de deuda, desindustrialización, inseguridad, y en la erosión incluso de la idea de América Latina y el Caribe como una zona de paz.
En la actualidad, las Galápagos cumplen una doble función para los intereses estadounidenses: ofensiva y defensiva. Desde allí se puede cubrir militarmente Mesoamérica y el nuevo Corredor Transístmico de México, el Canal de Panamá y el Puerto de Chancay en Perú, una pieza clave de la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta de China. Al mismo tiempo, el archipiélago opera como una extensión complementaria —aunque no oficial— del Diálogo de Seguridad Cuadrilateral (QUAD) y de la Estrategia del Indo-Pacífico, conectando el Pacífico oriental con la arquitectura de seguridad diseñada para disuadir a China.
